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I have been torn between the natural sciences and humanities for a long 
time. In fact, this book has probably been in the works since the day I sent 
in my acceptance to pursue a doctoral degree in molecular biology and 
reproductive neuroendocrinology. By accepting that admissions offer 
and extremely rewarding academic path, I declined an offer from an envi-
ron mental studies program where my plan was to study bioethics, environ-
mental justice, and women’s reproductive health movements. At my side 
while I made this difficult decision about my academic trajectory was a 
cadre of feminists who encouraged me to stay in the “hard” sciences, to 
become a feminist scientist, to learn the science that was being used to 
dev elop new reproductive and genetic technologies, and to participate 
in the creation of scientific knowledge. A long time coming, this book is a 
direct result of that encouragement. 
At any given point in my intellectual journey, I have been unbelievably 
fortunate to have many generous feminist mentors at my side. Several of 
them welcomed me into their midst while I was just an undergraduate 
student studying microbiology. Laura Sky introduced me to some of the 
most fierce and eloquent scholar-activists I have ever come across, includ-
ing Shree Mulay, Karen Messing, Sunera Thobani, and Elizabeth Abergel. 
As a master’s student studying in a cancer biology lab at McMaster Uni-
versity, my supervisor Andrew Rainbow supported my interdisciplinary 
tendencies; when I had finished required course work in genetics and 
radiobiology, he encouraged me to take a directed reading course in the 
philosophy department. For this opportunity, I am forever grateful. 
Through this course, Elizabeth Boetzkes introduced me to the work of 
Sandra Harding, Helen Longino, Nancy Tuana, Alison Wylie, and Joseph 
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of Toronto. I am thankful to my supervisor, Denise D. Belsham, for shar-
ing her scientific curiosity and her love of molecular biology research 
with me. I am grateful to Neil MacLusky, Ted Brown, and Bernardo Yusta 
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the same for my own students. Through Margrit I was invited to join the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council–funded group Biology 
As If the World Matters (BAITWorM), where Linda Muzzin and the late 
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research can go hand in hand.
This brief exposure to the field of feminist science studies and my 
participation in a science and social justice organization made me take a 
gamble and apply for a tenure-track position in a women’s studies depart-
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Anne Donadey, Doreen Mattingly, Oliva Espin, Esther Rothblum, Bonnie 
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To be present at the dawn of the world. Such is the link between 
imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and impersonality—the three 
 virtues. To reduce oneself to an abstract line, a trait, in order to  
find one’s zone of indiscernibility with other traits, and in this way 
enter the haecceity and impersonality of the creator. One is then like 
grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything, into a becom-
ing, because one has made a necessarily communicating world, because 
one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents us from slip-
ping between things and growing in the midst of things. One has 
combined “everything” (le “tout”): the indefinite article, the infinitive- 
becoming, and the proper name to which one is reduced.
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari
stolon (runner): (i). A modified aboveground stem creeping and 
rooting at the nodes. (ii). It is an aerial shoot from a plant with the 
ability to produce adventitious roots and new clones of the same 
plant. Such plants are called stoloniferous. A stolon is a plant propa-
gation strategy akin to a rhizome.
—Dinesh Kumar and Yashbir Singh Shivay
A few years back, a severe rainstorm brought down a mighty oak tree in 
my neighbor’s backyard. The tree fell toward my house, with the top 
branches just scraping the roof above the bedroom where I slept. I’ve had 
several tree encounters in my life—from climbing trees as a child, to plant-
ing saplings as a girl scout, to walking through the mighty trunk of an 
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ancient redwood in California. This particular tree encounter, however, 
was the first one that nearly ended my life. Despite this near-death 
encounter, I would not say that I am over trees, or even “tired of trees” as 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s statement is often understood.1 I’ve 
been around long enough to know that trees, like humans, have to live 
and die too. Interestingly, the event that was this tree spurred another 
very curious event that taught me a great deal.
The day the tree fell, I was in shock. This shock turned into immense 
awe as I watched countless animals and insects scurry in and out of the 
tree’s topmost branches, which were now at my eye level. Had the tree 
trunk not been in imperceptible relationships with several different spe-
cies of ants over a sixty- to seventy-year period, it would not have been 
hollowed by rot, too weak to withstand the wind gust that brought it down 
that day. It is not often that one has the opportunity to get up close to the 
leaves, branches, insects, and other tree becomings that generally tran-
spire five to ten stories above ground. As much as they were opposed to 
arboreal thought, Deleuze and Guattari were also fully aware of such tree 
becomings. They stated: “A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, 
the hollow of a root, the crook of a branch. Or else it is a microscopic ele-
ment of the root-tree, a radicle, that gets rhizome production going.”2 
Indeed, by way of this fallen tree, I was brought into a new intimate rela-
tionship with grass, made keenly aware of the strategies used by grass 
stolons to grow and remake the world.
Removing the massive tree trunk and enormous branches from my 
backyard took several days, but once these were gone, I realized that prac-
tically all of the grass that had been growing, where the tree had fallen, 
was also gone. This tree may have deterritorialized when it was cut into 
hundreds of small pieces and removed from the yard, but the microscopic 
element of its root-tree made its way known through the remaining blades 
of grass that lay crushed upon my lawn. The easy answer would have been 
to lay down new sod. For several reasons (one of which was most certainly 
financial) I didn’t want to replace the grass that had been destroyed, at 
least not immediately. I had a sense that the ground should have some 
time to recover from the blow, but more important I did not want to erase 
the event that was that tree so quickly.
By opening myself up to the route of least interference, I witnessed, 
over three full years, the slow processes of stolonic growth in a species of 
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everyday backyard Bermuda grass. I literally spent time watching grass 
grow. I witnessed, as Dinesh Kumar and Yashbir Singh Shivay explain in 
their definition of a stolon, how creeping grasses spread not by a rhizom-
atic root system that is underground and generally invisible to human 
senses but rather by the stolonic processes of developing new shoots and 
extending horizontal stems that grow above ground.3 Over time, I became 
captivated with the outwardly stretching veins that ran along the surface 
of the ground, constantly reaching out, in search of connections, feeling 
around. This is how I realized that grass has a strategy that works. This 
strategy is one of becoming, and as Deleuze and Guattari write, this strat-
egy works at making a communicating world. 
I use a similar strategy throughout this book to think more carefully 
about new connections and communications that can emerge between 
molecular biology and feminism. My hope is to show that by thinking 
with molecular feminisms, biophilosophies of becoming, and microphysiologies 
of desire, we can see that biology and biological processes need not be essen-
tializing or deterministic. As a feminist scientist trained in molecular 
biology and reproductive neuroendocrinology, I often wonder what knowl-
edges we as feminists might have created by now if we weren’t constantly 
having to spend our time and energy producing counterclaims to essen-
tializing or deterministic language, paradigms, and experimental designs 
in the biological sciences. What if we were able to use, as Audre Lorde 
suggested years ago, our “power of the erotic” to think about science, biol-
ogy, and molecular biology?4 By the term “erotic,” Lorde was referring to 
the potential, desires, and creative forces that lie within us to create 
change. Angie Willey has recently drawn from Lorde’s work to introduce 
the idea of “biopossibilities” and to encourage us to think differently about 
bodies and biologies.5 
Can biopossibilities and the playfulness that comes with powers of 
the erotic change how we approach bodies and matter in the lab? Would 
feminists be more willing to “do biology” if we knew from the start that 
the outcomes of our research would not bind us to an unwelcome fate? 
What if, after all, anatomy was not our entire destiny but was indeed 
involved in the emergent and expressive processes of life forms in all their 
becomings? What if biological reductionism was not seen as an end to 
scientific knowledge but instead as a means to connect more intimately 
to the multiple microscopic and molecular material actants that make up 
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the world within and around us? What if learning how to see the world 
was also about learning how to encounter that world? By using strategies 
inspired by grass, and by extending stolonic runners between new and old 
feminist engagements with science, I hope we will be able to think anew. 
What is at stake here is relevant to scholars in both the biological sciences 
and the humanities. It is the chance to learn how to approach bodies and 
matter through new lines of flight and to embrace the erotic possibilities 
and capacities that come with becoming a blade of grass.
Early in my scientific training, I conducted a series of lab experiments 
that inspired me to think about questions that lie smack-dab at the inter-
sections between feminism, biology, and philosophy. I did my doctoral 
research in a molecular biology and reproductive neuroendocrinology lab 
that studies the molecular mechanisms of steroid regulation in an in vitro 
cell line of specialized hypothalamic neurons.6 The goal of my research 
project was to further characterize these hypothalamic gonadotropin-
releasing hormone (GnRH) neurons to better understand their role in the 
regulation of reproduction. One of the first experiments I contributed to 
involved applying molecular biology techniques to search for estrogen 
receptor gene expression and protein synthesis in these neurons.7 Before 
I share more on this particular experiment, however, I want to point out 
the importance of learning the everyday nitty-gritty practices of experi-
mentation in molecular biology and the impact that these practices have 
had on my development as a feminist scientist. 
Throughout this book I emphasize the importance of developing prac-
tice-oriented approaches for feminist science and technology studies 
(STS). Perhaps driven by their background and training in the sciences, 
such feminist sc holars as Donna Haraway, Isabelle Stengers, and Karen 
Barad have long highlighted the importance of these approaches.8 Through 
her concept of cosmopolitics, for instance, Stengers has suggested that an 
emphasis on practices allows us to learn how to engage with and not sim-
ply judge a knowledge system that is not our own.9 This shift from focusing 
on the construction of theories in science, to developing a better apprecia-
tion for experimental practices in science that can contribute to theory-
making, is now a cornerstone of STS scholarship, perhaps best articulated 
by Ian Hacking, who has suggested that “experimentation has a life of its 
own.”10 I have tried to capture the erotic potential that lies within the life 
of experimentation, and by participating in this life I have gained a sense 
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of what Deleuze and Guattari meant by reducing oneself to an abstract 
line and finding a zone of indiscernibility with other traits. Discussing the 
research techniques of protein modelers, Natasha Myers has recently 
stated that “modelers, it turns out, cultivate intimate relationships with 
their molecules as they get themselves caught up in the involving work of 
molecular visualization.”11 In my case, training in a molecular biology lab 
has led me to create intimate relationships and zones of indiscernibility 
not only with molecules but also with many other traits, including femi-
nist activism, feminist theory, reproductive justice movements, neurons, 
genes, steroid receptors, steroids, signaling pathways, and philosophies 
of becoming.
The Life of an Experiment
At the beginning of my doctoral work, I had the opportunity to find new 
forms of communication between GnRH neurons, estrogen receptors 
(ERs), and estrogen molecules. The molecular biology techniques I was 
required to learn in order to conduct my experiments taught me how to 
face the lab bench, how to form experimental togetherness around shared 
objects of perplexity, and how to “break bread” as it were with my scientific 
peers and colleagues in the lab.12 I longed to create new zones of proximity 
between molecules and my own feminist political landscapes by examin-
ing a biological interaction and process that had been marginalized in the 
sciences but was relevant to both molecular neuroendocrinology and 
women’s reproductive health. Thus, my excitement when one of my first 
experimental research tasks involved searching for the expression of 
estrogen receptor genes and the synthesis of estrogen receptor alpha (ERα) 
and estrogen receptor beta (ERβ) proteins in an in vitro cell line model 
of GnRH neurons called GTI-7 cells.13 GnRH is known to be a central hor-
mone of the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal (HPG) axis. It helps to regu-
late the synthesis and secretion of luteinizing hormone and follicle 
stimulating hormone in the pituitary gland and androgen and estrogen 
in the gonads.14 I was tasked with investigating the possibility for direct 
feedback regulation of GnRH gene expression and synthesis by the 
gonadal hormone estrogen. 
Estrogen of course is involved in much more than just the processes of 
reproduction, including the fusion of long bone epiphyses, the suppression 
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of osteoclast activity, and providing direct protective effects against ath-
erosclerosis.15 Although estrogens are synthesized primarily in the gonads, 
they are also synthesized in extra-gonadal sites and are known to play an 
important role in coordinating regulatory effects in adipose tissue, skin, 
the immune system, and more.16 My doctoral supervisor at the University 
of Toronto, Denise D. Belsham, was interested primarily in examining the 
role of estrogen in the brain in its reproductive capacity. Estrogen is a very 
interesting hormone in this respect, as it has been shown to negatively 
regulate GnRH synthesis but is also necessary to induce the preovulatory 
surge of GnRH during the menstrual cycle.17 One would imagine therefore 
that estrogen would have something to do with the regulation of repro-
duction at the level of the brain. The research we conducted would almost 
be considered unnecessary if it were not for the fact that experts in the 
field had for decades declared that GnRH neurons did not express the 
proper nuclear protein receptors that bind to estrogen. Thus the working 
premise in the field, and the belief held by most neuroendocrinologists at 
the time, was that GnRH neurons could not be directly affected by estro-
gen. Instead, interneurons contacting GnRH neurons were thought to be 
responsible for mediating the effects of estrogen and other gonadal ste-
roids on GnRH synthesis and secretion.18
This is what I was up against when I started my doctoral research. I was 
working athwart to expert knowledge in reproductive neuroendocrinology 
that was unconvinced of a trait (that of a relationship between estrogen 
receptors and GnRH neurons) and unwilling or uninterested in spending 
time designing experiments to recognize new zones of indiscernibility. 
They dismissed this possibility because they could not imagine what estro-
gen would be doing in this part of the brain. The long-held belief that 
GnRH neurons functioned without experiencing direct contact by estro-
gen had resulted in a scientific milieu where novel relations between cer-
tain molecules had become inconceivable, and desires for creating fresh 
zones of proximity were cast aside. At the time, estrogen receptor research 
was of particular interest because these receptors had just been reported 
to behave in a manner that destabilized a dominant or “majoritarian” 
paradigm in neuroendocrinology. Estrogen receptors were traditionally 
thought to come in only one form. For a long time the field of endocrinol-
ogy was not aware of the possibility that more than one type of estrogen 
receptor could exist. However, just before I started my research, the stable 
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unitary identity of the estrogen receptor was displaced by the discovery 
of another nuclear receptor that bound to estrogen.19 
This caused a minor endocrinological skirmish in its day, forcing estro-
gen receptors to be reclassified as either estrogen receptor-alpha (ERα, the 
“original” estrogen receptor) or estrogen receptor-beta (ERβ, the “other” 
estrogen receptor). I began my nomadic wanderings in search of estrogen 
receptors in the in vitro model of GnRH neurons, moving in and out of Petri 
dishes, in the shadows of transgenic politics, surrounded by scandals of 
scientific authority, exposed to the gender, race, and class dynamics of 
scientists in the laboratory, and faced with the anxiety of protein otherness 
on many different scales—basically a day in the life of a feminist scientist. 
All this was worth it, however, because I knew that by participating in the 
production of scientific knowledge on the body, I would have a chance to 
bring together feminist politics and marginalized or “minor” literatures in 
neuroendocrinology to form new lines of inquiry. Many scientists as well 
as feminist health activists have suspected for some time that estrogens 
present in hormone-based therapies and reproductive technologies may be 
doing more than simply managing the symptoms of menopause or reg u-
lating ovulation. I was excited to participate in the production of scientific 
knowledge that examined the possible direct neurological impacts of estro-
gen and could perhaps help to address some concerns around the design 
and use of estrogen-based hormonal contraceptives, hormone replacement 
therapies, and new reproductive and genetic technologies. 
I recall the excitement that my colleagues and I shared when we first 
searched for estrogen receptors. We used molecular biology techniques 
such as subcloning and sequencing to find the genes for ERα and ERβ. We 
then carried out reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) 
experiments on in vitro GnRH neurons, in search of ER cDNA (comple-
mentary DNA). The idea was to show that the transcription and transla-
tion of these genes ultimately led to the expression of ER proteins in 
GnRH neurons. Not only did we find ERα cDNA coding for the gonadal 
hormone receptor that had been excluded from the mind’s eye of neuro-
endocrinologists, but we also found ERα’s other, ERβ.20 We went on to con-
duct more molecular biology experiments such as Western blot analysis, 
to search for the expression of ERα and ERβ proteins. Both were found 
easily. Our results proved not only that GnRH neurons express estrogen 
receptors but that these receptors directly repress GnRH synthesis in these 
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neurons. The life of these experiments set me onto a new line of flight and 
onto a series of interdisciplinary inquiries that continue to motivate me 
to this day. I faced and overcame scientific authority that had stacked the 
odds against this research and against the ability of estrogen and GnRH 
neurons to form more intimate zones of proximity. Although I did not 
have the vocabulary at the time to express myself in this way, I knew that 
I had witnessed a kind of ontological rupture that had moved my under-
standing of matter from one of fixity, stasis, and being to that of flexibility, 
change, and becoming. It was as if one night I had gone to bed with a 
materiality in which estrogen receptors could not be brought into closer 
proximity to GnRH neurons. The next morning, I woke up to an alternate 
materiality with new sites of play and unexplored biopossibilities for these 
biological matters.
Since I conducted these initial experiments, there has been even more 
reason to see that biologies are not fixed and to appreciate the value of 
moving toward playfulness and the power of the erotic in our search for 
biological knowledges. It has been further reported, for instance, that ERβ 
actually comes in not one but four different orientations or isoforms, 
including ER-β1 as well as ER-β2, ER-β4, and ER-β5.21 A third type of estro-
gen receptor has also been isolated, known as GPER1 (also referred to as 
GPR30).22 What is fascinating about this particular estrogen receptor is 
that it is a G protein-coupled transmembrane receptor (GPCR) and not 
a traditional nuclear steroid receptor. In GnRH neurons, which have been 
found to express this GPCR, this means that estrogen not only regulates 
nuclear transcription mechanisms, which happen on a timescale of hours, 
but that estrogen is also capable of eliciting rapid excitatory membrane-
initiated actions, which can take effect within seconds to minutes. This 
membrane-bound estrogen receptor can directly modify GnRH neuronal 
activity and can trigger several different signal transduction pathways 
that are not affected by the traditional ERs that act as nuclear transcrip-
tion factors.23 Once again, this discovery of membrane estrogen receptors 
may be of particular interest to feminist health and reproductive justice 
advocates, as rapid and direct effects of estrogen can help to explain the 
long-observed “side effects” that many women experience while using 
estrogen-based contraceptives and therapies. The discovery of ERs in 
GnRH neurons, and the further discovery of G-protein coupled estrogen 
receptors in both GnRH neurons and other tissues throughout the body, 
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serve as opportunities for feminists and molecular biologists to reach 
toward not just one but several shared objects of perplexity.
The life of this particular lab experiment continues to shape my efforts 
in theory-making. Beginning with my efforts as a scientist trying to 
become a feminist scientist, to a feminist scientist trying to become a 
women’s studies scholar, this lab experiment has encouraged me to slip 
and grow in the midst of many disparate fields and has extended itself 
into an immensely productive experiment in interdisciplinary scholarship. 
It has provided me with the impulse to bring together scholarship that is 
typically separated by disciplinary distinctions such as the humanities and 
sciences, as well as by cultural distinctions such as concepts of the East 
and the West. Molecular Feminisms was written with several different audi-
ences in mind. In addition to joining some ongoing conversations in the 
fields of feminist theory, postcolonial and decolonial studies, posthuman-
ism, new materialisms, and science and technology studies (STS), this 
book hopes to provide a reflective space for both feminist scientists who 
wish to participate in bench research and the production of scientific 
knowledge as well as scientist feminists who are eager to use scientific 
research and data to inform their feminist analyses.24 The past few decades 
of work in feminist STS has prepared us for noninnocent entry into lab 
spaces and participation in the production of scientific research. However, 
rather than following the more dominant women-in-science pipeline ide-
ology, I argue that feminists might want to try to proceed in this nonin-
nocent entry by exploring less common, marginalized, or minor modes of 
engagement with the sciences. My goal is to contribute to theory-making 
by creating conceptual frameworks that can be used to approach the lab 
bench, bring scientific research and data out of the lab, and revitalize how 
we think about bodies, biologies, and matter.
As a feminist scientist, I recall my interest and excitement after learn-
ing several feminist critiques of science. These critiques were eye-opening, 
compelling, and made great sense to me. Inspired by these critiques, I 
faced the challenges of actually trying to apply feminist epistemologies 
and methodologies at the level of practices at the lab bench. This was no 
easy task. While conducting research in the lab, the feminist scientist does 
not have a great deal of spare time, or the tools for that matter, to reflect 
upon and build connections between their love of science and their com-
mitments to social justice. Facing this challenge has perhaps been the 
12 Introduction
most productive and rewarding aspect of my intellectual career. Learning 
how to articulate this challenge into questions that make sense to both 
feminists and scientists has been an experiment in itself. 
The scientist feminist who is interested in working with the sciences 
and scientific data may also benefit from learning more about the nitty-
gritty practices of experimental biology. Recent projects have encouraged 
feminists to turn to questions of matter, and to animal, vegetal, and 
molecular bodies to develop more intimate treatments of materiality. 
Although new ontological gestures have revived feminist theory’s engage-
ments with the sciences and with biology in particular, without an effort 
to connect this theory to the theory and practices taking place at the level 
of the lab bench, these gestures run the risk of suffering a similar fate as 
that of poststructuralist feminist theory and earlier feminist critiques of 
science, which rightly or wrongly have been accused of working to restrict 
our access to the natural world. Worse still, what appears to be a growing 
tendency in some recent materialist scholarship to accept scientific knowl-
edge at face value could in fact do feminism a disservice. As a feminist 
scientist, I offer some new perspectives and tools that one might use to 
approach biology from outside the lab.
I address some big questions that both feminist scientists and scientist 
feminists may have in common. How do we continue with science after 
the critiques of science? How do we work toward a biology that we desire? 
How are we to encounter matter? How can we bring questions of context 
with us when we do encounter this matter? How can we reconfigure the 
relationship between the scientific knower and what is to become the 
known? These and other such interrogations are visited several times, in 
multiple ways, throughout Molecular Feminisms. Admittedly, some of these 
interrogations are theory-heavy and draw from larger philosophical proj-
ects, but a genuine effort is made to make them relatable to the busy bench 
scientist. I articulate these interrogations by providing examples of the 
challenges one might face while trying to practice science as a feminist or 
practice feminism as a scientist. These examples provide tools that can be 
used for going into the sciences, developing methods, presenting our 
results and data, and facing ethical dilemmas in our research.
Part of the challenge of developing an interdisciplinary experiment 
involves starting with distinct disciplinary vocabularies, even when one 
is trying to address an idea or concept shared by these different knowledge 
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systems. Building shared vocabularies takes a great deal of patience. Hav-
ing said this, I encourage humanities scholars to work through the scien-
tific experiments and data presented, and similarly I encourage scientists 
to push through the more philosophical aspects of the book. Chapter 1, 
“Biophilosophies of Becoming,” is a particularly theory-heavy chapter. 
Establishing the book’s philosophical framing, it provides tools for think-
ing about a broader conversation at the intersection of philosophy and 
science. Truly interdisciplinary work takes time, is full of failures, and can 
often leave everyone concerned unsatisfied. As excited as I am to bring 
this interdisciplinary conversation forward, I am fully aware that in my 
attempt to write a book for multiple audiences, I may have in fact written 
a book that is legible to no one, except perhaps myself—and even that is 
not guaranteed. What can I say? It’s an experiment.
Feminism, Science, and the Politics  
of Knowledge Production
Feminists have a long history of intervening in the politics of knowledge 
production in ways that are specific to their time, location, and culture. 
They have argued that such factors as one’s sex, gender, sexuality, race, 
ethnicity, class, age, abilities, location, and more influence who gets to 
conduct research, which questions generally get asked, and what knowl-
edge is ultimately produced.25 With today’s fast pace of biotechnological 
developments, feminists are aware, more than ever, of the importance of 
bringing these critical perspectives into dialog with the sciences. There are 
many different types of feminisms, and although there is overlap, each 
has its own various forms of analytics. Among the different genealogies 
of feminism, the project at hand highlights some of the distinct approaches 
that exist between what has been referred to as liberal feminisms or femi-
nisms of equality and what is often referred to as difference feminisms. 
Although these genealogies are no doubt messy and tangled, Elizabeth 
Grosz has provided an explanation of some of their distinctive features. 
“In place of the essentialist and naturalist containment of women,” she 
explains, “feminists of equality affirm women’s potential for equal intel-
ligence, ability, and social value.”26 
Grosz suggests that for many, equality feminisms are generally moti-
vated by a “logic of identification,” which is “identification with the 
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values, norms, goals, and methods devised and validated by men.”27 Alter-
natively, difference feminisms highlight women’s differences from men. 
However, as Grosz further explains, “it is vital to ask how this difference 
is conceived, and, perhaps more importantly, who it is that defines this 
difference and for whom.”28 As she notes, it is important to understand 
that for these feminists “difference is not seen as difference from a pre-
given norm, but as pure difference, difference in itself, difference with no 
identity.”29 These distinctions between feminisms of equality and femi-
nisms of difference can be understood to roughly align with the philo-
sophical and political approaches referred to respectively as “Molar” and 
“molecular” politics by Deleuzian scholars.
Following major feminist social and political interventions in the 
1960s and 1970s, which in the US context were generally aligned along 
feminism-of-equality frameworks, many feminist scholars and activists 
turned their attention to the authority, validity, and impact of scientific 
claims. These claims were examined specifically for their role in supporting 
gender-based discrimination of women within academia, the home, and 
the workplace. For example, beginning in the late 1960s, feminists in the 
women’s movement who were invested in participating in the production 
of scientific knowledge in the biological and reproductive sciences came 
together to form such groups as the Boston Women’s Health Book Collec-
tive (1969), the feminist Self Help Clinic in Los Angeles (1971), and the 
National Black Women’s Health Project (1984).30 During this era feminists 
in the United States formed these organizations and developed their own 
knowledge bases in response to, and as an alternative to, decades of 
research on women’s bodies, biology, and health that had originated from 
scientific disciplines and governmental institutions with long histories of 
excluding women and other minority groups as credible researchers and/
or policy makers.
Beginning in the early 1980s, and working mostly in the US, Canadian, 
and European contexts, feminist philosophers of science, feminist histo-
rians of science, feminist sociologists and anthropologists of science, and 
several critical scholars contributed to the efforts of disciplinary and insti-
tutional change by developing highly sophisticated critiques of traditional 
and dominant forms of scientific research.31 Many of these feminists made 
their interventions in the sciences by conducting in-depth critiques of the 
epistemological framings, methodological approaches, and language and 
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metaphors commonly used in scientific teaching, research, and publica-
tions. These modes of critique are still relevant and operational today and 
continue to serve as important sources of feminist engagement with the 
sciences, particularly within the biological and life sciences. Some key 
aspects of these feminist critiques include (1) questioning the capability 
of achieving “pure” or aperspectival objectivity; (2) interrogating the 
impact of reductionist thinking; (3) problematizing the use of binary 
 categories in the organization of observed biological and behavioral dif-
ferences; (4) pointing out essentialist assumptions in scientific theories, 
specifically those that reinforce and promote biologically deterministic 
reasoning; and (5) questioning linear logic and oversimplistic models that 
move too easily from observations of correlation to explanations of causa-
tion. Many of these feminist critiques of science were also accompanied 
by practical suggestions for the diversification and democratization of 
science, both in terms of who should have the opportunity to participate 
in the production of scientific research and which ideas should be included 
in the pursuit of evidence-based scientific knowledge.32 Put together, the 
work of early feminist health advocates and the strategies of critique 
developed by feminist academics trained in the humanities and social sci-
ences have served as crucial cornerstones in the theoretical development 
and applied practices of the field of feminist STS.
In addition to humanities and social sciences–based scholarly engage-
ments, in the early 1980s several notable feminists who were also scien-
tists began contributing to the early formations of feminist STS. They 
made their contributions by first meeting the challenge of training and 
practicing in the “hard” sciences in academic and workplace climates that 
were more often than not hostile to women. Many of these feminists went 
into the sciences because of their love of biology, physics, or chemistry, 
and after having met the material challenges of working within these dis-
ciplines, they began sharing their experiences, critiques, and informed 
calls for change. Starting in the early 1980s, many feminist scientists 
shared their hands-on experiences of living and working within the 
 sciences. They include, for instance, Margaret Benston, Evelyn Fox Keller, 
Ruth Bleier, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Lynda Birke, Sue V. Rosser, Ruth 
 Hubbard, Donna Haraway, Lesley Rogers, Ursula Franklin, Bonnie 
 Spanier, Karen Messing, Donna Mergler, and Karen Barad. Their critiques 
of the sciences, conducted from the “inside,” were not meant to shut down 
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feminist dialog with the sciences or discredit the sciences but were rather 
aimed at improving and furthering scientific knowledge in their respective 
fields.33 
Feminist biologists working during this era were well positioned to 
critically analyze research and data, at the level of basic laboratory bench 
science as well as at the level of behavioral studies conducted on animal 
and human subjects in the clinical environment. They conducted intimate 
critiques of the multiple disciplines of biology while also working with 
animals, plants, microorganisms, and other biological materials in the lab. 
Their careful analyses were produced through firsthand experiences and 
insights of the specificities associated with scientific practices such as 
experimentation, statistical analysis of data, and scientific publishing. The 
skills these feminist biologists acquired while working within the sciences 
were hard-earned and gave them a degree of legitimacy that was required 
in order to critique and comment on the state of their particular disci-
pline’s understandings of bodies, biologies, and matter. They continue to 
serve as role models for generations of feminist scientists to come, because 
rather than shying away from the challenge of training and working within 
the hard sciences, or keeping their experiences in the sciences to them-
selves, these feminists shared their thoughts and made the inner work-
ings of scientific research and knowledge production more transparent to 
others. Their efforts made it possible to know more about what one was 
getting into by signing up to become a feminist scientist.
Having said this, many of the early critiques of biological research and 
knowledge made by feminist scientists beginning in the 1980s were struc-
tured along liberal equality-based feminist frameworks. These critiques 
were in line with feminist critiques taking place at the time in humanities 
and social sciences–based disciplines such as philosophy, history, litera-
ture, political science, anthropology, and sociology. Rightly so, feminists 
during this era were primarily invested in questioning the dominant gen-
dered paradigms operating in the traditional disciplines of the humanities 
and social sciences whereby women, or traits associated with femininity, 
were deemed as being inferior to men or masculine traits. Feminist scien-
tists critiqued essentialist and deterministic modes of thinking and exper-
imentation within the sciences, largely by addressing the epistemological 
and methodological biases apparent within their own particular areas of 
scientific expertise. However, these studies did not explicitly develop 
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alternative epistemological or methodological approaches for conducting 
biological research that could be viewed as being nonessentializing or non-
deterministic. In addition, not a great deal of attention was paid to the 
ontological assumptions and implications operating within their own dis-
ciplinary frameworks.
Despite this, it is misguided to suggest that feminists who took the 
trouble to train and spend time within the natural sciences, and particu-
larly within the life sciences, did not develop their own intimate inquiries 
into the nature of matter or were not deeply aware of the importance of 
developing a feminist ethics of matter, even if that is not the vocabulary 
they used to describe their work. It is problematic to suggest that their 
critiques of scientific research were aimed at dismissing the contributions 
of bodies, biologies, and matter, or rejecting the knowledge that could be 
gained by the disciplinary fields of biology, genetics, and molecular biol-
ogy. Interestingly, a similar accusation has been brought against feminist 
theory that has been influenced by poststructuralism and cultural theory, 
and unfortunately in some cases to all of feminism in general. By return-
ing to the earlier work of feminist health advocates, women-of- color femi-
nists, feminist philosophers, historians, sociologists and anthropologists 
of science, and particularly to the accounts of feminist scientists with the 
productive generosity of generational feminisms, we can begin to view 
this important work in new ways and thereby sharpen our current analy-
ses in feminist STS.34
Much has transpired in both feminist political struggles and various 
areas of biological research since these early feminist engagements in the 
1980s. The vibrant field of feminist STS has become an integral part of 
disciplinary training in women’s studies, and for feminists who continue 
to train and practice in the sciences, feminist STS has come to serve as a 
toolbox, providing a compass from which one can navigate their own 
attempts at scientific knowledge production.35 As the importance of femi-
nist STS becomes more recognizable to scholars working in other fields, 
we are witnessing an explosion of interdisciplinary activity in an already 
interdisciplinary space. For example, feminist and queer scholars working 
at the intersections of philosophy, poststructuralist theory, cultural stud-
ies, literary studies, and psychoanalysis have also turned their attention 
to STS. They have brought with them the skills of questioning dominant 
metaphysical traditions and are imagining new ontological orientations 
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and ethical gestures that can be used to think more critically about our 
relations to matter and the world around us.36 They offer the experience 
of developing alternative frameworks for thinking about questions of dif-
ference, identity, and representation.
Many of these ontological and ethical reorientations and gestures may 
not be entirely new or unfamiliar to feminist scientists or feminist STS 
scholars. For instance, the question of the relationship between the sci-
entist and their “object” of study has been at the heart of several feminist 
reflections on science and scientific method.37 What is new is the interdis-
ciplinary and shared vocabulary that is developing around common ques-
tions related to matter, ethics, and knowledge-making practices thanks 
to the commingling of theories and vocabularies between various fields. 
Over the past decade these intellectual collaborations have led to an 
exciting burst of scholarship found in feminist STS. This long trajectory 
of feminist materialisms—starting with feminist health and reproductive 
justice activism, to early feminist critiques of science, to current-day inter-
ests in feminist theory regarding the ontological status of matter—has 
brought me to write this interdisciplinary book about feminism, molecular 
biology, and the importance of theory-making both inside and outside of 
the lab. 
Why Molecular Feminisms?
Other than my own interest in molecular biology research, and the obvi-
ous word play between “molecular biology” and “molecular politics,” what 
claim or distinction am I trying to make by turning to the molecular? 
Although I am in no way interested in dismissing current feminist STS 
projects that are aligned with women in science and feminisms-of-equality 
projects, I am invested in theory-making that can emerge from using phil-
osophical and political approaches that turn to more marginalized or 
underplayed ideas, literatures, and thinkers in both feminism and the 
sciences. What can happen at the intersections of feminism and science 
when we look to less familiar figures, both human and nonhuman, for our 
theory-making? I must admit that it is my training as a scientist (specifi-
cally as a molecular biologist), and not my interest in feminist theory, that 
first brought me to think about the difference between molar and molecu-
lar approaches. It is the years of making chemical solutions in the lab, 
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learning about the behavior of molecules, and studying the microdynam-
ics of signal transduction pathways that have led me to gravitate toward 
the molecular.
In their collaborative text A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, Deleuze and Guattari have described those modes of thinking 
and politics that draw upon philosophies of being, stasis, and identity 
as being “majoritarian” or “molar” in their approach. Alternatively, they 
describe those tactics that build upon the ideas of becoming, change, pro-
cess, and events as being “minoritarian” or “molecular” in their approach. 
Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly emphasize that these tactics are not 
opposed to each other, but rather that they can be distinguished by their 
orientations to matters of scale.38 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari attempt to move away from a Platonic metaphysics. To do so, 
however, they know it is necessary to account for the presence of forms 
and substances, which they attempt to do by suggesting that forms and 
substances are “generated by intensive processes rather than imposed on 
intensive processes from without.”39 During this treatment of forms and 
substances, Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between the molar 
and molecular. They state:
It is clear that the distinction between the two articulations is not 
between substances and forms. Substances are nothing other than 
formed matters. Forms imply a code, modes of coding and decoding. 
Substances as formed matters refer to territorialities and degrees of 
 territorialization and deterritorialization. But each articulation has  
a code and a territoriality; therefore each possesses both form and 
 substance. For now, all we can say is that each articulation has a corre-
sponding type of segmentarity or multiplicity: one type is supple, more 
molecular, and merely ordered; the other is more rigid, molar, and orga-
nized. Although the first articulation is not lacking in systematic inter-
actions, it is in the second articulation in particular that phenomena 
constituting an overcoding are produced, phenomena of centering, uni-
fication, totalization, integration, hierarchization, and finalization.40
Inspired by their interests in the natural and physical sciences, Deleuze 
and Guattari draw distinctions between molar and molecular thinking by 
turning to and drawing parallels with geology, chemistry, and biology. 
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They have described majoritarian politics as having molar tendencies, 
because these approaches often deal in identity-based, territorialized, 
organized, originary, and often privileged terms. 
The term “molar” in chemistry refers to a unit of concentration (known 
as molarity) that is equal to the number of moles of a substance per liter 
of a solution. A mole, in turn, is a chemical mass unit of a fixed number 
(6.022 × 1023) of molecules or atoms of a substance, also known as Avoga-
dro’s number. This representation of a group of molecules or atoms that 
come together to form one entity is what Deleuze and Guattari allude to 
in their use of the term “molar.” Alternatively, they describe minoritarian 
approaches as molecular tendencies, not because they belong to a minor-
ity group or that they operate only at a subcellular level but because they 
entail those ethical actions and ontological maneuvers that work to deter-
ritorialize our thoughts. As Eugene Holland has explained:
There are several ways of approaching the relations between molar and 
molecular. One is in connection with the articulation of content and 
expression. As we have seen, a substance can take liquid form on the 
molecular level, and then get transformed into a crystal on the molar 
level: water vapor becomes a snowflake. Notice that molecular and 
molar are relative terms: when individual snowflakes combine to form  
a snowdrift, or a snowman, it is now the snowflakes that constitute  
the molecular level, while the snowdrift and snowman are molar. . . .  
The recourse to statistical probabilities may be what gives rise to the 
false impression that the difference between molar and molecular is  
a matter of size, when in fact it is more a matter of perspective.41
My reason for turning to the molecular, and to questions of becomings, is 
directly related to becoming a feminist scientist, working at the intersec-
tions of reproductive neuroendocrinology and molecular biology, and the 
quandaries regarding matters of perspective that these experiences have 
produced.
This distinction between major/minor and molar/molecular politics 
and matters of perspective is also found in the work of new materialists 
but is best expounded by Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti. Both Grosz 
and Braidotti have reflected carefully on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophi-
cal interests and are aware of the valid feminist criticisms of molecular 
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concepts such as becoming-woman.42 However, they have also created a 
space for lively exchange between the work of Deleuzian ethics, feminist 
theory, and feminist STS. Their contributions to feminist theory and femi-
nist STS—particularly their ontological and ethical reflections on ques-
tions of difference, sexual difference, and molecular politics—have served 
as crucial points of reflection for me. Grosz, for example, has argued that 
the molecular is a way of thinking through difference in terms of differ-
ence in and of itself. “If molar unities, like the divisions of classes, races 
and sexes,” she writes, “attempt to form and stabilize an identity, a fixity, 
a system that functions homeostatically, sealing in its energies and intensi-
ties, molecular becomings traverse, create a path, destabilize, enable energy 
seepage within and through these molar unities.”43 Interestingly, Grosz 
cautions that molecular projects such as those aligned with difference 
feminisms might often appear to reify differences and work against liberal 
feminisms committed to equal rights.44 Despite this fact, she argues that 
molecular projects are necessary in order to think about difference, par-
ticularly to think about sexual difference through multiplicities rather 
than what Luce Irigaray has identified as a logic of the Same.45
Explaining the distinction between molar and molecular projects, Braid-
otti suggests that “the ‘Molar’ line” is “that of Being, identity, fixity and 
potestas—and the ‘molecular’ line—that of becoming, nomadic subjectivity 
and potential.”46 We can look, for instance, to the impact of identity- based 
molar politics, which in the case for humans has led to many advance-
ments made by women’s rights, civil rights, gay liberation, and disability 
rights movements. The ability to claim membership within a group that 
is marked as a stable identity—or as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has 
explained, to be able to strategically invoke an essentialized identity such 
as calling oneself woman, lesbian, transgender, intersex, or disabled—can 
carry much political import.47 It is therefore crucial to make clear that by 
turning to ideas of becoming, movement, change, and intensities—what 
I refer to as molecular feminisms—I am not attempting in any way to dis-
credit or devalue majoritarian naming practices or molar identity-based 
representational politics. Also, I am not suggesting that one must neces-
sarily have to choose one mode of thinking about and approaching the 
world over the other. Rather, I want to acknowledge, as Deleuze and Guat-
tari point out repeatedly in A Thousand Plateaus, that being and becoming 
coexist and even work to coproduce each other.48 
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Similarly, we could keep in mind the fact that stoloniferous plants grow 
by both extending stolonic shoots and establishing adventitious roots at 
its nodes. Yet, I also want to acknowledge that our habits of logic have 
limited how it is that we most often pursue knowledge about ourselves 
and the world around us. We have been limited by an all too familiar mode 
of questioning and reasoning through molar modes of being. This has been 
the case in the vast majority of encounters between feminism and 
biology.
Approaching Matter through New Lines of Flight
I have always had a passion for the natural sciences. Molecular Feminisms 
is written from the perspective of a feminist STS scholar who had the 
benefit of learning from feminist critiques of science; in fact, because of 
(and not in spite of) these critiques, I went into the “hard” sciences purpose-
fully at a time immediately following the “science wars.”49 Encouraged by 
feminist activists and scholars around me, who themselves were deeply 
involved in identity-based women’s rights and reproductive justice move-
ments, I pursued my doctoral training in molecular and reproductive biol-
ogy in order to gain expertise in the scientific theories and practices that 
were directly related to our knowledge of women’s reproductive health. I 
was exposed to some crucial scholarship in feminist STS while I was train-
ing in the lab, including theoretical interventions mapped out by, to name 
a few, Donna Haraway’s situated knowledges and cyborg manifesto, Helen 
Longino’s outlines for socially just science, Sandra Harding’s concept of 
strong objectivity, Emily Martin’s suggestions for new ways of conducting 
reproductive biology research, and Banu Subramaniam’s metanarrative 
on science and scientific method.50 Bonnie Spanier’s Im/Partial Science: 
Gender Ideology in Molecular Biology was particularly eye-opening for me, 
as the work provided a methodology for revealing gendered paradigms 
in molecular biology research.51 These were the feminist theoretical inter-
ventions and methodological tools I took with me to the lab bench while 
training to become a scientist. 
However, I wasn’t prepared for the journey of ontological and ethical 
reorientations that I was to embark upon as a direct result of my training 
in molecular biology. Nor could I have anticipated the reactions I would 
encounter from my feminist colleagues in women’s studies departments, 
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women’s health movements, and reproductive justice organizations as a 
result of these reorientations. I went into the biological sciences in the first 
place because of the strong impulse not to ignore questions related to matter 
that I had learned from feminist philosophers of science, women of color 
feminisms, postcolonial studies, and women’s health activism. I knew very 
well that I was making a noninnocent entry into the lab. Once I got there, 
I realized that I was somewhat on my own in my attempts to bring my 
feminist interests in matter and materiality, which were directly related to 
women’s reproductive health, together with the everyday, nitty-gritty prac-
tices of molecular biology. As a feminist scientist, I wanted to participate 
in the production of scientific knowledge, but as a result, I found myself 
asking a series of challenging and difficult questions that I had to face head-
on if I wished to learn more about matter through the practices of molecu-
lar biology. These questions were multiple and varied, and when I tried to 
bring the challenges of doing bench science back into conversation with 
my feminist peers who worked outside of the sciences, my questions were 
often met with a fair bit of confusion, if not alarm. The reactions I received 
after posing such questions as “Should feminists clone?” (a genuine ques-
tion I needed to ask as a molecular biologist) indicated that my ontological 
and ethical reorientations had led me to venture out a little too far.52
Learning the everyday practices of bench science in molecular biology 
taught me a number of invaluable lessons. Before I was introduced to the 
work of Isabelle Stengers, I had a hunch that in order to create meeting 
places for meaningful interdisciplinary conversations and opportunities 
for imagining joint biological and technological futures, both molecular 
biologists and feminists could benefit by learning about each other’s prac-
tices.53 While training to become a molecular biologist, I was genuinely 
interested in learning how to work with biological matters through the 
practices specific to this field of scientific research. During this process, 
did I take with me the feminist critiques of science that taught me how to 
recognize sexism in the sciences? Yes. Did I learn to recognize and name 
institutional racism and how it operated in my university and depart-
ment? Yes. Did I register the gendered, racist, classist, and ableist language 
and paradigms that surrounded me in molecular biology or reproductive 
physiology textbooks, lectures, or scientific articles to which I was exposed? 
Absolutely, yes! Did I see a relation between those who wore a white lab 
coat, their pursuit of pure objectivity, and the drive within the sciences to 
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erase matters of context? Repeatedly, yes. Despite these active recogni-
tions, however, I did not approach the actual nitty-gritty everyday prac-
tices of molecular biology and reproductive neuroendocrinology laboratory 
techniques and experiments through a sense of irony or distrust. Nor did 
I intentionally plan to become a scientist and spend years of my life learn-
ing the incredibly complex practices of my field only to simply dismiss 
them or to “bring science down” as it were. Constantly aware of the impor-
tance of thinking with molecular biology, I also registered the constraints 
and difficulties posed by this research. Ultimately, I was driven by the 
desire to proceed.
As a direct result of my participation in molecular biology research, I 
learned how to ask informed questions about the scientific method, objec-
tivity, reductionism, and how to develop informed feminist critiques of 
science. I also began to articulate a new line of philosophical inquiry for 
myself into the nature of knowledge, the nature of biological matters, and 
the nature of being. I have always been drawn to the minor literatures of 
molecular biology. Years later, after having a chance to more carefully read 
the work of other feminists who also trained in the sciences (such as Har-
away, Stengers, Barad, and Subramaniam), I am able to express my rea-
sons for entering into the sciences in the first place. I feel more capable of 
expressing my earlier insights into the importance of learning from 
disparate practices, in terms that are more familiar or recognizable to 
my colleagues in the humanities and social sciences. I am better able to 
express the interdisciplinary impulse that I have had to bring feminism 
and molecular biology into conversation in less commonly explored onto-
logical, epistemological, methodological, and ethical terms. I am now able 
to truly appreciate the value of learning how to encounter the varied mate-
rials and practices of a discipline that is not one’s own, through the pro-
ductive lens of “shared perplexities.”54 
Most important, my original hunch about the importance of learning 
to appreciate and respect the practices of disparate disciplines has led me 
to reframe how we might think about molecular biology and feminism 
together, how we may be able to work together to create new lines of flight 
to think about the world that we inhabit, and how we can produce knowl-
edge about that world. This is why I am drawn to molecular projects, both 
in molecular biology research and feminist politics, that can present alter-
natives to dominant modes of thinking.
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A Note about Methodology
Grasses, apparently, are notorious for crossing taxonomical boundaries 
but are generally recognized to grow in three ways: as cespitose grasses 
(grass that grows in bunches with straight roots), turf or sod grasses 
(grasses that grow by spreading their roots outward horizontally), and 
matgrasses (which fall somewhere between the other two grass forma-
tions). The roots of cespitose grass grow in clonal patterns, whereas all 
other grass species grow and extend their roots either as rhizomes or 
stolons. Like the rhizome, the stolon is not just a taxonomical classifica-
tion but also a strategy for plant propagation. Both stolons and rhizomes 
form internodes from where new root systems can begin. Stolons, which 
are referred to as “runners” for their ability to move horizontally above 
ground, have the additional capacity of serving as “foraging organs for 
light.”55 
Stolons have the ability to extend runners in multiple directions and 
also the capacity to sense their surroundings. As an interdisciplinary proj-
ect, Molecular Feminisms goes by the way of the stolon and the stolonifer-
ous plant, creating runners along different directions, foraging in and out 
of properly defined disciplinary formations—all the while aiming to con-
nect and contribute to the field of feminist STS. If extending toward and 
trying to touch shared objects of inquiry counts as a methodological strat-
egy, this book does just that by attempting to extend runners between 
feminist theory, postcolonial and decolonial theory, posthumanist ethics, 
new materialisms, philosophy of science, and molecular biology. While 
there is a clear emphasis on the foraging strategies used by the stolon, the 
fact that stoloniferous plants also grow nodes with roots that go down 
into the ground is not ignored in this work. 
To sketch the methodological approach that ties this book together, I 
want to briefly recall an exchange I had with a well-known sociologist and 
STS scholar soon after completing my PhD and starting my tenure-track 
position. During that encounter this very generous colleague cared to ask 
me about my work and was curious about how and why, with a PhD in 
molecular biology and neuroscience, I had ended up in a women’s studies 
department. After briefly listening to me fumble my way around saying 
that I wanted to bring feminism and science together to generate new 
kinds of conversations, he quickly summed up my methodological 
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allegiances by saying, “Oh—so you’re an ethnographer! You study scien-
tists in the lab!” If being an ethnographer means observing and interpret-
ing the actions of the people and culture around oneself, then yes, I am 
an ethnographer. But to be clear, this book in no way meets any standards 
of a proper ethnography. While I was training to become a scientist, and 
conducting my own experiments in a lab, I was not systematically taking 
notes on my colleagues around me or documenting how as scientists we 
come up with our hypotheses and conduct our scientific experiments. 
Rather, I went deep into studying the practices of molecular biology, 
and through a slow and sometimes imperceptible process, perhaps much 
like watching grass grow, I became an expert in learning how to spot both 
the challenges and possible points of entry for creating interdisciplinary 
work and shared moments of perplexity. Having been trained in the bio-
logical sciences and having now spent a significant amount of time as a 
feminist STS scholar, I have come to the conclusion that the hardest task 
of interdisciplinary scholarship entails not only learning how to come to 
the table but also knowing how to assemble a table that will actually sup-
port joint conversations. This process takes time, and the results are not 
always immediate. A methodology of reaching out and making connec-
tions requires the slow and painstaking work of developing shared vocabu-
laries and respect for distinct and sometimes quite disparate practices. It 
takes time to learn how to frame one’s questions in a way that they can 
actually be heard from another disciplinary standpoint.
Another important point on the methodological framing: as mentioned 
previously, I write as a feminist scholar who conducted graduate training 
in the sciences after the science wars. As a result, this book has been deeply 
informed by debates between social constructivism and positivism and 
the intellectual fallout that transpired between poststructuralists and sci-
entific realists. In the framing of Molecular Feminisms, science and femi-
nism are treated as being co-constituted. This interdisciplinary text aims 
to bring together the work and methodologies of diverse groups of schol-
ars to think about overlapping sets of questions regarding the nature of 
scientific inquiry, the nature of the relation between a knower and the 
known, and the nature of feminist political movements. Whether articu-
lated in a similar way or not, both groups of stakeholders—molecular 
biologists who may not necessarily identify as being feminist and femi-
nists who are not trained scientists—know that it matters how one 
Introduction 27
orients oneself toward an object of inquiry and that the practices of sci-
entific observation carry with them the weight of great political impact.
By taking into account our orientations toward a blade of grass, it could 
be said that I am also trying to work “from below”—or in the case of using 
stolonic strategies, from along the surface of a flat plane or ground. Femi-
nist philosopher Sandra Harding has taught us the importance of using 
feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial theories and practices to approach 
the “sciences from below.”56 What I am in search of, however, are ways to 
think about feminism and molecular biology through minor literatures 
and modes of molecular thinking, as Harding reminds us, by “keeping 
both eyes open.”57 In chapter 1, I develop biophilosophies of becoming, 
which is about learning how to start thinking not just from below but from 
“far far” below the usual human point of entry and view. It is about learn-
ing how to take ourselves down a notch or two, how to come to eye level 
with the stolon, and how to become like the blade of grass in order to make 
a more communicating world. The hope is to draw from disparate theories 
and practices that can become part of our everyday politics. These prac-
tices exist both inside and outside of the lab and can help us, as Claire 
Colebrook has stated, to “grasp all the inhuman perceptions and forces 
beyond the order of our point of view” that contribute to flourishing.58 
I am also aware of Harding’s methodological prompting of approach-
ing the sciences from below in order to locate the Eurocentrism in our 
own work.59 It is indeed the case that as a scientist trained in the global 
North, I have been exposed to those canons deeply embedded within male-
dominated and Eurocentric knowledge traditions. In addition, my limited 
language skills block me from reading and writing about both science and 
feminism in any other language than English. I acknowledge these factors 
up front as methodological limitations of the work presented here. To 
address this point, I attempt to reach out toward a number of different 
thinkers, a great many of them from South Asia, to reflect on diverse 
accounts of the world around us and diverse accounts of how we can come 
to know this world. These accounts do not aim to displace modern scien-
tific understandings or theories of origin and evolution of the universe. 
Rather, I draw from scientists and philosophers whose work has been 
marginalized within both the sciences and feminist theory to think more 
broadly about questions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics and how 
these may add to our theories of the universe and its inner workings. Just 
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as important as it is to recognize that I am a scientist trained in the global 
North, as a diasporic South Asian, born and raised in Canada, with Bengali 
immigrant parents who grew up during India’s partition, it is important 
to recognize that there are also certain anticolonial and postcolonial logics 
that have been woven into my methodological approach. Much like the 
character and scientist Sneha in Subramaniam’s essay “Snow Brown and 
the Seven Detergents,” I know very well that ignoring, whitewashing, or 
cleansing these logics from my intellectual palette is impossible, not to 
mention undesirable.60 
Many of the figures I draw from are purposely Bengali (including Baba 
Premananda Bharati, Rabindranath Tagore, and Jagadish Chandra Bose), 
presented as anticolonial figures, who as colonial subjects under British 
rule in India were actively trying to communicate alternative ontologies 
and ethical approaches to matter and the world around us through reli-
gion, literature, and science at the turn of the twentieth century.61 As 
Ashis Nandy wrote in his biographies of the scientist J. C. Bose and the 
mathematician Srinivasa Ramanujan, both British colonial subjects in 
India at the turn of the twentieth century, “How much has science lost 
by its mechanistic and physicalistic concepts of the universe, how much 
by its denial of all alternatives to the scientific culture of the industrialized 
world? How much has the Newtonian idea of a world machine contributed 
to the ethical predicament of modern science, to its role in fostering 
human violence, and in violence towards the non-human environment?”62
My intention behind creating runners between these figures is not to 
develop a project in comparative science or comparative philosophy. Nor 
is it to create a divide between the “East” and “West” and draw from East-
ern traditions in order to dismiss Western traditions (or vice versa), as if 
these traditions and cultures could even be divided and determined so 
simply. I certainly do not provide in-depth biographical accounts of these 
thinkers or spend a sufficient amount of time reflecting on their full philo-
sophical contributions and anticolonial positions. That would be a differ-
ent book. I turn to these anticolonial figures for the minor literatures they 
developed in their own ways, and use these literatures to reframe majori-
tarian thought found in both science and feminism. Lastly, this book does 
not intend to use molecular biology research and methods to dismiss femi-
nist concerns or, alternatively, to use feminist theories and methodologies 
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to poke holes into molecular biology research. Rather, at the core of this 
inquiry is a deep curiosity that wants to see what is possible when two 
modes of thinking, simultaneously distinct yet in multiple ways co-
constituted, are encouraged to interact reciprocally. What becomes pos-
sible when two modes of inquiry are allowed to move closer toward each 
other through unexplored processes of desire and produce new ways of 
thinking? Molecular Feminisms, like the stolon, is a strategy for becoming-
minoritarian, becoming-molecular, and becoming-imperceptible.
Overview of Chapters
Chapter 1, “Biophilosophies of Becoming,” establishes the theoretical 
framing of the book. It defines and deals with key questions of ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics that drive feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial 
STS interrogations of scientific knowledge production. The chapter asks 
us to reflect on how it is that we orient ourselves toward a diverse range 
of matters, starting with a blade of grass. It questions the nature of nature 
and what status we as humans have given to others, humans as well as 
nonhumans. It addresses a metaphysics and humanism that has influ-
enced both our philosophical and scientific approaches to encountering 
the world around us and argues that in addition to spending our creative 
energies toward identification and classificatory practices (the values of 
which are not dismissed), we must also ask what matter, molecules, bod-
ies, and organisms such as grass are capable of doing. This line of question-
ing opens us to the opportunity of developing biophilosophies of becoming 
that rethink matter in terms of flux, motion, and capabilities, and reframe 
biology in terms of events and processes. New ontological, epistemologi-
cal, and ethical reorientations must also be contextualized and therefore 
I turn to postcolonial and decolonial STS approaches to consider the 
broader implications of knowledge-making practices. Building upon con-
nections that can be made between feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial 
approaches, biophilosophies of becoming are more thoroughly articulated 
in terms of the qualities of (1) changefulness and nonhuman becomings, 
(2) kinship and hylozoism, and (3) univocity and immanence.
Chapter 2, “Microphysiologies of Desire,” visits a long tradition of inti-
mate ontological, epistemological, and ethical considerations made by 
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feminist scientists and feminist philosophers of science regarding the rela-
tionship between the knower and the known. It acknowledges genera-
tional feminist materialisms and revisits questions that are familiar to 
feminist scholars—namely, how we can continue with science after the 
critiques of science and how we can reconfigure the relationship between 
the scientific knower and the known. The chapter explores earlier inter-
ventions made by Barad, Patti Lather, Stengers, and Haraway. By bringing 
together the scientific work of Bose and recent scholarship in posthuman-
ist ethics, I examine what the implications would be of shifting our ethical 
stance from a transcendent understanding of “responsibility” toward the 
other, to a more immanent awareness of the “ability to respond” to the 
other. I offer microphysiologies of desire as strategies that bring us closer to 
a biology that we desire. Inspired by Evelyn Fox Keller’s work on the life 
and scientific research of Barbara McClintock, I playfully reconfigure 
McClintock’s famous dictum “a feeling for the organism” to “feeling around 
for the organism” to lay out a more immanent rather than transcendent 
orientation that can be put into practice in the lab. The aim is to speak to 
those feminist scientists and those scientist feminists who, in the wake 
of recent material turns, are eagerly looking for ways to participate in the 
biological sciences and work with and beside molecular actants in the lab.
Chapter 3, “Bacterial Lives: Sex, Gender, and the Lust for Writing,” 
outlines key arguments in relation to poststructuralism, feminist theory, 
and posthumanist ethics. Following the lives of bacteria and the creativity 
and labor of bacterial writing, the chapter explores what new politics 
become possible when we think with members of a domain that have been 
noted for their qualities of changefulness and nonhuman becomings. 
Thinking alongside biophilosophies of becoming in relation to bacteria, 
the chapter confronts three binaries that are commonly used by scientists 
and feminists—namely, sex/gender, biology/culture, and matter/language. 
Beginning with the rich body of work left behind by the biologist Lynn 
Margulis, I trace how our understanding of bacterial sex has created new 
feminist theories and treatments of sex. I take note of the confusion that 
often exists between the terms “sex” and “gender” in biological research. 
Using the materiality of bacterial writing, reading, and modeling, the 
chapter illustrates the importance of including analytical frameworks in 
our theory-making that have been informed by decades of scholarship 
in feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial STS. Emerging from political 
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movements that are invested in social justice, I argue that these frame-
works not only allow us to posit new ontologies but also help us with the 
difficult task of putting these ontologies into practice.
Chapter 4, “Should Feminists Clone? And If So, How?,” proposes a 
model for feminist inquiry from within the sciences. This model has the 
potential for broad use in the natural sciences but is most directly appli-
cable to feminist scientists working in molecular biology labs. Michelle 
Murphy has suggested that women’s health activists in the 1970s showed 
the “most sustained efforts to practice science as feminism.”63 Readers 
familiar with my earlier work will know that I also view my entry into and 
contributions to the sciences as expressions of my feminism. For this rea-
son, and for the greater part of my feminist STS career, I have been com-
mitted to developing practices that are relevant to the feminist scientist 
in the natural sciences. After feminists learn the very important critiques 
of science, or learn to make astute ontological and ethical claims, they still 
need to directly engage with the sciences and the practices of scientific 
knowledge production. This can only take place when we spend time devel-
oping practice-oriented approaches in feminist STS and methodological 
interventions for the feminist scientist working in the lab. 
Using the technology of subcloning, my goal in chapter 4 is to extend 
the scope of how we think about practicing science as feminism or femi-
nism as science today. Theoretical interventions can emerge from both 
inside and outside of the lab, often as a direct result of the everyday nitty-
gritty practices of both feminism and science. Formulating new feminist 
or molecular politics from a scientific protocol, a biological actant, or even 
a machine used in an experiment can be difficult. However, when we frame 
these efforts through biophilosophies of becoming, and through the quali-
ties of hylozoism and kinship in particular, new modes of knowledge pro-
duction become possible. The model of scientific inquiry proposed is based 
on a “mutated subcloning protocol,” designed to acknowledge that a femi-
nist scientist is accountable to multiple communities of knowers, which 
can lead to several tensions and dilemmas in their research. The model 
allows the researcher to take these dilemmas into account and move for-
ward with a research agenda by formulating their questions in the lab in 
contexts that are most relevant to their own social justice commitments. 
The chapter details my own experience of conducting molecular biology 
research in a wet lab. Delving into my scientific research and discoveries 
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in molecular biology and reproductive neuroendocrinology, I reflect on 
the tensions of using recombinant DNA technologies to search for estro-
gen receptors in GnRH neurons and the experiments that brought me to 
some of my current ethical and ontological queries.
Chapter 5, “In Vitro Incubations,” focuses on new developments in the 
field of synthetic biology and explores how synthetic lives such as minimal 
genome organisms force us to reconsider the boundaries of interdisciplin-
ary thinking. Starting with my experience of working in a molecular biol-
ogy lab, I highlight several questions that I only learned how to ask by 
working with and paying careful attention to an in vitro neuronal cell line. 
Two main challenges face feminist STS scholars today—namely, address-
ing the question of what constitutes life and the living in this age of syn-
thetic biology, and figuring out how to respond to and deepen our human 
entanglements with these lives by paying attention to questions of con-
text and social justice in this molecular era. Turning to the qualities of 
univocity and immanence, the chapter explores how biophilosophies of 
becoming can present a different set of tactics that can be used for reach-
ing out toward and responding to synthetic lives. 
Following Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the machinic assemblage, 
both molar and molecular approaches are employed to understand the 
monstrous couplings that bring together digital DNA, humans, DNA syn-
thesizers, Petri dishes, bacteria, yeast, and more. Synthetic biology has 
created a machinic assemblage that moves through three phases or strata 
of a new kind of synthetic life cycle, including the inorganic, organic, and 
social. In the inorganic strata we see the important role that the central 
dogma in molecular biology has played as a far-reaching paradigm, giving 
material form to minimal genomes. Through the organic strata we see the 
beginnings of expressive life in minimal genome organisms whereby they 
learn to communicate with each other and their external world. The last 
stage of the life cycle is examined through the social or alloplastic stratum, 
where we see how our machinic assemblage modifies the external world. 
Using the tools of postcolonial and decolonial STS, and through a series 
of vignettes, I analyze how synthetic lives simultaneously are produced 
by and work to produce social institutions and behaviors that are undoubt-




The molecule’s journey backward to Love is made by a very circuitous 
path. That path leads through the process of opening one by one the 
passages of its composing principles. By passages is meant channels 
of communication and sympathy with the main laws and vibrations 
of the working of the universe. The first step the molecule takes, in 
this return-journey, is by opening the passage of one principle, the 
sense of feeling, and becoming a blade of grass.
—Baba Premananda Bharati
Every time I walk on grass I feel sorry because I know the grass is 
screaming at me. . . . Basically everything is one. There is no way in 
which you draw a line between things. 
—Barbara McClintock
In the world’s audience hall, the simple blade of grass sits on the 
same carpet with the sunbeam and the stars of midnight. Thus my 
songs share their seats in the heart of the world with the music of 
the clouds and forests. 
—Rabindranath Tagore
Becoming a blade of grass is perhaps an odd place to begin the task of 
developing an interdisciplinary project. Add to that the vision of scream-
ing grass and the idea of a blade of grass sitting on a carpet in a hall as an 
audience member, and now there may be sound reason to flip back to the 
cover of this book and reread its title. Indeed, it is Molecular Feminisms: 
Biology, Becomings, and Life in the Lab. Starting this chapter by thinking 
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about blades of grass that grow under our feet, or grass that grows on 
carefully manicured lawns if you happen to live in a concrete jungle, might 
appear at first to have very little to do with either molecular biology or 
feminism, let alone theories and practices in and out of the lab. However, 
the space where these matters all meet has everything to do with how we 
think about, and approach, the blade of grass.
Those of us who have had intimate access to grass—whether in our 
backyards, public parks, savannahs, or in actual grasslands—may be able 
to recall the smell of freshly cut grass or the feeling of cool blades under 
our feet. Perhaps you can remember sitting on a soft bed of grass while 
watching a faraway sunset. Some of us may even recall pulling out hand-
fuls of grass only to find a shallow mess of tangled roots growing together. 
Alternatively, the thought of grass may conjure for you less idyllic reflec-
tions and instead raise concerns regarding the threat of deforestation, the 
development of genetically modified grass to provide even green turfs for 
playing golf, images of overly trimmed and herbicide-treated lawns that 
have been produced at high environmental costs simply for the benefit of 
human notions of “natural” beauty, or perhaps even remind one of old 
colonial English gardens and ornamental grasses that were planted and 
pruned outside of England in order to “civilize” supposedly backward and 
barbaric lands. Each and every one of these reflections is valid. 
What the chapter epigraphs would have us consider, however, is that 
perhaps our thoughts on grass—whether we are pleased by its presence 
or not—may not just be about contemplating its role as a silent backdrop 
to our outdoor excursions, or considering the historical and political fac-
tors that go behind our enjoyment of picturesque green vistas. Rather, the 
epigraphs suggest that the thought of becoming a blade of grass or getting 
closer to grass is more about acknowledging the desires, voice, and status 
of grass. They raise the question of how we as humans act toward and 
respond to something as simple as grass, and ultimately how we might 
orient ourselves to a more diverse range of matters that constitute our 
own bodies, lives, and the world around us.
While taking pause to consider our relationship with grass, we may 
be inclined to start by ruminating on our own human status compared to 
that of grass and our grand place among all of nature’s organisms and ele-
ments. The organisms and elements of nature referred to here include 
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nonhuman animals, plant life, microorganisms, molecules, and even those 
rocks, minerals, and inorganic matters all around us that have been 
deemed inanimate or nonliving. By beginning with a blade of grass—or 
better yet, with molecules that love and that work toward becoming a 
blade of grass, with grass that has the capability to scream, or with a blade 
of grass that holds equal footing with the sunbeams and stars—we may 
be prompted to go even further and pose some difficult questions regard-
ing not only the nature of our human encounters with the environment 
but also questions regarding the nature of nature itself. 
We might, for instance, start to consider more seriously the possibility 
that the world is perceived and actualized not only by humans but also by 
nonhuman beings, organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate, living 
and nonliving. We might begin to pay more attention to and give more 
credit to the intricate and perhaps even imperceptible forces that push 
and pull, or desires that are enacted or expressed by nonhuman organ-
isms, molecules, and elements, which undoubtedly contribute to the 
building up and breaking down of our universe. We might begin to con-
sider more carefully the assemblages and entangled subjectivities that are 
bound to form between those who claim to observe this nature (never 
innocently) and those objects in nature, which are being observed (never 
passively). We may further start to question the limitations of what has 
come to constitute the human subject as an “autonomous agent” in a liberal 
humanist sense in our societies, who through a series of moral and legal 
codes has been given the right to either observe or the choice to be 
observed. We may start to wonder how our need for defining such a unified 
subject has undoubtedly resulted in the articulation of those who have 
come to constitute that subject’s “other,” both human and otherwise. 
Where these questions regarding the nature and status of humans, 
human others, nonhuman others, subjects, objects, knowers, and the to-
be-known lead us, is precisely where the disciplines of philosophy and 
science have always met and where they have also promptly become entan-
gled. Some may argue that the boundaries between philosophy and science 
have never been clear. It is precisely at those spaces of unclear boundaries 
and entanglements between philosophy and science where feminist, post-
colonial, and decolonial scholars have dedicated a great deal of their cre-
ativity over the past few decades through their analytical, theoretical, 
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organizational, and material contributions. They have long known the 
high stakes involved in the not-so-simple acts of observing nature and 
producing knowledge. Many have pointed out that not all knowledge sys-
tems are considered equal and that in some dominant traditions of phi-
losophy and science, not everyone is considered capable of being a knower, 
even when the knowledge that is produced relates directly to their own 
lives and experiences.
Feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars have pointed out the cost 
of coming to know the world if this knowledge is sought and obtained only, 
or primarily through, the limited scope of “modern” or what is often referred 
to as “Western” traditions of philosophical and scientific inquiry.1 These 
traditions of philosophy and science, which are generally traced back to the 
era of the classical Greek philosophers Plato (428–348 BC) and Aristotle 
(384–322 BC) and the European Renaissance (the fourteenth through the 
seventeenth centuries), are defined by a metaphysics that made very clear 
distinctions between the inferior ontological status of raw matter compared 
to the superiority of that entity which had the capability of moving from 
raw matter to assuming a form. Plato treated the body as a mere vessel for 
the soul.2 This distinction operates in Cartesian dualisms that further sepa-
rated “man” from nature and the mind from the body.3 This transcendent 
distinction and relationship between form and matter, or the soul and the 
body, made its way into the Enlightenment (the seventeenth through the 
eighteenth centuries). Ultimately, this metaphysical framework of divi-
sions, distinctions, and discontinuity has led us to the many philosophical 
and scientific approaches that we are taught and that we observe today, 
particularly in public and private institutions of higher learning. In addi-
tion to seeing the world through the lenses of discontinuity, transcendence, 
and dualisms, these approaches have been further limited, as some phi-
losophers and historians of science have argued, by their epistemic reliance 
on reductionism and claims of achieving aperspectival objectivity.4
Feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars have argued that these 
traditions in philosophy and science can be further characterized by the 
liberal humanist principles that reside at their core.5 They have suggested 
that this form of humanism has led to the creation of hierarchies of being, 
where greater or lesser values are placed on different lives (including 
human) and expressions of being. Such dominant philosophical and sci-
entific traditions are built upon the problematic belief that there is a 
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singular and easily discernable positive teleology of thought and progress 
that is somehow unique to the West, and that this entity, “the West,” is 
derived from a history and materiality that is distinct from and superior 
to “non-Western” thought and cultures.6 These scholars are critical of the 
colonial and imperial-inflected definitions of what has come to constitute 
modern philosophical and scientific thought versus the so-called uncivi-
lized or “premodern” traditions of knowledge production.7 
Together, the disciplines of both philosophy and science, as perceived 
in “the West,” have come to form a legacy whose modes of inquiry and 
knowledge production have, as a default, continued to place at its center 
of analysis what Audre Lorde theorized as the “mythical norm.”8 Defined 
by Lorde as “white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, christian and finan-
cially secure,” this mythical norm occupies a position of privilege, or what 
Simone de Beauvoir called out as holding positions of both a positive and 
neutral subjectivity.9 It is from this view of the mythical norm and the 
subject position of positivity and neutrality that current and dominant 
traditions of philosophy and science have developed their systems of see-
ing, naming, and defining the world.
In turn, the questions and answers derived from the ontological, epis-
temological, methodological, and ethical frameworks made possible 
within this dominant metaphysical tradition have been written into our 
textbooks. These frameworks have provided the language, ideas, and exper-
iments for how we can come to know the world and how we are to orient 
ourselves toward the multitude of others that inhabit this world. As Claire 
Colebrook has stated, “the way we think, speak, desire and see the world 
is itself political; it produces relations, effects, and organizes our bodies.”10 
If this is indeed the case, that how we see the world is political to the point 
of organizing our bodies, then something as simple as how we see and 
think about a blade of grass may matter a great deal to how we see and 
think about molecular biology, feminism, and where the two meet. If we 
want to reflect on how it is that we have come to know the world, we must 
also consider which questions have been asked about the bodies and biolo-
gies around and within us, why they have been asked, how they have been 
asked, and by whom. Much may be at stake in how we orient ourselves 
toward supposedly simple matters, and ultimately there could be much to 
gain if we follow through with the questions and answers that grow out 
of these encounters.
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What Can Grass Do?
What can we learn to know if we begin our inquiries by thinking with the 
blade of grass? It may be of little to no surprise to agrostologists and seri-
ous gardener-types out there that in a Carl Linnaeus–inspired taxonomical 
world, grass has been classified as belonging to the kingdom Plantae, the 
division Anthophyta (flowering seed plants), the class Monocotyledons 
(embryos with one seed leaf), and if we keep going down the taxonomical 
ladder even further, into approximately 11,369 accepted different species 
according to the Kew Royal Botanic Gardens’s online database aptly called 
GrassBase.11 Although grass taxonomy, and the practices of naming variet-
ies of grass and identifying the properties of what grass is, is itself a vast 
and productive field of analysis, this book focuses on a set of questions 
that can be applied not only to our knowledge of grass but also to femi-
nism and molecular biology. 
As the chapter epigraphs prompt us to ask, how does an organism such 
as a blade of grass happen? How does a blade of grass extend or retract 
itself through time and space? What does grass require in order to change, 
develop, grow, and perish? How does grass react to being touched and how 
does grass express desire? By turning to the abilities of grass, we can begin 
to think about matter and molecules not only through classificatory or 
representational terms but also through the question of what they can do. 
What can we learn from the abilities of creeping grasses to spread not only 
by developing new shoots that emerge from nodes on underground stems 
(rhizomes) but in some cases also by developing horizontal stems that 
grow above ground (stolons)? Posing this line of questioning is not only 
possible but has in fact become imminently relevant to the field of femi-
nist STS and to a project such as the present one.
Rather than asking what counts as grass, defining what grass actually 
is only in terms of its chemical properties and physical structures, or using 
the traditional and dominant philosophical and scientific practices of 
naming, identifying, and placing various forms of grass into neat catego-
ries by pointing out what it lacks compared to other organisms and dif-
ferentiating it from what it is not, this chapter takes a molecular approach 
to asking what matter, molecules, bodies, and organisms such as grass can 
do and are capable of doing. By taking a molecular approach to biological 
matter, bodies, and nature, I follow a line of questioning that is generally 
Biophilosophies of Becoming 39
less explored in both feminist theory and molecular biology—one that 
pursues ideas of becoming more than being, movement more than stasis, 
change more than fixity, and intensities more than identities or essences 
in biology. This pursuit brings forward what might loosely be referred to 
as biophilosophies of becoming. This is not to say that there isn’t any value 
to organizing our knowledge of grass and other biological matters along 
the principles of being, stasis, fixed subjectivities, stable identities. As 
scientists and philosophers, however, we are already familiar with the 
kinds of knowledge that can be gained by viewing the world through this 
dominant lens or more organized terms. We know, for example, that the 
chemical elements of grass include carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, phosphorus, 
and hydrogen, and that the enzyme chlorophyll enables the process of 
photosynthesis in grass. This knowledge is important, and the ontological 
frameworks and questions that motivate us to gain this knowledge are 
also important. There is no denying that scientific and social progress has 
been made and can continue to be made through the practices of naming 
and working with fixed identities. 
By becoming a molecular biologist, however, I learned firsthand that 
arriving at a valid hypothesis requires a great deal of open-mindedness 
and, at times, what one might even call ontological flexibility.12 One had 
to either learn to put aside their questions regarding the nature of being, 
or learn how to think about the nature of being and what one was bring-
ing forth, as a direct result of their experimentation. By working with 
material actants such as genes, hormones, receptors, signal transduction 
proteins, bacteria, and in vitro cell cultures derived from transgenic mice, 
I came to question my own ontological assumptions and was ushered 
into orienting my thinking in terms of processes and becomings. Through 
my own research in molecular biology I came to appreciate what Natasha 
Myers has described as “excitable ontologies.”13 I am intrigued by the pos-
sibility of moving feminist politics and feminist STS projects even further 
into molecular modes of thought by developing biophilosophies of becom-
ing that treat biology in terms of an event and molecular biology in terms 
of processes. 
Why use the term “biophilosophy” and not “philosophy of biology” to 
describe this project at the intersections of molecular biology, feminism, 
and philosophy?14 Although the philosophy of biology dates back to the 
early twentieth century and is well established as a discipline, Sahotra 
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Sarkar has argued, and I agree, that there has been a dearth of philosophi-
cal engagement with molecular biology itself. His own work is a rich gene-
alogy of the missing history of philosophy in molecular biology, particularly 
the role of reductionism and the central dogma in molecular biology.15 
Sarkar suggests, however, that despite the discovery of the structure of 
DNA in the early 1950s, and the vast growth and impact of molecular biol-
ogy research, “philosophical interest in molecular biology declined in the 
late 1970s and 1980s when, with few exceptions, philosophers of biology 
focused only on evolutionary biology and, within evolutionary biology, 
on the problem of identifying units of selection.”16
Sarkar makes the case that by turning its attention to evolutionary 
theory, much of philosophy of biology is out of touch with contemporary 
biology, including molecular biology, let alone a field such as synthetic 
biology (discussed in chapter 5).17 Instead, the philosophy of biology 
 generally engages with a different set of questions. Paul Griffiths has 
 summarized the three types of inquires that fall under philosophy of 
biology: addressing general theses in the philosophy of science through 
the context of biology, subjecting conceptual puzzles within biology to 
philosophical analysis, and “appeal[ing] to biology to support positions 
on traditional philosophical topics, such as ethics or epistemology.”18 Phi-
losophy of biology has much to offer, but for the particular project I am 
developing here, traditional analytical approaches do not bring me imme-
diately to questions I would like to pose. 
Although there is a great deal of overlap, a distinction can be drawn 
between philosophy of biology and biophilosophy. Spyridon Koutroufinis has 
suggested that the borders between philosophy of biology and biophiloso-
phy often shift, but some primary features can be used to distinguish the 
them. Whereas philosophy of biology turns to a materialism that stems 
from a mechanistic ontology and “metaphysical principles of classical 
physics, . . . in a version that is expanded to include the idea of dynamical 
systems, which include the theories of complexity, self-organization, and 
chaos,” he suggests that contemporary biophilosophy holds a process-
metaphysical perspective and takes into account “notions of matter and 
causality that have long been established within quantum physics.”19 
Biophilosophy is also open to liberal naturalism, which according to Kou-
troufinis “allows mental states, such as phenomenal qualities, as aspects 
Biophilosophies of Becoming 41
of natural entities and ascribes ontological relevance to abstract, modal, 
moral, and intentional entities.”20 
The biophilosophy I wish to explore here emerges at a moment within 
feminist STS, which due primarily to the work of Karen Barad can also 
be said to reflect a process-metaphysical perspective that engages with 
questions of matter and causality after quantum physics. It is also deeply 
influenced by feminist philosophical interrogations of subjectivity, found 
in the writings of Donna Haraway (whose work has been connected to 
Alfred North Whitehead’s processual metaphysics), Elizabeth Grosz (whose 
work turns to Henri Bergson’s emphasis on duration and time), and Rosi 
Braidotti (whose work elaborates Gilles Deleuze’s ideas on nom adology).21 
These combined trajectories of feminist and materialist inquiry have led 
me to think more about feminist engagements with process ontology as 
well as recent interests in process ontologies for contemporary biology.22 
A feminist philosophy of biology has much to offer, but the biophilosophy 
that I am interested in articulating relies less on approaches of subjectiv-
ism found in feminist STS and more on those projects that frame the 
properties or qualities of becoming, movement, change, and intensities 
of matters and bodies in biology, in terms of process and events.23 
Returning to the question of what grass can do allows us to think about 
organisms and molecules not as pre-given forms with fixed attributes, but 
instead, what the biophilosophy of Deleuze might encourage us to discern, 
as nonhuman becomings. Deleuze’s biophilosophy is an ethical one, aimed 
at thinking beyond the human and, as some have argued, making way for 
a new metaphysics.24 In our case, we may think of grass not as a fixed and 
passive entity, but rather as an event or what Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as “haecceity”—that is, as a dynamic interaction between organisms 
and elements, one that experiences and expresses time and duration, has 
emergent properties, and is capable of change.25 Drawing from the philo-
sophical works of John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), Baruch Spinoza (1632–
1677), and Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Deleuze and Guattari express 
becoming as that continual process of change and flux through which dif-
ference is produced.26 This difference is positive and not defined through 
lack. It is through the production of a continuous difference that life 
simultaneously emerges, is sustained, and gets dissolved. Discussing the 
influence of Spinoza and Bergson on Deleuze’s biophilosophy, Keith Ansell 
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Pearson explains that what Deleuze believes is that “what a body can do 
is never something fixed and determined but is always implicated in a 
‘creative evolution.’”27 Ansell Pearson suggests that what Deleuze is faced 
with in thinking through difference and becoming is the development of 
a complex ontology, one in which we are “compelled to think an ethics of 
matter itself.”28 I return to this question of the ethics of matter more 
closely in the following chapters. 
Resonating with Bharati, McClintock, and Tagore, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, the authors use philosophies of becoming 
to motion us away from a dominant metaphysical tradition that has led 
us to believe that not only is there “a distinction between different orders 
of being” but that humans (albeit some more than others) are definitively 
and qualitatively separate from all other forms of life on Earth.29 This tra-
dition is marked by dualisms that work to separate “intelligibility and 
sensibility, doer and deed, Being and beings, condition and conditioned, 
[and] Creator and creation.”30 Perceiving our reality and existence in this 
way has given us the idea that humans are far superior to all other matters 
and forms in nature, and the supposed right to hold dominion over that 
nature. Bharati, McClintock, Tagore as well as Deleuze and Guattari sug-
gest a different orientation, one that is both ontological and ethical. They 
present an alternate framework for perceiving our status as humans, and 
by doing so, force us to reevaluate our place in the world among nonhu-
man others. Instead of setting ourselves high above and far apart from 
the other organic and inorganic elements of our physical surroundings, 
they ask that we attempt to reduce this distance and get closer to such 
organisms as grass—an organism that grows under our feet and is quite 
literally “below” us. Rather than turning to a hierarchical chain of being 
marked by superiority and transcendence, the reorientation to the uni-
verse that Deleuze and Guattari promote is one of univocity and imma-
nence. This reorientation requires moving away from the ideas of humans 
as ideal and autonomous subjects, and replacing our belief in a “great 
chain of being” with an understanding of the world that instead acknowl-
edges the univocity of being. 
The univocity of being put forward is not meant to suggest that every-
thing is the same, or part of the “One” in some onto-theological sense; 
rather, as Brent Adkins has suggested, everything exists on a continuous 
and ontologically single field.31 Deleuze and Guattari use the phrase 
Biophilosophies of Becoming 43
“pluralism = monism” to make room for difference and the arrival of the 
new within this ontological univocity.32 As Adkins explains:
Dualisms create exclusive disjunctions, or biunivocal relations between 
terms. What Deleuze and Guattari are proposing is an inclusive disjunc-
tion by which we “arrive at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = 
MONISM” (Thousand Plateaus 20). . . . The monism arrived at here, though, 
is not an Eleatic stasis in which movement is an illusion. It is the monism 
of the continuity thesis, the monism of univocity. The claim is not that 
ontology is a monotonous sameness, but that everything exists in exactly 
the same way. There is no dualism of form and content that must then 
be related by analogy. There is no transcendence, only immanence. All 
assemblages are arrayed on the same plane. The formula (pluralism = 
monism) is magic precisely because it allows for the creation of the new.33
Therefore, it should be understood that the ontological univocity of 
beings does not mean the erasure of difference. It also does not mean a 
dismissal of the distributive effects of power. This is a common misinter-
pretation of Deleuzian philosophy. Of course, we as humans are in many 
ways different from grass, and from mountains, rivers, and fields of corn, 
and for that matter from each other. However, is it possible to think about 
these differences without automatically assigning values on these differ-
ences? Are we as humans so very removed from other organic species and 
inorganic elements that we cannot see or feel a continuity with or connec-
tion to nonhuman others? The question perhaps is not whether or not 
differences exist between humans, animals, plants, water, inorganic ele-
ments, and more, but how we think about these differences. Do we choose 
to see these differences as positive differences, ones that are not under-
stood through their lack or through their otherness from some transcen-
dent figure or object? Do we choose to see these differences as differences 
in degree, or as differences in kind? By turning to the idea of ontological 
univocity, I am not interested in disregarding embodied experiences. Nor 
am I arguing for the equivalent but independent status of all objects 
through the lens of an object-oriented ontology or speculative realism. 
Rather, my intention is to see how the idea of ontological univocity can 
be used to emphasize our intimate moments of encounter with difference 
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and to alter our treatments of these differences both inside and outside 
of the lab.
The remaining chapters are invested in exploring what biophilosophies 
of becoming can do for feminism, for molecular biology, and for the space 
where the two can meet. They deal with those theories, research designs, 
and techniques that are already present in both feminism and molecular 
biology that can help us to think about matter and bodies in terms of flux, 
motion, and capabilities. They consider more closely those approaches to 
knowing that can guide us in our encounters with other matters and bod-
ies in the lab. The intention is to extend what becomes possible for both 
feminism and molecular biology if we think more about the capacities for 
change that exists in all aspects and expressions of matter, and the precise 
nature of our encounters with that matter. 
I am not in any way invested in dismissing the knowledge that we have 
gained thus far, either through feminism or molecular biology, that relies 
on a logic of being, on a metaphysics belonging to the era of classical phys-
ics, or on mechanistic ontologies for that matter. I am not invested in 
discrediting the scientific method or scientific practices of gathering 
empirical evidence. I am, however, interested in exploring what new 
knowledges we can produce by thinking in terms of process and events 
through ontological univocity. More specifically, I want to consider care-
fully a biophilosophy of becoming that is highlighted by the qualities of 
(1) changefulness and nonhuman becomings, (2) kinship and hylozoism, 
and (3) univocity and immanence. These qualities are discussed in more 
detail below. In the chapters that follow, these qualities are further char-
acterized through biological actants including bacteria, plasmids, in vitro 
cell lines, and minimal genome organisms.
Postcolonial and Decolonial Haecceities  
and the Project of Reframing
I am fully aware of the hesitation that may lie for many scholars in turn-
ing to Deleuzian concepts such as univocity and immanence, and particu-
larly the fear of obscuring or “flattening out” identities, politics, and the 
effects of power that can come with the use of such concepts. This is why 
I am purposeful throughout Molecular Feminisms about placing these 
philosophical concepts into conversation with the ideas of anticolonial 
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figures, and recent work in postcolonial and decolonial studies. The aim 
is to ensure some level of contextual accountability to this ontological and 
ethical framework. Of course, it must be understood that there is no sin-
gular or fixed context as such that can be said to define any given event. 
Just as matter, an event, or even the meaning of a text cannot be fixed, 
so too is true for context. Having said this, there is no point tiptoeing 
around my reason behind developing biophilosophies of becoming. Put 
simply, it is to learn how to deterritorialize or decolonize our thought by 
reframing dominant relations and practices found in both in feminism 
and in science.
Postcolonial, decolonial, and indigenous studies scholars have taught 
me the importance of considering the broader context of knowledge- 
making practices that come with a given philosophical concept or onto-
logical gesture. They have taught me that one way to “decolonize relations 
and practices” is to give voice to a diverse range of knowledge bases in 
order to produce new ontological accounts.34 In this way, concerns regard-
ing the context of an event can also become opportunities to think about 
social justice. For instance, as decolonial frameworks, both feminist and 
postcolonial STS argue that “Western modern technosciences tend to 
distribute their benefits primarily to already well-resourced groups and 
their costs to economically and politically vulnerable groups.”35 Both fields 
also prioritize the concerns of those who have been marginalized or are 
considered “other” by the global North, calling attention to issues involv-
ing, but not limited to, the “environment, development, corporatization, 
and militarism.”36 
Sandra Harding explains that decolonial perspectives simultaneously 
allow for the “disunity of science” as well as “scientific pluralism.”37 In the 
case of Latin America, she states, “Latin American decolonial theory has 
been shaped by liberation theology, dependency theory, Paulo Freire’s 
work, the distinctive history in Latin America (LA) of development in the 
context of persisting underdevelopment, and by chaotic recent economic 
and political histories in many of these countries. Different national his-
tories have included different practices of inequality.”38 She writes that 
decolonial theory emphasizes the importance of “knowledge that is other-
wise,” where the term “otherwise” is understood as “an alternative to both 
neoliberal and Marxian understandings of democracy, anti- colonialism, 
modernity, tradition, capitalism, ontology, epistemology, and positivism.”39 
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Similarly, Laura Foster sees the decolonial approach as “a set of research 
processes (and political practices) that seek to change the hegemonic 
ordering of knowledge production.”40 In her work on the hoodia plant, 
patents, and indigenous knowledge in South Africa, for instance, Foster 
sees the decolonial perspective as an important tool in the “project of 
reframing.”41
Therefore, although some may consider it odd to bring Deleuzian 
thought together with postcolonial and decolonial perspectives to develop 
biophilosophies of becoming, my collaboration with postcolonial and 
decolonial STS scholars over the years has taught me several important 
lessons regarding the benefits of developing interdisciplinary encounters. 
Simone Bignall and Paul Patton, for instance, remind us that in her famous 
essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points to 
Deleuze (as well as Foucault) as “being guilty of a Eurocentrism that fails 
to acknowledge how such ‘speech’ must be presented within the privileged 
structures of Western epistemology and representation in order to be 
comprehended or perceived as sensible.”42 Yet many postcolonial scholars 
believe that there is still some value to putting postcolonial theory into 
conversation with Deleuzian thought. For instance, Bignall and Patton 
attempt to draw some parallels between Deleuze’s philosophical work and 
themes in postcolonial studies, including shared “comments about the 
imperialism of normative Western forms of Oedipal subjectivity; move-
ments of de/reterritorialization describing a conceptual politics of capture 
and relative liberation; creation of hybrid and migratory forms of selfhood 
through relational processes of becoming, and of course [the idea of] 
nomads and their relation to the ‘war-machines’ that embody acts of resis-
tance against the imperial ‘state-form.’”43 Closely related to the project at 
hand, Bignall and Patton see the value of Deleuzian concepts such as that 
of “minoritarian subjectivities and minor languages that introduce a 
deconstructive ‘stuttering’ into majoritarian identities, discourses and 
literary forms” for postcolonial work.44
Similarly, in reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s theories such as 
becoming and the body without organs (BwO) and their relationship to 
postcolonial theory and feminism, Sushmita Chatterjee explains that the 
“theory is often seen as extremely Eurocentric and elitist in celebrating 
the ability to play at will. What does ‘dismantling the self ’ mean for post-
colonial subjects? Couldn’t it be another insidious power ruse to distort 
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the agency of subjects already dismantled through the politics of 
colonialism?”45 However, like Bignall and Patton, Chatterjee also com-
ments on the possible utility of these concepts in creating interdisciplin-
ary conversations. “While recognizing these shortcomings,” she writes, 
“it is also important to discern Deleuze’s utility for postcolonial studies 
where this theory can be of great help to conceptualize minoritarian 
becomings, think about imaginative possibilities, and move beyond dif-
ferent limitations that colonize worlds and lives. . . . For postcolonial femi-
nism, the ‘politics of becoming’ can work actively to decolonize relations 
and practices.”46
The imaginative possibilities that Deleuzian thought brings to postco-
lonial theory (and vice versa, I suggest) is highlighted further by Rey Chow. 
Resonating with my own reason behind turning to Deleuze to work toward 
a biology that feminists desire, in a recent collection of essays Chow sug-
gests that “following Deleuze’s lead” would be “eminently logical for schol-
ars to embark on an affirmative postcolonial studies, one that is less 
anxiously preoccupied with the mechanisms and apparatuses of European 
exclusion, perhaps, and more substantively engaged with the transforma-
tive potential” that concepts such as “becoming, deterritorialization, 
assemblages, multiplicities, affects, virtualities, bodies without organs, 
nomads, the rhizome, and so forth” have to offer.47 Using what she calls 
“Deleuze’s method,” Chow admits to a certain utopianism in Deleuze’s 
work, but she also suggests that this utopianism can be used by postcolo-
nial studies to inspire liberatory thought. Thus, as I put forward biophi-
losophies of becoming for feminism and molecular biology, it is crucial for 
me that this philosophical approach attend to questions of context and 
work to decolonize certain established relations and practices. As I motion 
us toward molecular feminisms and biophilosophies of becoming, and ask 
us to consider biological organisms in terms of events, the question to 
remember is, How do we also consider the context of any such given event? 
It is precisely the context of an event that Deleuze and Guattari are 
referring to by using the concept of “haecceity.” This concept attends to 
the specificity and individuality of any given event. “There is a mode of 
individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or sub-
stance,” they state. “We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a 
winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking 
nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing 
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or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of 
relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities 
to affect and be affected.”48 One way to understand a haecceity, and what 
makes any given event unique, is to think about things in terms of their 
ratios of motion and rest (what Deleuze and Guattari call longitude) as 
well as their intensities and affective qualities (what Deleuze and Guattari 
call latitude). The vast multiplicities of possible latitudes and longitudes 
contribute to the singularity of an event. 
While discussing the multiplicity of how Deleuze’s name itself has been 
taken up by so many postcolonial scholars, Réda Bensmaïa suggests that 
a haecceity allows us to ask specific questions about the events we are 
interested in analyzing such as, “What century are we in? What wave is 
sweeping us along? What history?” and “What new visibilities are possible 
after the postcolony?”49 Bensmaïa makes the case that the concept of the 
haecceity helps us to simultaneously identify and name the “singularities 
which characterize forces, events, movements and moving objects, winds 
and typhoons” but also equally name a “period of time.”50 In this way we 
can come to see that the postcolonial as well as the decolonial are not only 
haecceities in and of themselves in the sense that they name a period of 
time, but also strategic approaches that we can use to identify and name 
some specific singularities that define an event. Postcolonial and decolo-
nial haecceities make it possible to think about events in relation to spe-
cific dominant practices of knowledge production, particularly in relation 
to institutions that have in the past, and in some cases, still continue to 
support imperialism and colonialism. 
For instance, in relation to postcolonial and decolonial STS, Itty Abra-
ham suggests that “postcolonial techno-science[,] as a field of enquiry that 
crosses geopolitical boundaries as it tracks flows, circuits of scientists, 
knowledges, machines, and techniques[,] is a critical way of thinking 
about science and technology.”51 Abraham points out, however, that the 
emphasis that has been placed on the situatedness or the “local” within 
postcolonial STS (and within feminist STS, I argue) is often misunder-
stood. “When the postcolonial as a mode of analysis is linked to a fixed 
site of irreducible knowledge claims,” he states, “it articulates an ontology 
that ties knowledge to location as a singular and essential quality of 
place.”52 Therefore, rather than using the postcolonial or the decolonial to 
mean the study of institutions and knowledge-making practices belonging 
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to a specific location that was once or is still colonized, I use the terms 
more broadly. Such scholars as Itty Abraham, Suman Seth, Warwick 
Ander son, Sandra Harding, Vandana Shiva, Kavita Philip, Michelle Murphy, 
Gabrielle Hecht, Banu Subramaniam, Laura Foster, Kim TallBear, Anne 
Pollock, Amit Prasad, Kaushik Sunder Rajan, and more have shown that 
incorporating a postcolonial, decolonial, feminist, or indigenous STS anal-
ysis means reflecting on the situatedness and specificity of technology-
mediated events, including biological events, in terms of capital, labor, 
time, geography, and scale—all of which can be examined through social 
institutions.53 
Although the following is by no means a comprehensive list, recent 
work in postcolonial and decolonial STS emphasizes that scientific prac-
tices and technological interventions should be contextualized in a vari-
ous number of ways, including an analysis of (1) transnational processes 
of colonialism and imperialism; (2) capitalist practices of production, con-
sumption, and commodification; (3) gendered and raced labor of produc-
tion and reproduction and the abstraction of this labor; (4) neoliberal 
forms of individualism and imperialism; and (5) technological impacts on 
global as well as local scales. Each of these approaches keeps an eye on the 
different elements that contribute to the specificity of an event while also 
developing a broad scope of analysis. These approaches have taught me to 
remember the situatedness of any given becoming and to remember that 
our understanding of biological and technological events is always con-
nected to specific practices of knowledge production.
Changefulness and Nonhuman Becomings
Baba Bharati’s epigraph at the beginning of the chapter speaks of the 
journey a molecule must initially make by becoming a blade of grass in 
order to find its place back to love. Here, what Bharati means by “love” is 
in fact the Lord Krishna himself, from whose bosom it is believed the 
universe was formed and to whose bosom all matter and forms are longing 
to return. Bharati (1868–1914) was a Hindu missionary who came to the 
United States to spread Krishna Chaitanya consciousness and Gaudiya 
Vaishnava theology. The quote is derived from the text Sree Krishna: The 
Lord of Love, written at the turn of the twentieth century.54 The intention 
of the book, written as a Hindu theistic text in English by a colonial subject 
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of British India, was to share a Hindu story of the history of the universe, 
from its birth to its destruction, to an American audience.
It must be noted that some postmodern critiques of science and ratio-
nalism have recently been aligned with “Hindutva” or renewed Hindu 
nationalist movements that pay increased attention to “Vedic science” to 
establish Hindu moral superiority.55 I highlight the work of Bharati here 
to show that the idea of ontological univocity, which works against any 
sense of moral superiority, is not unique to the “West” or to continental 
philosophy alone. In the introduction to Bharati’s text, he explains that 
the word “Krishna” in the ancient language of Sanskrit is derived from the 
root word “karsha,” which means “to draw.” Bharati explains: “Krishna 
means that which draws us to Itself; and what in the world draws us all 
more powerfully than Love? It is the ‘gravitation’ of the modern scientist. 
It is the one source and substance of all magnetism, of all attraction; and 
when that love is absolutely pure, its power to draw is absolute, too.”56 It 
is not my intention to question what we know about gravity through mod-
ern science or simply replace what we have come to know about gravity 
through the practices of scientific experimentation or the disciplines of 
mathematics and physics with the term “love.” I am interested in what 
Bharati describes as the “draw” of love, and want to suggest that the 
attraction, magnetism, and pull toward something that occurs due to any 
form of longing may also be characterized in terms of desire. 
Interestingly, it is this draw or desire that, according to this text, pro-
duces motion or movement in matter. Bharati explains: “All matter is 
changeful—matter is nothing but collected forms of change. Its seeming 
substance embodies but motion of change, so that its inmost attribute is 
changefulness.”57 Due to this quality of changefulness, he notes, nothing 
that is living in the universe is finite, “not even a blade of grass, or the 
tiniest speck of earth.”58 Bharati draws here not only from Hindu theology 
but also from scientific research and publications by the biophysicist Sir 
Jagadish Chandra Bose (whose work is discussed in more detail in chap-
ter 2). Around the same time as the publication of Bharati’s text in 1904, 
Bose was conducting experiments on electromagnetic waves, radiowaves, 
and plant behavioral biology. His experiments troubled the distinctions 
between the living and nonliving and suggested that the capacity to 
respond to a stimulus was not only present in humans and animal tissues 
but also in plants, metals, and other “nonliving” entities.59 Drawing on 
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these findings, Bharati extended the definition of what counts as living 
and therefore what has the capacity to express desire, changefulness, and 
movement, far beyond the human. 
While explaining Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming, Colebrook sug-
gests that “becoming inhuman” is to understand that “life is the potential 
to differ”—a sentiment that fits nicely with Bharati’s claim that “all matter 
is changeful.”60 “Becoming inhuman” resonates with Bharati’s idea that in 
order to think about the history of the universe and the passing of time 
in new ways, we can think with the different temporalities and rhythms 
of grass. In fact, Colebrook argues that while developing a philosophy of 
becoming, Deleuze places a great deal of importance on different rhythms 
of temporality and scales of duration that are to be found in inhuman or 
nonhuman becomings. Colebrook states: “Deleuze seeks to expose an 
inhuman time that will open thought up to a future, a future that is no 
longer grounded on the unfolding of human history. . . . The history that 
Deleuze and Guattari compose in A Thousand Plateaus places human 
becoming alongside other planes of becoming. Within human life there 
are flows of varying speed and slowness—varying degrees of habit, mem-
ory, promising and desiring—while there are also the speeds and flows of 
non-human becomings (including animals, machines, molecules and 
languages).”61
In recent feminist and posthumanist projects, turning toward the 
nonhuman and decentering the human has been an important aspect of 
the critiques of anthropocentrism and the liberal humanist subject. In 
her most recent work, Elizabeth Grosz speaks to the role of the nonhuman 
and inhuman in our human endeavors. She writes:
Art, science, and technology are not frames we impose on matter  
and ideality but explorations and inventions through the framing  
that incorporeals provide for our ongoing explorations of matter.  
They are contingent, contested elaborations of the world’s qualities  
and processes. Art, science, and technology, not to mention the creation 
of economic and political systems, do not impose themselves from the 
outside on brute matter . . . but are rather the elaborations, in poten-
tially infinite directions, of trajectories, lines of development, that are 
already there, immanent, in the prehuman and nonhuman world. It is  
to the prehuman, the inhuman, the organic and the inorganic, that we 
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must direct our efforts, and which provide us with human ways to 
invent, to create ourselves and what comes beyond us.62
What is important here, and what can be thought of as the first set of 
tendencies that contribute to a project on biophilosophies of becoming, 
is to realize that becomings, and the capacity for changefulness, should 
be extended beyond human bodies to other organic organisms such as 
animals and plants, and even to inorganic compounds, molecules, and 
matter itself.
Kinship and Hylozoism
Barbara McClintock’s epigraph would also have us reconsider our orienta-
tion toward grass. I am particularly struck by her sentiment that grass has 
the capability to scream.63 McClintock (1902–1992) was a biologist who 
won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1983 for her discovery 
of transposons or “jumping genes”. She dedicated her life to studying 
the chromosomes of different species of maize starting in the 1930s and 
pioneered the field of cytogenetics.64 McClintock biographer Evelyn Fox 
Keller has explained that developing a “feeling for the organism” was 
apparently a common refrain for McClintock while describing her own 
approach to scientific research. For me, this phrase of McClintock’s has 
served as a refrain in my own efforts to develop feminist practices in 
the natural sciences that heighten our awareness of ethical engagements 
with what it is that we wish to know. McClintock’s “feeling for the organ-
ism” returns us to the question of developing an ethics of matter, the 
broader implications of which are discussed in more detail in chapter 2. 
For now, however, I want to hone in on two points McClintock raises—
namely, the ideas of kinship and hylozoism. 
Interestingly, Keller downplays McClintock’s claim that grass has the 
capability to scream, describing it as “an uncharacteristic lapse into 
hyperbole.”65 In specific reference to McClintock’s statement that she feels 
sorry for walking on grass, Keller states, “a bit of poetic license, perhaps, 
but McClintock is not a poet; she is a scientist.”66 McClintock was obvi-
ously very attentive to the capabilities of nonhuman actants, and this 
willingness to describe the capabilities of grass using expressions com-
monly reserved for humans (such as screaming) should not be dismissed 
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as crude anthropomorphizing. I would argue that McClintock wants us to 
reorient ourselves in such a way so that we may learn to be with grass, and 
to listen to what grass has to say, sing, and scream despite our physical, 
emotional, intellectual differences or presumed distance as species. She 
wants us to be aware of the fact that we do harm to grass, but I don’t think 
that this awareness is geared toward preventing us from walking on grass 
altogether. Rather, it is beckoning us to recognize a sense of kinship or 
co-becoming.
Donna Haraway has spent a great deal of time and effort thinking and 
writing about a similar sense of kinship, whether through her work on 
cyborgs or dogs or most recently by drawing our attention to chthonic 
critters (those that dwell in the underworld).67 “If there is to be a multi-
species ecojustice, which can also embrace diverse human people,” Har-
away states, “it is high time that feminists exercise leadership in 
imagination, theory, and action to unravel the ties of both genealogy and 
kin, and kin and species. . . . We need to make kin sym-chthonically, sym-
poetically. Who and whatever we are, we need to make-with—become 
with, compose-with—the earth-bound.”68 A blade of grass may be about 
as earth-bound as it gets. It so happens that most species of grass grow 
either as rhizomes, with their roots joined in multiple networks just under 
the surface of the soil, or as stolons, with their roots growing as outwardly 
stretching veins running just along the surface of the ground. It turns out 
that making kin with grass, both sym-chthonically and sym-poetically, 
may not be such an odd place to begin after all.
However, McClintock’s sentiment describes not only a sense of kinship 
between humans and grass but also a hylozoism that recognizes the capa-
bilities of grass on an equal footing to those of humans. Hylozoism frames 
nonhuman forms, as well as matter that has yet to assume a form, as being 
active or “alive” in some way.69 Rather than following the philosophical 
tradition of hylomorphism, where all matter is viewed as passive or inert 
until it assumes a pre-given form, through hylozoism one has to be will-
ing to consider that all matter, even prior to the movement of this matter 
into any particular form or relation, has a self-sufficiency and the ability 
to exert some sort of push and pull on the universe.70 For instance, the 
scientific discipline of taxonomy, which has named and divided grass into 
more than eleven thousand species, follows in the tradition of hylomor-
phism whereby clear distinctions are drawn between the subordinate 
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properties of “raw” matter compared to those of actualized or pre-given 
forms. As useful as it is for organizational purposes, taxonomy is ulti-
mately a practice of drawing lines between raw matters and forms. Tax-
onomy must go even further by separating forms from each other that 
are deemed as being different in kind. It is a scientific system that has 
been utilized to not only differentiate humans from their natural world 
but to give different elements, organisms, and even some humans a lesser 
or subordinate status along a supposed great chain of being. This scientific 
system requires us to deny the capacities for change that exists in all 
matter and to rule out the ontological reliance any given entity has upon 
another.
Lastly, I am struck by McClintock’s claim that “basically everything is 
one,” which in other terms may be referring to the univocity of being.71 In 
my opinion, she is not trying to collapse, flatten, or disregard this differ-
ence. In fact, she spent her entire life analyzing the many different species 
of corn and learning the unique cytogenetic intricacies of each. This con-
nection between the qualities of kinship and hylozoism led McClintock to 
develop a feeling for the kernels of corn that she studied; it is the ontologi-
cal univocity articulated through these qualities that biophilosophies of 
becoming can bring forward.
Univocity and Immanence
Rabindranath Tagore’s epigraph encourages us to frame our relationship 
with the blade of grass in terms of a live potential, thereby blurring the 
lines that have typically been used to divide humans from their non-
sentient and nonliving surroundings. Tagore (1861–1941) was a Bengali 
polymath who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. A writer, poet, 
musician, and artist, he held a deep regard for even the smallest mur-
murings that could be found in nature. Tagore established Visha Bharati 
University in Santiniketan, India, to put into practice an educational phi-
losophy and pedagogy that brought to the fore the importance of one’s 
orientations toward nature. Tagore is noted for his profound sense of 
humanism, but this humanism was not the same as that humanism we 
think of today which holds at its center the modern liberal humanist sub-
ject. As Debashish Banerji has noted: “Tagore’s critical humanism, rooted 
in a pre-Enlightenment Indian canon, included properties which exceeded 
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the human, . . . we find a Tagore who, while including the freedom, justice, 
and poetry of the human, reached for identity beyond the human, a 
becoming-other, through affective empathy, an identification with exis-
tences beyond boundaries.”72 
Regardless of the religious or spiritual beliefs of Bharati, McClintock, 
or Tagore, we know that many organized religions such as Buddhism and 
Jainism would also have us consider the interconnectedness of the natu-
ral world more carefully. For example, in the case of Jainism, the principle 
of ahimsa provides its followers with a karmic impetus to do no harm to 
other life forms including animals, insects, plants, and microorganisms. 
However, all three thinkers highlighted here are pushing for an intimacy 
with grass that is not quite captured by a religious principle such as 
ahimsa. It seems that they are motioning us toward something other 
than a karmically-driven, nonviolent stance toward grass. Theirs is an 
ethics of encounter. Karen Barad has extended the onto-ethical relation 
to the ethico-onto-epistemological, marking the inseparability of ethics, 
ontology, and epistemology.73 In later chapters we turn to the fact none 
of these relations are without context, but for now let us remain within 
this onto-ethical plane. Given this starting point, the first onto-ethical 
maneuver we must deploy involves becoming more aware of change-
fulness and open to the capabilities of nonhuman others. Next, we must 
invite a sense of kinship and develop a more hylozoic view of the universe 
that recognizes the expression of certain capacities in all forms of matter. 
These capacities may not resemble our own, and of course these expres-
sions will differ between animals, plants, and rocks. Recognizing these 
capacities brings us to the third set of qualities that contribute to biophi-
losophies of becoming: that of univocity and immanence. 
The idea of ontological univocity would have us consider the differ-
ences that exist between humans and nonhuman others as existing on 
or even comprising an immanent plane of processes and becomings. In a 
traditional metaphysics characterized by hierarchical taxonomies and 
well-established orders of being, the gesture of bringing our human selves 
down to the level of an organism such as grass would undoubtedly be odd 
and may require knocking the illusions of our superior status down more 
than a notch or two. It is difficult from our vantage point as humans to 
summon such a sense of proximity to something as elemental as grass, let 
alone foster the ability to hear grass scream or acknowledge that grass can 
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listen to music, unless we are prepared to learn how to live and play on a 
more level, more equal, or, in other words, an immanent field. The idea of 
ontological univocity levels this playing field, which in turn is an ethical 
maneuver. For Spinoza, and philosophers that have followed in his tradi-
tion including Deleuze, it is hard to keep a clear division between ontology 
and ethics. For these philosophers, ontology is ethics—and both exist on 
an immanent plane. In other words, how we think about ontology, or the 
nature of being, is in itself a matter of ethics, and in our case, how we can 
start thinking about an ethics of matter. Together, immanence and the 
univocity of beings allows us to imagine what it means to think about 
grass and other nonhuman and inorganic matters that sit in an audience 
hall with us and have the capacity to appreciate the songs and music pro-
duced not only by humans but also those songs created by clouds and 
forests alike. Paying attention to what grass or other organic and inorganic 
matters perceive is an example of a Deleuzian transcendental empiricism 
or as Colebrook has described, Deleuze’s “inhuman philosophy.”74 
Becoming a blade of grass therefore is not about finding this organ-
ism’s place along a hierarchical ladder or evolutionary tree, or highlighting 
what properties or abilities grass lacks compared to humans and other 
organisms. Neither is it about impersonating or mimicking grass. Rather, 
becoming a blade of grass is a biophilosophy of becoming that involves 
thinking about the qualities of changefulness and nonhuman becomings, 
kinship and hylozoism, as well as univocity and immanence. It is about 
making connections to organisms and elements such as grass so that we 
might find new ways to reach out and new ways to respond to the world 
around us. It is about using strategies, or what I refer to in chapter 2 as 
microphysiologies of desire, to approach difference in the world—not 
through lack but rather through positive and productive senses. Ulti-
mately, it is about breaking our all too comfortable habits and opening 




I now proceed to a demonstration of the fact that whatever be the 
mechanism by which they are brought about, these plant responses 
are physiological in their character.
—Jagadish Chandra Bose
Compared to most animals, plant movement is slow; it occurs via 
growth processes and benefits accrue due to maintenance of connec-
tions between sister ramets. . . . Ramets remain connected via stolons 
or rhizomes for variable lengths of time and these connections allow 
for the transport of nutrients and hormones between the mother and 
daughter ramets.
—Erica Waters and Maxine Watson
Thanks to the entanglements of more than three decades of feminist cri-
tiques of science anchored in feminist health activism, feminist theory, 
and feminist philosophy of science, and more recent work taking place 
under the mantles of feminist materialisms and posthumanist ethics, 
there appears to be a particularly rich opportunity at this moment to think 
about feminism, molecular biology, and matter along more molecular lines 
of questioning. Why am I interested in biophilosophies of becoming that 
create minoritarian projects, deterritorializing gestures, and micropo-
litical sensibilities at the interstices of molecular biology and feminism? 
Biophilosophies of becoming can change how we perceive and encounter 
the world around us and, furthermore, can be used to support practice-
oriented feminist STS approaches in the lab. As a feminist scientist, I 
have always been deeply curious about the relationships that form 
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between the knower and what is to become the known. I have also been 
curious as to how, as feminist scientists, we are to proceed with our sci-
entific inquiries once we start paying more attention to these relation-
ships. Put differently, my time in the lab has made me curious about 
developing an ethics of matter. 
I begin this chapter with a quote from an experimental account made 
by Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937). Bose was a Bengali scientist who 
conducted his life’s work as a colonial subject under British rule in India.1 
He pioneered investigations of radiowaves, microwaves, and even gave the 
first public demonstration of the existence of electromagnetic waves in 
1895, managing to use electromagnetic waves to ring a faraway bell and 
even fire a pistol.2 Bose, who can be described as the first biophysicist in 
our modern understanding of the term, used electrical signals to explore 
and trouble the limits of what we consider to be a life, or a living form. His 
scientific findings are fascinating, as are the instruments he designed to 
measure what he called “response” in animal tissues, plants, and metals. 
Two aspects of Bose’s work spark particular interest for me as they relate 
to the project of using biophilosophies of becoming to decolonize and 
reframe dominant relations and modes of knowing in both feminism 
and science.
The first aspect is that despite having invented wireless telegraphy 
and the technology that led to the radio two years before Guglielmo Mar-
coni took credit for the invention, Bose was adamantly against the idea 
of patenting and therefore chose not to lay such claims to ownership over 
his pioneering research. Instead, he was interested in the processes of 
discovery and apparently regarded the idea of patenting his scientific find-
ings for monetary profit with a fair amount of disdain.3 I am interested 
in this proprietary tension that people often raise when discussing Bose 
and his contributions to science, and what it might also have to say about 
Bose’s alignment with a particular ontology of the natural world as well 
as his anticolonial stances within that world that might have informed 
his ethical relations to matter as a scientist. In addition to being a pio-
neering scientist, Bose belonged to the Brahmo Samaj, a Hindu reform 
movement that rejected polytheism, denounced the caste system, and 
played an important cultural role in the Bengal Renaissance. A key tenet 
of Brahmoism includes an understanding of god as being both infinite 
and singular, both immanent and transcendent, and one who is present 
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in everything from fire and water, to plants and trees. Another key prin-
ciple, specifically in reference to love, is that the reform movement asks 
its followers to respect all of creation.4 It is quite possible that these prin-
ciples also informed Bose’s ethical approaches to studying and learning 
from the natural world.
The second aspect of Bose’s work that I draw from involves his use of 
electrical activity as the measure of a physiological response in plants, 
metals, and animal tissue. His definition of the physiological properties 
of response and what constituted a “response” versus a simple “reaction” 
in nonhumans and nonorganic life were contested during his lifetime. 
More than a century later, scientists are returning to Bose’s research to 
reevaluate the categorical distinctions we have drawn between humans, 
nonhumans, organic and inorganic life. Bose was the first scientist who 
convincingly argued that plants not only have a nervous system of their 
own but that they also have the ability to feel pain.5 He demonstrated that 
the physiological ability to respond extends beyond the human to not only 
animals, plants, and microorganisms but even to rocks, metals, minerals, 
elements, and anything else capable of experiencing sensitivity to external 
stimuli. I am drawn to the ontology and ethics that Bose’s approach pres-
ents and wish to use his claim of a physiology of response in this chapter 
to start reimagining our own feminist encounters with biology. 
Despite many traditions of thought that have defined desire as a lack 
or as a negative concept, the abilities to respond, to act, and to react are 
also qualities that can be used to describe the notion of desire. Desire is 
what motivates us to reach out toward, grow closer to, and in some cases 
even touch the other. As Elizabeth Grosz has explained, drawing from 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s attempts to provide alternatives to 
dominant psychoanalytic interpretations, desire can be understood oth-
erwise. “Instead of understanding desire as a lack or a hole in being,” she 
states, “desire is understood by Deleuze—again following Spinoza and 
Nietzsche—as immanent, as positive and productive, a fundamental full 
and creative relation. Desire is what produces, what makes things, forges 
connections, creates relations, produces machinic alignments . . . desire 
is an actualization, a series of practices, action, production, bringing 
together components, making machines, making reality.”6
Bose’s research on the physiology of response in plants helps me to 
better understand Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the micropolitics of 
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desire, Grosz’s work on feminist becomings, Donna Haraway’s call to mak-
ing kin, and Rosi Braidotti’s posthumanist ethics. Following a transplanted 
line of flight from Bose’s physiology of response, I put forward micro-
physiologies of desire as an applied ethics of matter. Microphysiologies of 
desire can be thought of as practices of encounter for feminists, feminist 
scientists, and scientist feminists.7 They are a way to describe the nature-
cultural, as well as a strategy to proceed forward in our encounters with 
other humans, nonhuman animals, plants, bacteria, and inorganic others 
that comprise the naturecultural. Microphysiologies of desire serve as the 
material and semiotic nervous system of biophilosophies of becoming, 
extending beyond a single body and connecting the knower to what is 
to become the known. They put into practice and apply the ontological 
lessons drawn from biophilosophies of becoming by (1) cultivating an 
openness to nonhuman becomings and changefulness; (2) making con-
nections through kinship and hylozoism; and (3) creating movement by 
way of univocity and immanence. Feminist philosophers and feminist STS 
scholars have been thinking about microphysiologies of desire in various 
ways, under various names, for decades. This chapter attempts to gather 
together these practices of encounter, not with the intention of creating 
one unified microphysiology of desire, but rather to show the rich and 
diverse ways that developing an ethics of matter has been at the heart of 
so many feminist desires.
Generative Desires
While revisiting her doctoral work on morning glories and color variation, 
Banu Subramaniam weaves together complex genealogies of evolutionary 
biology, eugenics, and invasive plants through feminist critiques of sci-
ence, storytelling, and fiction.8 Subramaniam poses the question, “How 
does one study the naturecultural world?”9 She offers plant thigmatropism 
as a model mechanism, stating:
An academy with separate and distinct disciplines has carved knowledge 
production into unique objects of studies and methodologies, obscuring 
the teeming life between the worlds of natures and cultures. . . . Inspired 
by the touch-sensitive thigmatropic tendrils of morning glories, which 
allow the plants to scale large objects and burrow into narrow crevices,  
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I narrate tales of morning glories through the curious and adventurous 
tendrils of naturecultural storytelling.10
Derived from the Greek root “thigma,” which means “to touch,” thigmat-
ropism describes the ability of plants to sense and respond to changes in 
surface conditions when they come in contact with another object.11 Sub-
ramaniam uses thigmatropism as her methodology for conducting inter-
disciplinary work. Inspired by similar tendrillic tendencies, but following 
more closely the immanent and stolonic extensions thrown out by crab-
grass, this chapter develops a cartography for molecular feminisms.
My challenge in writing this chapter is to develop the project of molec-
ular feminisms by learning from the capabilities of the stoloniferous plant. 
In the chapter epigraph, Erica Waters and Maxine Watson explain that 
stoloniferous plants such as strawberry plants grow both as a clonal colony 
(genet) that shares the same genetic material and also as individuals 
(ramets) that work together within this colony. Applying optimal foraging 
theory to plant growth, they explain that plants must be able to “sense, 
interpret, and respond to environmental signals.”12 For stoloniferous 
plants that grow by making aboveground connections in particular, appar-
ently the “detection of differences in red/far-red ratios via phytochromes 
and other photoreceptors induces plant morphological responses such as 
enhanced elongation rates.”13 The morphological responses initiated by 
stolons therefore contribute to ramet growth across generations, from 
mother ramet to daughter ramet.
Accordingly, microphysiologies of desire aim to extend across and con-
tribute to the growth of generations of feminist scholarship that have 
examined ontological and ethical approaches to matter. This does not 
mean that critical analysis of previous work becomes impossible or that 
tensions and disagreements between the work are overlooked. Rather a 
purposeful effort is made to avoid the tired and predictable Oedipal ten-
dencies found throughout most scholarly traditions that would have us 
believe that theoretical progress can only occur by dismissing or discredit-
ing previous forms of scholarship. Thus, instead of declaring the arrival 
of a “new” feminist approach to science, biology, the body, or a new ethics 
of matter by turning away from “older” work in feminist STS, feminist 
theory, or feminist materialisms, I use microphysiologies of desire to 
uncover lines of flight made possible by these previous engagements. 
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Similarly, Iris van der Tuin has articulated a need for moving away from 
our habits of characterizing a single and central lineage of feminist 
thought to thinking across generations. She advocates for generational 
feminisms with the suggestion that we use “jumping generations” as a 
feminist methodology. “The methodology of jumping generations,” van der 
Tuin states, “changes the parameters of generational feminism and enables 
the abandonment of a feminist center, takes advantage of running on mul-
tiple and transversal tracks, and stimulates channeling one’s energies and 
desires to seeking commonalities in difference and useful coalitions vis-à-
vis current day problems. This is helpful for feminist politics in academia, 
art, and activism because it allows us to act on lessons learned from equal-
ity and difference feminisms when we discuss issues of representation.”14
In my own research in molecular biology and reproductive neuro-
endocrinology, the act of bringing forward decades of feminist STS work 
on science, biologies, and matter through a generative lens has been cru-
cial. These bodies of work directly motivated and challenged me to enter 
into a molecular biology and neuroscience wet lab in the first place. In the 
lab I participated in scientific projects where it was my responsibility to 
ask questions about the presence and mechanisms of androgen, estrogen, 
and melatonin receptors in gonadotropin releasing hormone (GnRH) 
neurons. I asked my scientific questions while keeping an eye to what it 
was that feminists wanted to know and change about how biological and 
reproductive physiology research was being conducted at the molecular 
level. For example, in The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of Repro-
duction, feminist anthropologist Emily Martin shared her research on 
the metaphors most commonly used in scientific and medical literatures 
to describe the processes of menstruation, birth, and menopause.15 Martin 
provided evidence of gendered and hierarchical language being used to 
describe the cellular and molecular processes of reproduction mediated by 
the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal (HPG) axis in mammals. She argued 
that not only was this language being used to describe scientific results, 
but that the very design of scientific experiments on female and male 
reproductive physiology was influenced by these gendered and hierarchical 
paradigms. Her analysis, and the work of many other feminists invested in 
reproductive and social justice, led me to a lab where I had the opportunity 
to search for paradigm-shifting scientific evidence and create alternate 
modes of approaching the study of reproductive neuroendocrinology.16 
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Conducting scientific work in a lab was how I was able to practice my 
feminism, and I am very grateful for the generational support that led me 
there.
If you have ever watched stolonic grass grow, you know that there is 
no center from which the single blades emerge. Rather, runners crisscross 
on the surface of the soil, interrupting and integrating into already estab-
lished patches. With the strategies of jumping generations and stolonic 
growth in mind, this chapter highlights those approaches that could be of 
most use to the feminist scientist who wishes to think about their encoun-
ters with the world through the scientific practices of biology. The idea of 
molecular feminisms itself is of course a direct take on difference femi-
nisms. As I have stated, and as van der Tuin notes, difference feminisms 
and equality feminisms need not be at odds; they can work together. Just 
as a stolon can develop both horizontal shoots as well as vertical shoots 
that grow out of nodes, molecular projects are not in opposition to molar 
projects. In fact, van der Tuin’s methodology of “jumping generations” 
draws out the generative capacity of thinking about the molar and molec-
ular together through a generational lens. We can, for instance, connect the 
methodology of jumping generations itself to a rich genealogy of feminist 
philosophical work that includes Braidotti’s theory of transpositions and 
Chela Sandoval’s idea of split consciousness.17 Both of these may in turn 
be connected to Barbara McClintock’s scientific discovery of transposons 
or “jumping genes” in molecular genetics.18
Multiple generations of feminist materialist thinkers have made it pos-
sible for feminist scientists to consider questions of ontology and ethics 
more closely while seeing scientific research as a means of practicing their 
feminism. Following cues from such feminist STS scholars as Karen Barad, 
Patti Lather, Isabelle Stengers, and Haraway, and by drawing from the col-
laborative works of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Keller and McClintock, 
the remainder of this chapter explores microphysiologies of desire that 
address the relationship between the knower and the to-be-known. Using 
the concepts of agential realism and intra-actions, getting lost, cosmopoli-
tics, becoming-with, and a feeling for the organism, I present several dif-
ferent theoretical tools that feminists have already developed to think 
about an ethics of matter. 
The chapter ends with my own idea of “feeling around for the organ-
ism,” which I hope speaks to feminist scientists in the natural sciences and 
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helps put together a shared vocabulary between feminism and molecular 
biology. What is perhaps slightly different about my argument, compared 
to past feminist STS projects, is my emphasis on the point that ontology 
and ethics are coetaneous and that learning how to see the world has always 
also been about learning how to encounter that world. My experiences of 
working directly with DNA, proteins, cells, cultured cell lines, bacteria, 
animals, chemicals, radiation, and machines in the lab taught me this 
crucial lesson about ontology and ethics. That is why while turning to the 
onto-ethical aspects of molecular feminisms, I focus on the importance 
of creating practice-oriented feminist STS approaches. I call upon those 
encounters that the feminist scientist must have with the everyday mate-
rials, tools, customs, languages, and theories of science. Reflecting upon 
these encounters makes it possible to think differently in the sciences and 
in many cases prompts us to pursue less explored lines of flight in feminist 
theory and politics. 
Nonlinear Desires
Over the past several decades, the field of feminist STS has proliferated, 
producing rich feminist critiques of specific sciences and recuperating 
theories from the sciences for feminist ends. From the outset, feminists 
have pursued multiple theoretical approaches to thinking about science, 
ranging from “feminist theory of science,” “feminist theory in science,” 
“feminist theory out of science,” and most recently “science out of feminist 
theory.”19 Feminists from different disciplinary and activist traditions 
have contributed theoretically to feminist STS, and as the editors of the 
special issue of the journal differences dedicated to “feminist theory out of 
science” suggest, everything we know and do is already “theory all the way 
down.”20 Undoubtedly, there are many ways to organize the impressive 
range of theoretical work that falls within the scope of feminist STS. 
Entangled in various productive ways with science, these intersecting but 
divergent feminist orientations have raised a host of questions about the 
nature of scientific knowledge production. 
Distinguishing itself from metaphysics, religion, and superstition, 
“modern” science is often characterized as a knowledge-making practice 
that is rational, objective, empirical, experimental, and evidence-based. 
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Celebrating the capacity to discover the truth through systematic observa-
tion, hypothesis formulation, rigorous hypothesis testing, and falsifica-
tion, the scientific method purportedly frees individual knowers from the 
taint of idiosyncrasy, bias, prejudice, particularity, and sociocultural 
 values. As an interdisciplinary field that draws concepts and analytic 
 categories from anthropology, cultural studies, economics, feminist  theory, 
history, philosophy, political science, and sociology, feminist STS recog-
nizes the importance and value of scientific inquiry but seeks to move 
beyond these characterizations to think about science as a social practice. 
Investigating how science works through its historical emergence, and the 
social, economic, and political dimensions of institutionalized science, 
feminist STS has illuminated how social values permeate the varied prac-
tices, processes, and products of scientific research. Building upon a core 
tenet of the field of science and technology studies, feminist STS has fur-
ther illuminated the co-construction of science and society.
The field designations “feminist STS” and “feminist science studies” 
are often used interchangeably in the literature, and to complicate matters 
even further, feminist STS is also often referred to as “feminist techno-
science studies.” To many, these different designations have come to mean 
the same thing, and they do share a great deal of similarities in their 
disciplinary underpinnings and analytical frameworks. For example, all 
share common formative departure points such as critiques of positivism 
and pure objectivity. They all draw important theoretical insights into the 
body, biology, medicine and technology by reaching out to multiple 
sources of knowers and users. Scholars identifying with any one of these 
field names have responded to feminist, queer, intersex, and trans theory’s 
interrogations of sex, gender, and difference. In fact, long aware of the 
limits of mainstream feminism’s engagement with the concepts of sex and 
gender, both feminist science studies and feminist STS scholars have cul-
tivated different sets of analytical tools. Also, rather than positioning race, 
class, sexuality, and disability as intersectional additives to a theoretical 
mainframe of sex and gender analysis, questions regarding the body, mat-
ter, materiality, difference, and nature in these fields have been articulated 
through much broader frameworks.21 These frameworks have been atten-
tive, as Murphy has summarized, to transnational processes of colonial-
ism and postcolonialism, neoliberal capitalist practices of production, 
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consumption, and commodification, and particularly in the US context, 
women’s social justice movements that situated emerging reproductive 
and genetic technologies in relation to histories of slavery and eugenics.22 
Through a healthy feedback mechanism, many of these theoretical insights 
are now informing and reconfiguring key concepts that have typically been 
found in more canonized bodies of US- and European-based second-wave 
feminist thought. 
However, the designations of feminist STS and feminist science studies 
indicate slightly different theoretical approaches and histories of disciplin-
ary engagements that feminists have used to address questions regarding 
the role and impact of science and technology in our lives. From early work 
on the history of women in science, the persistent underrepresentation 
of women across STEM fields, and androcentrism in scientific discourses, 
the body of scholarship known as feminist science studies has paid par-
ticular attention to illuminating those practices in science that have led 
to the devaluation, marginalization, and exclusion of individuals based 
on such factors as gender, race, class, sexuality, disability, and colonialism. 
Rejecting the notion that these modes of exclusion are extraneous to sci-
ence, feminist science studies scholars have sought to demonstrate that 
exclusionary practices are constitutive of particular scientific endeavors 
and that certain sciences have played crucial roles in consolidating con-
structions of women, people of color, the economic underclasses, the colo-
nized, and the disabled as inferior and therefore less worthy of respect 
than elite property-owning white men. These studies have argued that in 
marked contrast to their claims of value-neutrality, various sciences have 
helped produce, sustain, and justify social inequalities and systems of 
domination. Much of this work was informed by commitments to creating 
socially just frameworks for conducting science.
Where feminist science studies can be noted for developing highly 
nuanced epistemological and methodological critiques of science, femi-
nist STS scholars have drawn our attention to and emphasized the co-
construction of science and society. Some feminist STS scholars have 
received their disciplinary training in the relatively new field of science 
and technology studies (STS) itself. STS draws primarily from historical 
and sociological studies of science and is mainly interested in delineating 
the relationships between scientific knowledge, technological systems, and 
society. Key contributions from actor-network theory developed in the 
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sociology of science, from feminists scholars such as Lucy Suchman and 
Judy Wajcman who examined our relationships with technology, and 
from Haraway’s figuration of the cyborg, helped form the field of feminist 
STS which has flourished into a larger umbrella term since the early 
1990s.23 With an emphasis on working with the sciences while also creat-
ing interdisciplinary dialogs, feminist STS has become a multidisciplinary 
field drawing from a various number of areas including feminist theory, 
black feminist theory, queer theory, disability studies, postcolonial stud-
ies, and STS (just to name a few). Commonly recognized analytical frame-
works operational within feminist STS include (1) acknowledging the 
co-construction of science and society; (2) questioning the authority of 
science; (3) interrogating traditional definitions of scientific objectivity; 
(4) connecting feminist interventions in the sciences to community-based 
participatory projects and/or social justice movements; and (5) promoting 
practice-oriented approaches for knowledge production.
By highlighting these distinctions between feminist science studies 
and feminist STS, I want to be clear that it is not my intention to produce 
a narrative of increasing theoretical complexity or disciplinary progress. 
Nor is it my aim to dismiss the distinct interventions made possible by 
these approaches in an effort to produce one unified mode of inquiry. As 
Jutta Weber explained, regarding the development of the field of feminist 
technoscience over a decade ago, “the problem is how to write a non-linear 
and complex historiography of theories and practical engagements, as 
well as the artifacts of science and technology. It might help to avoid linear 
stories of feminist theory by reflecting not only on the epistemological 
and ontological framework of earlier approaches, but also by rethinking 
these frameworks in the light of contemporary sociopolitical develop-
ments as well as prevailing technological practices, artifacts, and material 
cultures.”24 In addition to reflecting on ontological and epistemological 
frameworks, developing new critiques of science and technology by point-
ing out essentialist assumptions, problematizing the use of binary catego-
ries, and questioning linear logic, some feminist STS scholars who are 
scientists use their training in the “hard” scientific disciplines to expose 
the “prevailing technological practices, artifacts, and material cultures” of 
science.25 What I see as a standout feature of this scholarship is the attempt 




In this book I consider the capacities of life in the lab, ranging from bac-
teria, in vitro cell lines, and minimal genome organisms, to ask what it is 
that we as humans can learn from our exchanges with nonhuman actants. 
While thinking with these actants, as Weber suggests, I want to rethink 
previous feminist ontological and epistemological gestures in light of 
“contemporary sociopolitical developments” and “prevailing technologi-
cal practices, artifacts, and material cultures.”27 The contemporary socio-
political developments in which I am most interested include not only 
feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial projects but also posthumanist proj-
ects that aim to disrupt liberal humanist aspirations of autonomy and 
individualism.
The term “posthumanism” has come to describe several different 
schools of thought. The body of critical posthumanist work that I am refer-
ring to here are the discourses that developed through feminist theory, 
literary criticism, and cultural theory in the late 1990s. As Francesca 
Ferrando has suggested, this particular tradition of posthumanism 
brings with it an “awareness of the limits of previous anthropocentric and 
humanistic assumptions.”28 Describing key elements of this particular 
school of posthumanism, Ferrando states: 
Posthumanism is often defined as a post-humanism and a post-anthro-
pocentrism: it is “post” to the concept of the human and to the historical 
occurrence of humanism, both based, as we have previously seen, on 
hierarchical social constructs and human-centric assumptions. Specie-
sism has turned into an integral aspect of the posthuman critical approach. 
The posthuman overcoming of human primacy, though, is not to be 
replaced with other types of primacies (such as the one of the machines). 
Posthumanism can be seen as a post-exclusivism: an empirical philoso-
phy of mediation which offers a reconciliation of existence in its broadest 
significations.29
Although posthumanism allows me to think with nonhuman actants such 
as bacteria in order to question liberal humanistic narratives of productiv-
ity and progress made possible through autonomy and individualism, I do 
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not wish to turn to this philosophical movement in order to ignore the 
human. It is not my intention to focus my inquiry on decontextualized 
artifacts of material cultures and thereby disembody these actants from 
their deep entanglements with human lives whose own conditions have 
been organized by systematic and institutionalized exclusions based on 
race, class, gender, and more. Haraway has criticized the term “posthu-
manism” on this very basis, claiming that it encourages the tendency of 
decontextualization. Instead, she has forwarded her concept of compan-
ion species as one that better captures the ontological and ethical entan-
glements that take place between humans and nonhumans.30
Explaining the importance of developing posthumanist ethics within 
gender studies, Cecilia Åsberg has turned to the field of animal studies. 
She motions to a body of work that has turned from anthropocentrism to 
the “integration of both human and non-human natures.” Åsberg explains 
the need for developing such a “reciprocal ontology,” drawing from both 
Haraway’s companion species and Barad’s concept of intra-action.31 
“Rather the ethical turn in this field [gender studies] is in the materialist 
wake of poststructuralist theory an attempt to recognize the other,” 
Åsberg states. “Posthumanist ethics, entangled with onto-epistemologies 
of worldly ‘intra-actions’ (Barad), emerge as efforts to respect and meet 
well with, even extend care to, others while acknowledging that we may 
not know the other and what the best kind of care would be.”32
My own experiences in molecular biology research have brought to 
light the need for such a reciprocal ontology, raising questions not only 
regarding the nature of existence and questions of being, becoming, and 
difference, but also how questions about our relationship with the physical 
and biological matters of the natural world can be articulated within the 
context of scientific inquiry. The reason for bringing together these critical 
discourses is that they have helped me, and I believe that they can help 
other feminist scientists who work with animals, cell cultures, or other 
nonhuman actants, to think through the ontological and ethical entangle-
ments that occur at the level of the lab bench. For the feminist scientist, 
working in the lab matters. This in turn requires developing microphysi-
ologies of desire that allow us to meet the other in the lab well, whomever 
or whatever that other may be, while acknowledging that we may never 
completely know that other.
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Practice-Oriented Desires
In the 1989 pivotal feminist science studies anthology Feminism and Sci-
ence, edited by Nancy Tuana, feminist scholars trained in philosophy, 
biology, and physics came together to discuss the intricate relationships 
between women, feminist theory, and science. Articles highlighted dis-
cordant views on the interventions in science that were made possible by 
feminist theory as well as the purpose and scope of feminist science 
studies (as it was referred to in the special two-volume issue of the jour-
nal of Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, from which the anthology 
was formed). In addition to providing an overview of feminist scholar- 
ship in the sciences at the time, Sue Rosser wrote in the anthology, “More 
feminists in science are needed to further explore science and its relation-
ships to women and feminism in order to change traditional science to a 
feminist science.”33 Although other scholars in the same collection cau-
tioned against the idea of a “feminist science” as such, Rosser’s vision of 
changing traditional science to the promise of a feminist science provides 
a useful point of departure for thinking not only about the complex issues 
involved at the intersections of sex, gender, women, feminism, and science 
but also the need to develop practice-oriented approaches for those femi-
nists who wanted to change the sciences from within.34 
Rosser makes a clear distinction between the terms “women” and “femi-
nism” that relates directly to my own argument regarding the project of 
thinking about feminist STS through both molar and molecular modes of 
politics. Although I am interested in developing a project in molecular femi-
nisms, the argument I make does not aim to dismiss molar projects, such 
as those described by Rosser, that are aimed at exploring the absence or 
presence of women in science or “science and its relationships to women.”35 
In fact, foregrounding the “women” question in science in epistemological 
terms has been very productive for the philosophical inter rogation of 
science and knowledge production.36 Rosser’s own catalogue included 
feminist influences on pedagogical and curricular transformations in sci-
ence, the history and professional status of women in science, feminist 
critiques of science, feminist theory of science, and even what she called 
the development of a “feminine” science.37 Her additional call, however—
the one that motions us toward exploring science and its relationship to 
feminism—is precisely where microphysiologies of desire can take us.
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My interest in exploring microphysiologies of desire is directly related 
to the fact that I am indeed one of those “feminists in science” who, as 
Rosser challenged, did go ahead to “further explore science and its rela-
tionship to women and feminism.”38 By placing myself within the sciences, 
I faced both the challenge and opportunity of having my feminism tested 
and extended into less familiar areas of feminist thought. My experience 
has been stolonic in that my growth as a feminist STS scholar, much like 
crabgrass, has depended entirely on my ability to reach out and make 
intimate connections with less familiar modes of thinking. As a result of 
these connections, I have ended up here with my current molecular proj-
ect. While this project is not opposed to liberal or equality feminisms 
that foreground “women in science” or “pipeline”-related questions, it 
does not immediately contribute to these inquiries. Rather, the promise 
of a “feminist science” for me has meant following the unexpected turns 
and outgrowths that result from the experience of becoming a feminist 
scientist. This path has led me directly to probe the relationship between 
feminism and science through minor literatures and less familiar means.
In an editorial written for the journal Bioethical Inquiry, Catherine 
Mills explained that the dearth of continental philosophy in the area of 
bioethics can be attributed to the fact that “recent continental philosophy 
has been more concerned with ontological questions than normative 
ones.”39 Arguing that the strict separation between questions of ontology 
and normative resolutions is neither correct nor useful, she also states 
that “continental philosophy is often criticized, if not derided, for a per-
ceived failure to provide normatively clear guidelines about ‘what should 
be done.’”40 Although I agree with Mills that there need not be a strict 
distinction between ontological presuppositions and normative resolu-
tions, I think that by placing a little more emphasis on the “what should 
be done” part of the equation, we can begin to invite more feminist scien-
tists into this important conversation. Indeed, it would be incredibly use-
ful for the feminist scientist in the natural sciences if a more concerted 
effort was made to connect interests in ontology, ethics, matter, and mate-
riality with the everyday, nitty-gritty practices in the lab.
When a feminist scientist actually finds herself in front of a lab bench, 
she may be motivated to ask difficult questions that typically would not 
have been raised in her traditional scientific training. A likely place that 
her feminist research practices will first lead her are to questions that 
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deeply interrogate the idea of who can be a knower and what can be 
known. More explicitly, how should she approach the object of study? How 
should she treat this object of study that is the other? What should she 
make of biological and statistical differences that emerge in the measure-
ment of this other? How will these differences influence her understand-
ing of subjectivity? Alternatively, the feminist scientist working in the lab 
may find that similar questions of ontological and ethical significance may 
begin to emerge as a direct result of her repetitive and ritualized perfor-
mances of the scientific method. As a result of their attempts to know and 
to “discipline” the body, biology, and matter through scientific experimen-
tation, many scientists (feminist or not) are dealing head-on with ques-
tions of ontology and ethics that are similar to those being raised within 
continental philosophy and feminist STS. With their hands-on experi-
ences of working with live organisms and dealing with the difficulty of 
experimental reproducibility, biologists are accustomed to witnessing the 
fluidity, vulnerability, and unfixed “nature” of life.41
Adding to Mills’s argument, I suggest that these ontological queries 
can in fact emerge from close encounters with the mundane or everyday 
techniques and tools that the feminist scientist requires in order to con-
duct experiments. In my own analyses of neuroscience, reproductive biol-
ogy, and molecular biology research, for instance, I have been interested 
in how biological molecules and organisms are brought forward in the lab. 
Drawing from such theories as standpoint theory, situated knowledges, 
agential realism, and the methodology of the oppressed, I have called for 
feminist scientists who are working in the lab to examine the ideologies 
behind dominant representations of biological molecules and organisms 
and ask, Why not otherwise?42 I have stressed the importance of bridg-
ing these ontological and ethical discussions with scientific practices. 
This is precisely “what can be done” in feminist STS.43 As Michelle Murphy 
has reminded us in Seizing the Means of Reproduction: Entanglements of 
Feminism, Health, and Technoscience, multiple generations of feminist 
health practitioners and health advocates, starting in the late 1960s, have 
already used practice-oriented approaches to think about the body and 
biology differently. For example, by creating women’s health clinics, 
designing their own tools for conducting vaginal exams, and producing 
pamphlets with anatomical details and methods for self-care, these 
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feminists have devised their own ways of thinking about reproductive 
health and biology and went as far as to produce innovative forms of 
scientific knowledge.44 Feminist health advocates show us every day that 
it is possible to simultaneously think with biology, work with matter, 
interpret data, and enact our feminist politics. They show us the impor-
tance of knowing what to critique and what to use from traditional scien-
tific experiments and literatures. The scientific knowledge they have 
created continues to shape our understandings of female anatomy and 
reproductive health today.45
For the feminist scientist working in the natural sciences, ontological, 
ethical, and critical posthumanist concerns are always present, even if 
not clearly articulated as such. Ontological queries produced in the lab 
can very quickly become entangled with ethical queries related to one’s 
research design. These entanglements might be traced back to the very 
beginning of one’s inquiry, even before arriving at a hypothesis. Through 
the design of a research methodology, one must consider how to approach 
the encounter with what it is that one wishes to know. Driven by a molec-
ular desire to position the knower in the same critical plane as that which 
becomes known, I will now flesh out a shared vocabulary for an ethics of 
matter that can be used in the laboratory setting of the natural sciences. 
Indeterminacy in the Lab
As I outlined earlier, microphysiologies of desire are feminist practices of 
encounter. They help us articulate an applied ethics of matter and develop 
strategies for moving forward in our scientific work. Although we can 
begin to flesh out many such strategies, I would like to start with those 
that cultivate an openness to nonhuman becomings and the capacity for 
changefulness. In Meeting the Universe Halfway, Karen Barad advances 
ontological discussions in feminist theory by drawing from the physical 
and natural sciences. Through her knowledge of quantum physics, she 
invites us to reexamine and reformulate our current feminist theoretical 
treatments of matter and reality. In her introduction she shares the short 
story of an exchange between the quantum physicists Niels Bohr and 
Werner Heisenberg, leaving us with a powerful ontological lesson. Barad 
writes:
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For Bohr, what is at issue is not that we cannot know both the position 
and momentum of a particle simultaneously (as Heisenberg initially 
argued), but rather that particles do not have determinate values of 
position and momentum simultaneously. . . . In essence, Bohr is making 
a point about the nature of reality, not merely our knowledge of it. What 
he is doing is calling into question an entire tradition in the history of 
Western metaphysics: the belief that the world is populated with indi-
vidual things with their own independent sets of determinate proper-
ties. The lesson that Bohr takes from quantum physics is very deep and 
profound: there aren’t little things wandering aimlessly in the void that 
possess the complete set of properties that Newtonian physics assumes 
(e.g., position and momentum); rather, there is something fundamental 
about the nature of measurement interactions such that, given a partic-
ular measuring apparatus, certain properties become determinate, while 
others are specifically excluded. Which properties become determinate 
is not governed by the desires or will of the experimenter but rather by 
the specificity of the experimental apparatus.46
Extending this idea, we might start to recognize that the matters we study 
as biologists, for example, or that we attempt to define and then regulate, 
do not preexist. In fact, “we” as we tend to define ourselves as scientists 
and knowers also may not preexist but rather, as Barad suggests, partici-
pate in the “mutual constitution of entangled agencies.” What becomes 
“determinate” or known is a result of the specific interactions of an appa-
ratus. What constitutes the apparatus includes a range of players, includ-
ing the knower, the tools of measurement, and discursive practices. Barad 
defines this mutual entanglement as an “intra-action.” Intra-action 
addresses the question “What can we do?” Specifically, Barad would have 
us orient ourselves to an ontological and ethical framework that assumes 
indeterminacy and asks that we as scientists become accountable for “the 
material nature of practices and how they come to matter.”47 
Indeterminacy and accountability both play roles in the making of any 
phenomena and describes Barad’s concept of agential realism. “In my 
agential realist account,” she explains, “scientific practices do not reveal 
what is already there; rather, what is ‘disclosed’ is the effect of the intra-
active engagements of our participation with/in and as part of the world’s 
differential becoming. . . . What is made manifest through technoscientific 
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practices is an expression of the objective existence of particular material 
phenomena. . . . Objectivity is a matter of accountability for what materi-
alizes, for what comes to be. It matters which cuts are enacted: different 
cuts enact different materialized becomings.”48 Barad’s idea of the “agen-
tial cut” might be thought of as an event, or what I have described using 
Deleuze and Guattari’s term: a haecceity. This cut allows for a “resolution 
of the ontological indeterminacy” and the “condition for the possibility 
of objectivity.”49 
To better illustrate the usefulness of Barad’s feminist practice of 
encounter, I would like to share a very interesting case of indeterminacy 
accompanied by accountability in molecular biology research. A few years 
ago, Linda Buck stirred up a storm of controversy when she retracted the 
findings from one of her own groundbreaking scientific works published 
in the highly acclaimed scientific journal Nature. Embedded within this 
controversy were deeper questions related to issues of ontology, episte-
mology, ethics, and the nature of discursive practices. Buck, who studies 
the olfactory systems in mammals and the mechanisms involved in odor 
and pheromone sensing, shared the 2004 Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine with Richard Axel. Working as a postdoctoral fellow in Axel’s 
lab in the 1980s, Buck successfully managed to identify a family of more 
than a thousand genes that code for odor receptors.50 She has since 
spent a very productive scientific career mapping out the neurological 
and molecular basis of olfaction. Her work has revealed the interaction 
between olfaction and reproduction at the neuromolecular level.51 Of her 
many scientific accomplishments, Buck and her colleagues are known for 
utilizing molecular visualization techniques such as genetic tracing meth-
ods to better understand the neural circuits involved in the regulation of 
the olfactory system. Using transneuronal tracers, Buck and colleagues 
have shown that gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) neurons 
“receive pheromone signals from both odor and pheromone relays in the 
brain” and that “feedback loops are evident whereby GnRH neurons could 
influence both odor and pheromone processing.”52 Her lab was the first 
to have engineered transgenic mice in which GnRH neurons also 
expressed the transneuronal tracer barley-lectin (BL) and green fluores-
cent protein (GFP). By performing immunostaining of brain sections 
derived from these mice, Buck has been able to visually map the neural 
circuits of GnRH neurons.
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The controversy that emerged surrounding the scientific work involved 
Buck’s research on the visualization of signaling from specific odorant 
receptors to specific clusters of neurons in the olfactory cortex.53 In the 
March 2008 retraction of the original paper, Buck and her colleagues 
stated: “During efforts to replicate and extend this work, we have been 
unable to reproduce the reported findings. Moreover, we have found 
inconsistencies between some of the figures and data published in the 
paper and the original data. We have therefore lost confidence in the 
reported conclusions. We regret any adverse consequences that may have 
resulted from the paper’s publication.”54 One of the reasons this retraction 
is so interesting and caused such a stir is that the retraction came from a 
Nobel Prize winner. Also, the retraction statement goes on to reveal that 
the actual experiments that were put into question were not done at the 
hands of Buck herself, but rather by one of the two primary authors of 
the article, who was a former postdoctoral fellow in her lab. In scientific 
circles the retraction of an article from a prestigious journal always makes 
for sensational news. Commenting on the retraction, the article “How to 
Read a Retraction” posted in the science blog Drug Monkey suggested 
how strange it was to see an “author contribution” list in the retraction 
 statement— a list that did not exist in the original article and one that 
outlines the exact contributions of each scientist.55 Basically, the “author 
contribution” information reveals that the postdoc’s work was under ques-
tion, and the postdoc was being made to take the fall for the faulty research.
How can this event be read? The question is not so much what Buck 
should have done differently, but what we can see and know differently 
as a result of this event. It is possible that the postdoc somehow fudged 
the results. From an agential realist account, however, we would also have 
to ask what effects or events have been disclosed as a result of the intra-
active engagements of Buck, her other scientific colleagues, the retraction 
statement, and of course, the odorant receptors and neurons of the olfac-
tory cortex.56 It would appear that prior to November 2001, the intra-
actions that had formed up until that point had resulted in a lack of 
scientific knowledge regarding the neural mechanisms of olfaction in 
mammals. In fact, until Buck’s original work in the 1980s, the odorant 
receptors themselves (as we have come to know them) did not even exist. 
After November 2001, upon the publication of their findings in the journal 
Nature, Buck and colleagues, as well as the entire scientific community 
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that supports a system of peer-review, faced yet another shift in the onto-
logical status of these receptors. New intra-actions between scientists, 
mice, the transneuronal tracer barley-lectin, and visualization techniques 
disclosed a novel biological relation, one of signaling between olfactory 
receptors and neurons. After March 2008, however, this knowledge was 
once again put into question and a formal retraction published in a scien-
tific journal, thereby in a way “dematerializing” that biological relationship 
which had come to be. How can we as scientists become more open to such 
nonhuman becomings and to such capacities for changefulness? 
From a traditional perspective of scientific method and objectivity, it 
is hard to say what happened, and perhaps pointing a finger at the post-
doc seemed like the easiest thing to do at the time. From the perspective 
of Barad’s practice of encounter, however, we might suggest that the appa-
ratus (that is, the combination of all the human, nonhuman, organic and 
inorganic actors and measuring devices that went into creating the exam-
ined phenomenon) changed and thus new agential cuts were enacted. 
Buck claims that she was no longer able to repeat the findings of this initial 
experiment in her lab. What is not readily known is that her lab moved 
from the time when the initial experiments were conducted. The results 
published in 2001 were based on work that her postdoc had done at the 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute at the Harvard Medical School in Bos-
ton. Buck tried to repeat the experiment, likely with a different postdoc-
toral fellow, a different generation of transgenic mice, and perhaps even 
a different water source to mix the chemical reagents needed for the exper-
iment in her new lab in Seattle, at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research 
Center, University of Washington. 
Following the theoretical insights of Barad’s onto-epistemological 
framework, the “inconsistencies” that Buck refers to in the retraction 
statement can be read to imply much more than simply the faulty lab 
notes taken by a postdoc. Perhaps Buck’s statement, in a way, also reveals 
the possibility for a new approach to dealing with biological matter. 
Through the appearance and disappearance of signals between olfactory 
receptors and specific neurons, we may be able to see a microphysiology 
of desire emerging from within the sciences—one that moves us from an 
ontology that treats what it encounters in biology as being fixed, to one 
of becoming that takes more seriously the ideas of fluidity, flux, and 
indeterminacy.
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Becoming-With in the Lab
As some readers may anticipate, no chapter on developing feminist prac-
tices of encounter in the natural sciences would be complete without 
invoking the work of Donna Haraway. Her writing directs us toward those 
microphysiologies of desire that help us make connections through kin-
ship and hylozoism. I am interested in bringing together and developing 
a vocabulary of ontological and ethical gestures that the feminist scientist 
might find useful in the lab. I am particularly interested in those micro-
physiologies of desire that help position the feminist scientist as a knower 
who operates in the same immanent plane as that which is to become the 
known. For some time, Haraway has turned her attention to the practices 
and effects of multispecies entanglements. In Staying with the Trouble: 
Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Haraway describes the significance of her 
concept of “staying with the trouble.” She writes: “My multispecies story-
telling is about recuperation in complex histories that are as full of dying 
as living, as full of endings, even genocides, as beginnings. In the face of 
unrelenting historically specific surplus suffering in companion species 
knottings, I am not interested in reconciliation or restoration, but I am 
deeply committed to the more modest possibilities of partial recuperation 
and getting on together. Call that staying with the trouble.”57
In When Species Meet, Haraway developed this ongoing project on com-
panion species relations. Throughout that book she expands on what 
thinking through companion species relationships could mean by asking 
two main questions: “(1) Whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog? 
and (2) How is ‘becoming with’ a practice of becoming worldly?”58 Her 
interpretation of becoming-with begins with the idea that to respond is 
to show respect and that the practice of becoming-with works to “remove 
the fibers of the scientist’s being.”59 To appreciate the idea of becoming-
with as a feminist practice of encounter, Haraway paints a scenario of a 
scientist working within their discipline. Commenting on the work of pri-
matologist Barbara Smuts, Haraway states:
Trained in the conventions of objective science, Smuts had been advised 
to be as neutral as possible, to be like a rock, to be unavailable, so that 
eventually the baboons would go on about their business in nature as if 
data-collecting humankind were not present. Good scientists were those 
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who, learning to be invisible themselves, could see the scene of nature 
close up, as if through a peephole. The scientists could query but not  
be queried. People could ask if baboons are or are not social subjects,  
or ask anything else for that matter, without any ontological risk either 
to themselves. . . . [I]f she really wanted to study something other than 
how human beings are in the way, if she was really interested in these 
baboons, Smuts had to enter into, not shun, a responsive relationship.60
Becoming-with informs how we as feminist scientists can start to think 
about experimentation, but goes one step further to disturb our ontologi-
cal presuppositions of what in fact constitutes a knower and the to-be-
known. As a relational ontology, becoming-with is clearly aligned with the 
concept of becoming. Haraway’s work reads nicely together with a great 
deal of Deleuzian thinking. However, she is also quite vocal about distin-
guishing her concept of becoming-with from Deleuze and Guattari’s use of 
becoming-animal, which she claims comes with a deep disdain for domes-
ticated animals and, among other things, “incuriosity about animals.”61 
Haraway places a different kind of emphasis on becoming by embedding it 
within companion species relations. “Becoming-with, not becoming, is the 
name of the game; becoming-with is how partners are, in Vinciane Despret’s 
terms, rendered capable,” she writes. “Ontologically heterogeneous part-
ners become who and what they are in relational material-semiotic world-
ing. Natures, cultures, subjects, and objects do not preexist their intertwined 
worldings. Companion species are relentlessly becoming-with.”62
“Worlding” is Haraway’s way of communicating a particular kind of 
coming together, an enmeshment, or even a touch that becomes possible 
once we see life and all of its actants operating on an immanent plane. She 
explains:
Instructed by Eva Hayward’s fingery eyes, I remember that “becoming 
with” is “becoming worldly.” When Species Meet strives to build attach-
ment sites and tie sticky knots to bind intra-acting critters, including 
people, together in the kinds of response and regard that change the 
subject—and the object. Encounterings do not produce harmonious 
wholes, and smoothly preconstituted entities do not ever meet in the 
first place. Such things cannot touch, much less attach; there is no first 
place; and species, neither singular nor plural, demand another practice 
80 chapter 2
of reckoning. In the fashion of turtles (with their epibionts) on turtles 
all the way down, meetings make us who and what we are in the avid 
contact zones that are the world. Once “we” have met, we can never be 
“the same” again.63
Haraway’s feminist practice of becoming-with involves giving up the idea 
of human exceptionalism. This is a key aspect of critical posthumanist 
projects as well. Haraway’s ethical stance is guided quite emphatically by 
the desire and ability to touch and to be touched. It helps us work through 
the concepts of kinship and hylozoism and highlights an integral compo-
nent of all microphysiologies of desire—namely, the ability to respond.
Getting Lost in the Lab
As one would perhaps anticipate, microphysiologies of desire can also cre-
ate uncomfortable and complex encounters. They can motion us toward 
new lines of flight by way of univocity and immanence, but the outcomes 
are not always guaranteed to solve all of our problems. Yet through these 
difficult encounters, movement and change can occur. In Getting Lost: 
Feminist Efforts toward a Double(d) Science, Patti Lather theorizes “getting 
lost” as a feminist practice of encounter that also functions as a “fertile 
ontological space and ethical practice.”64 Lather’s getting lost serves as a 
perfect example of how strict distinctions between ontology, ethics, epis-
temology, and methodology cannot easily be drawn. Lather articulates 
getting lost in the following way:
At its heart, Getting Lost situates feminist methodology as a noninno-
cent arena in which to pursue questions of the conditions of science 
with/in the postmodern. Here we are disabused of much in articulating 
a place for science between an impossible certainty and an interminable 
deconstruction, a science of both reverence and mistrust, the science 
possible after our disappointments in science. Against tendencies toward 
the sort of successor regimes characteristic of what feminist philoso-
pher of science, Sandra Harding (1991), terms triumphalist versions of 
science, this book asks how to keep feminist methodology open, alive, 
loose. . . . Given my interest in the science possible after the critique of 
science, my central argument is that there is plenty of future for feminist 
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methodology if it can continue to put such “post” ideas to work in terms 
of what research means and does.65
Lather appreciates the importance of being able to work in a lab and con-
tinue to raise that pipette, despite our disappointments with science. This 
is indeed a crucial and challenging task for the feminist scientist. The list 
of disappointments is long and includes the distress caused by biological 
theories that have been used for deterministic ends and have contributed 
to the normalization of inequalities, the regret over biotechnologies that 
have caused environmental harm and have been produced at the cost of 
many lives, and the frustration that can come with positivism and the 
belief in pure objectivity. But obviously, if the feminist scientist is to con-
tinue in the lab, they must learn how to look beyond these disappoint-
ments and continue to navigate their steps—or as Lather puts it, learn to 
work within the “ruins.” 
The feminist scientist must learn to take the dilemmas and disappoint-
ments with existing technological practices and look at them in a different 
light. As Lather suggests in the plateau of her book dedicated to working 
within the ruins: “In such a time and place, terms understood as no longer 
fulfilling their promise do not become useless. On the contrary, their very 
failures become provisional grounds, and new uses are derived. . . . To situ-
ate inquiry as a ruin/rune is to foreground the limits and necessary mis-
firings of a project, problematizing the researcher as ‘the one who knows.’”66 
Lather continues: “In this move, the concept of ruins is not about an epis-
temological skepticism taken to defeatist extremes, but rather about a 
working of repetition and the play of difference as the only ground we 
have in moving toward new practices.”67 Like Barad, in this brief statement 
Lather raises both ontological concerns as well as the ethical issue of 
accountability for “the one who knows.” If the feminist scientist is to take 
these concerns to heart, how does one actually learn how to work within 
the “ruins” of their discipline? This is perhaps not the easiest task to 
undertake, particularly in the natural sciences. “Getting lost,” as Lather 
suggests, is about becoming at ease with the idea of uneasiness. Learning 
to live with uneasiness is indeed most crucial here, a sentiment echoed in 
Haraway’s call for “staying with the trouble.”68 Lather would have the femi-
nist scientist see the benefits of getting lost by learning how to live with-
out absolute knowledge and by respecting the demand for complexity.69 
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It may be of some benefit to look back and consider again the story of 
Linda Buck—neuroscientist, Nobel Laureate, and retractor of a published 
scientific work. Are we now able to see how microphysiologies of desire 
can be used to read Buck’s scientific work in a new light? Can we learn to 
see how Buck herself may have “foregrounded the limits and necessary 
misfirings” of her project?70 Can we learn to read her retraction and 
response to the entire affair as an attempt to be “accountable to complex-
ity?” Is Buck (who may or may not self-identify as a feminist scientist) 
showing us the importance of “getting lost”? By getting lost, the feminist 
scientist is also able to move toward previously unexplored encounters.
We now have some sense as to how the feminist scientist may go about 
enacting new agential cuts even if they have to use the traditional scien-
tific techniques and tools that are readily available. The point may not be 
to create “new or better” methods, but rather to work within the dominant 
tradition—in this case the scientific method—and gain what fresh knowl-
edge they can from accepting the loss that accompanies the use of this 
method. The dilemmas that will occur by working with the traditional 
technoscientific practices and tools in the natural sciences should not 
become paralyzing and their disappointments should not stop the femi-
nist scientist from continuing to stand in front of a lab bench. Rather, the 
movement that will occur from getting lost in this place and posing the 
question “How do I proceed?” may bring with it a new ethical orientation 
toward matter. Drawing from the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Lather 
explains that “big band theories of social change have not served women 
well. Here, something begins to take shape, perhaps some new ‘line of 
flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) where we are not so sure of ourselves 
and where we see this not knowing as our best chance for a different sort 
of doing in the name of feminist methodology.”71 
As a microphysiology of desire, at first glance “getting lost” may be 
disorienting to the feminist scientist. We are used to following clearly 
labeled flow charts and neatly organized protocols. Getting lost may seem 
counterintuitive, but it does address the question, What can we do? By 
getting lost, Lather states that one can neither claim to produce better 
knowledge than her nonfeminist peers nor be chasing after the ultimate 
“truth.” After years of spending time in a lab, I too am drawn to those 
feminist practices of encounter that are open to new lines of flight and 
encourage different sorts of doing. Working along a similar line of flight, 
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I now move the feminist scientist from a plateau filled with disappoint-
ments, wounds, and loss to one with a different set of productive discom-
forts. I turn to the work of Isabelle Stengers, who suggests that we need 
to learn how to take risks in scientific inquiry and search for moments of 
joint perplexity with other (more traditional) scientists. Both Lather and 
Stengers develop frameworks for inquiry that elicit sensory experiences, 
but whereas Lather’s getting lost is more closely aligned with Derridean 
deconstruction, taking risks and searching for joint perplexities are micro-
physiologies of desire that move us in the direction of Deleuze’s ontologi-
cal univocity and immanence.
Cosmopolitics in the Lab
We have to be willing to acknowledge that feminist scientists aren’t the 
only ones in the lab who have the capacity to be disappointed. Regular 
scientists also face disappointment. Following cues from Stengers and her 
“ecology of practices,” I am interested in expanding upon the question of 
how a feminist scientist might be able to work with instead of against the 
science and perhaps the scientists that have produced these disappoint-
ments.72 As Stengers might suggest in response to this query: “The problem 
for each practice is how to foster their own force, make present what causes 
practitioners to think and feel and act. But it is a problem which may also 
produce an experimental togetherness among practices, a dynamics of 
pragmatic learning of what works and how. This is the kind of active, fos-
tering ‘milieu’ that practices need in order to be able to answer challenges 
and experiment changes, that is, to unfold their own force. This is a social 
technology any diplomatic practice demands and depends upon.”73 To me, 
this suggests that feminist scientists need to go deep into the methods and 
protocols of their research projects and gain an intimate knowledge of the 
inner workings of their experimental setups. This intimate knowledge will 
give them the tools they need to take a risk and start asking different ques-
tions. The quote also suggests that by going deep into the practices of their 
specific science, the feminist scientist will also be able to produce a different 
kind of encounter with the scientists around them.
In Power and Invention: Situating Science, Stengers explains the impor-
tance of taking “risks” in order to move forward with scientific inquiry.74 
In this microphysiology of desire or feminist practice of encounter, one 
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has to take a risk in order to find those moments of experimental togeth-
erness and joint perplexity that can be shared with other scientists. This 
concept of risk forms the basis of an ontological and ethical framework 
that Stengers refers to as cosmopolitics. In his foreword to Stengers’s 
book, Bruno Latour expands the link between this notion of risk and 
Stengers’s use of the term “cosmopolitics.” He states, “There are construc-
tions where neither the world nor the word, neither the cosmos nor the 
scientists take any risk. These are badly constructed propositions and 
should be weeded out of science and society. . . . On the other hand, there 
exist propositions where the world and the scientists are both at risk. 
Those are well constructed, that is, reality constructing, reality making, 
and they should be included in science and society; that is, they are CC 
[cosmopolitically correct], no matter how politically incorrect they may 
appear to be.”75
Stengers’s cosmopolitics adopts a notion of “risky constructivism,” 
which, according to Latour, opens up what gets to count as scientific evi-
dence in the first place.76 This openness places cosmopolitics apart from 
those types of practices that either narrowly promote a kind of scientific 
imperialism or those that would dismiss the scientific method altogether. 
As Steven Shaviro has written in his scholarly blog The Pinocchio Theory: 
“She [Stengers] seeks, rather, through constructivism and the ecology of 
practices, to offer what might be called (following Deleuze) an entirely 
immanent critique, one that is situated within the very field of practices 
that it is seeking to change. . . . Stengers’ vision, like Latour’s, is radically 
democratic: science is not a transcending ‘truth’ but one of many ‘inter-
ests’ which constantly need to negotiate with one another. This can only 
happen if all the competing interests are taken seriously (not merely ‘tol-
erated’), and actively able to intervene with and against one another.”77 
The task for the feminist scientist is not to critique traditional scientific 
practices in order to dismiss them. Nor is it sufficient to simply learn how 
to tolerate such practices. Movement must be made from seeking to secure 
a position of transcendence and “truth” to one of immanent critique and 
“joint perplexity.” This process may involve reorienting our encounters 
not only to biological matter and organisms in the lab but to the other 
scientists we find working around us.
Drawing upon the same quote from Latour, Sarah Kember, who works 
at the intersections of artificial life, biology, and cyberfeminism, suggests 
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that “at the heart of Stengers’s cosmopolitics is a philosophy in which 
scientific realism and social constructionism are not opposed.”78 This is 
similar to Barad’s agential realism, which aims to move “beyond the well-
worn debates that pit constructivism against realism.”79 However, Kem-
ber goes on to state that “Stengers advocates a philosophy in which the 
object, the thing, the world is recognized as having something to say for 
itself. It is about embracing the risk which is therefore posed to science 
and to the scientist.”80 This is perhaps where the microphysiologies of 
desire that we can draw from Barad and Stengers begin to part ways. 
Barad, for instance, would have us place an emphasis on the ontological, 
epistemological, and ethical implications of coming to know the world 
through phenomena, and also have us take account of our responsibilities 
for those mutually constituted others that we want to come to know. 
Stengers, while aware of the imbrications of human, nonhuman, and tech-
nological actors or actants in the world that we come to know through the 
sciences, motions us to also consider that the “thing in itself” has some 
sway in what comes to constitute an event, underscoring a different type 
of emphasis on relationality.
This ontological gesture made by Stengers occurs upon a more imma-
nent plane and returns me to a point I raised earlier regarding the onto-
logical presuppositions that have guided the majority of feminist STS 
inquiries into the relationship between the knower and the known. If, as 
Stengers believes, we are able to picture ourselves in a location of imma-
nent critique, we might be able to see how microphysiologies of desire 
that rely on the concept of ontological univocity might guide our encoun-
ters between the knower and the to-be-known. This ontological stance 
shifts our ethical encounters toward the to-be-known slightly—from that 
of responsibility for the other to one of simply response. Following 
Stengers, we might say that in this plane of immanent critique and joint 
perplexity, all actants become partial knowers and that the real challenge 
is to learn how to respond to that other knower.
“Feeling Around” for the Organism
Having analyzed several feminist practices of encounter that explore the 
relationship between the knower and what is to become the known, I am 
interested in exploring how slightly different ontological stances might 
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influence an ethics of matter. What kind of an ethics of matter might come 
forward when we move away from ontological gestures that emphasize 
responsibility toward the other, and move instead toward those gestures 
that simply require the recognition of a response?
To address this, I turn to what Barbara McClintock described as her 
approach to science, an approach based on developing a “feeling for the 
organism.”81 McClintock made this comment while being interviewed 
by Evelyn Fox Keller. It is not my intention here to attempt to channel 
McClintock or to get to the “real” meaning behind her statement. Rather, 
I would like to end this chapter by exploring what this statement can mean 
for developing microphysiologies of desire. At its basis, McClintock’s “feel-
ing for the organism” is all about the relationship between the knower and 
the known. What I want to pursue further here is the uncertainty that 
remains over the precise nature of that relationship. Where does the 
emphasis fall? Is it a feeling for the organism, where the emphasis falls on 
the for in a type of benevolent affection toward, or is it a feeling for the 
organism, where the emphasis falls on the feeling, in a manner of stolonic 
or tendril-like extension? The distinction I am trying to make is subtle, 
but our attraction and possible ontological commitment to one meaning 
over another will have an impact on an ethics of matter that follows. I 
suggest that one type of feeling for the organism describes a molar or 
transcendent mode of encounter, while the other carries a more molecular 
or immanent approach. In the first scenario the feminist scientist may 
learn to develop a feeling for the organism. Her interaction with that 
organism, an organism that is no longer seen as an object simply available 
at her disposal, is reevaluated so as to accommodate a new ethical rela-
tionship of responsibility between that scientist and the organism. This 
is how she becomes accountable. In attempting to develop a feeling for 
that organism, she will have to ask herself what her ethical commitment 
is toward that other organism. 
For instance, in her 2012 essay “On Touching—The Inhuman That 
Therefore I Am” and her 2007 book Meeting the Universe Halfway, Barad 
turns to the philosophical work of Emmanuel Levinas.82 Levinas’s ethics 
is generally understood as a study of intersubjectivity aligned with tran-
scendence, existence, and the human other.83 Barad reads Levinas through 
diffractive means and draws upon posthumanist ethics to propose that as 
an epistemological-ontological-ethical framework, her concept of agential 
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realism allows us to “turn our attention to our responsibilities not only 
for what we know but what may come to be.”84 She aims to reorient the 
relationship between the knower and what is to become the known, work-
ing toward an ethics of mattering. “We (but not only we humans) are 
always already responsible to others with whom or which we are entan-
gled,” she states, “not through conscious intent but through the various 
ontological entanglements that materiality entails. What is on the other 
side of the agential cut is not separate from us—agential separability is 
not individuation. Ethics is therefore not about right response to a radi-
cally exterior/ized other, but about responsibility and accountability for 
the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a part.”85
Barad makes clear that agential separability is not individuation and 
that our responsibility toward the other does not occur through conscious 
intent. She emphasizes the point that the other (nonhuman others 
included) is not seen as an exteriorized other, but rather as another within 
a relationship. Importantly, however, there is also a reconciliatory tone in 
the ethical response that Barad forwards, taking the form of accountability 
or responsibility toward that other—or what I argue might be interpreted 
as a molar feeling “for” that nonexteriorized other. Furthermore, this 
molar commitment may lend itself more easily to a mode of engagement 
that is moored in transcendence. As Grosz explains regarding ethics:
Unlike Levinasian ethics, which is still modeled on a subject-to-object, 
self-to-other relation, the relation of a being respected in its autonomy 
and the other, as a necessarily independent autonomous being—the 
 culmination and final flowering of a phenomenological notion of sub-
ject, Deleuze and Guattari in no way privilege the human, autonomous 
sovereign subject, or the independent other, and the bonds of communi-
cation and representation between them; they are concerned more with 
what psychoanalysis calls “partial objects,” organs, processes, flows, which 
show no respect for the autonomy of the subject. Ethics is the sphere  
of judgments regarding the possibilities, and actuality of connections, 
arrangements, linkages, machines.86
Although I have emphasized the importance of recognizing that molar 
and molecular approaches always coexist, and in many cases need to work 
together, my interests in revisiting the idea of McClintock’s feeling for the 
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organism is more aligned with thinking about ethics through this second, 
more molecular sphere of possibilities.
From a parallel site of play I would like to toggle the switch and move 
from a sense of responsibility moored in transcendence to an immanent 
sense of desire which is in search of a response—any response. I want to 
move to the idea of immanence and envision a molecular “feeling around” 
for the organism. I return to Bose’s claim that both the living and the 
nonliving are capable of response and extend this immanent capability 
into a microphysiology of desire. At the start of this chapter, I turned to 
Grosz for her treatment of desire as immanent, positive, and productive. 
She defined desire as that which forges relations and creates connections. 
“Desire does not take for itself a particular object whose attainment it 
requires,” she notes, “rather, it aims at nothing in particular above and 
beyond its own proliferation or self-expansion: it assembles things out of 
singularities; and it breaks down things, assemblages, into their singulari-
ties. . . . As production, desire does not provide blueprints, models, ideals 
or goals. Rather it experiments, it makes, it is fundamentally aleatory; it 
is bricolage.”87
Where biophilosophies of becoming and microphysiologies of desire 
take us is precisely to an ethics of matter where desire experiments. Feeling 
around for the organism serves as an applied ethics of matter that brings 
together the qualities of changefulness and nonhuman becomings, kin-
ship and hylozoism, and univocity and immanence. As a microphysiology 
of desire, “feeling around” resembles a stolonic searching in motion, a 
reaching toward and touching of an always unfixed and incompletely 
knowable other, in search of a response—any response. These responses 
can be good or bad, full of living or dying, but in no way are they reconcil-
iatory. Thinking about our encounters in the lab through these qualities, 
we begin to see that a “feeling for the organism” can also be a “feeling 
around” for the organism. What is at stake here in developing this feminist 
practice of encounter is that different types of inquiries, experiments, and 
lines of flight become possible in the lab, depending on which applied eth-
ics of matter we follow.
It is hard to know where such encounters will take us. In fact, develop-
ing practice-oriented feminist STS approaches for the natural sciences can 
feel a little bit like putting a love letter into a bottle and sending it out to 
sea. It is hard to predict if a fellow feminist scientist working away quietly 
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and diligently in a lab, without a connection to a broader feminist com-
munity, will ever find this letter, let alone pick it up and run with it. Over 
the past few years, however, I have been delighted to see the growing 
number of undergraduate double majors in women’s studies and biology. 
It will no doubt be very exciting to watch as these feminists enter into labs 




Sex, Gender, and the Lust for Writing
Bacterial sex differs from ours relative to time. Bacterial sex, the first 
kind of sex on this planet, is speedy sex.
—Lynn Margulis and Dorian Sagan
Language (word choice, metaphors, analogies, and naming practices 
chosen to explain scientific concepts) and visual representations 
(images, tables, and graphs chosen to illustrate scientific concepts) 
have the power to shape scientific practice, the questions asked, the 
results obtained, and the interpretations made. Rethinking language 
and visual representation in textbooks can help remove unconscious 
gender assumptions that restrict discovery and innovation, and 
thereby reduce gender inequalities. . . . In bacteriology, this includes 
removing scientifically unsound metaphors that present bacteria as 
sexed organisms.
—Gendered Innovations
Putting microphysiologies of desire into practice, this chapter discusses 
the kinds of molecular projects that become possible when we begin feeling 
around for an organism such as bacteria. It considers what new lines of 
flight can emerge at the intersections of molecular biology and feminism 
when we think with members of the domain bacteria and carefully reflect 
on the capabilities of these primordial, non-nucleated, unicellular organ-
isms. Regardless of how we frame our scientific theories of evolution— 
whether through Charles Darwin’s ideas on mutation and adaptation, or 
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Lynn Margulis’s ideas on symbiosis—the qualities of changefulness and 
nonhuman becoming in bacteria are absolutely integral to how we think 
and what we come to know about genetics, DNA, and molecular biology 
today.1 Recent interest in the human microbiome, for example, coupled 
with the growth of metagenomics, has fostered a great deal of scientific 
interest in the contributions made by microorganisms such as bacteria 
to our human lives. The Human Microbiome Project sponsored by the 
National Institutes of Health recognizes that microbes such as bacteria 
are essential to our health, providing essential vitamins, breaking down 
food to extract nutrients, bolstering the immune systems, and producing 
anti-inflammatory compounds that are needed to fight disease.2 
We have several modern scientific methods at hand to measure the 
extent of our biological and genetic kinship with bacteria. However, put-
ting this recent interest aside, our connection with bacteria should come 
as no surprise. Since the first human observation of microorganisms over 
three hundred years ago, those of us who have worked with them have 
long known the important lessons we can learn from organisms such as 
bacteria. In addition to playing a crucial role in the genesis of this planet 
and all of its inhabitants including humans, bacteria have a great deal to 
teach us not only about changefulness and nonhuman becomings but also 
about desire, response, experimentation, and communication through 
language, writing, and text. Through an analysis of bacteria, this chapter 
asks what new ontological, epistemological, and ethical lessons can bacte-
ria teach us? In particular, I turn to a bacterium’s ability to alter its genome; 
importantly, bacterial sex plays a crucial role.
The ability to conduct genetic engineering through recombinant DNA 
techniques is not even a human invention, but rather a skill set that we as 
human scientists have simply borrowed from our bacterial kin. By taking 
advantage of their capacity for changefulness, we have learned a great deal 
from bacteria, including the physical and chemical features of DNA, the 
complex processes that are involved in the transcription of genes into mes-
senger RNA (mRNA), and the translation of RNA into proteins. Whether 
we realize it or not, almost all of the molecular biotechnologies that we use 
today are based on the bacterial ability to have sex through several mecha-
nisms of gene transfer. As humans, we certainly need to develop a broader 
understanding of sex, and indeed much of this chapter is dedicated to that 
very project. By learning more from bacteria, we can begin to expand our 
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understanding of sex to include the molecular politics and microprocesses 
of desire, response, experimentation, and communication. 
The sex I refer to in this chapter, as well as the sex that Lynn Margulis 
refers to in the epigraph, is the intricate array of molecular mechanisms 
involved in the processes of gene transfer. Bacterial abilities to replicate 
and edit genomes, synthesize new proteins, and adapt their immune sys-
tems are at the heart of many recent molecular biology–based research 
and technologies today, including the industrial and environmental 
applications of synthetic biology as well as the biomedical and directed 
engineering applications of the Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short 
 Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR)-Cas9 gene editing system. No genetic 
engineering technology, and perhaps not even the field of molecular biol-
ogy itself, would exist without the spectacular capabilities of bacteria— 
particularly, the bacterial capability of having sex.
Margulis (1938–2011) dedicated her career as a biologist to thinking 
differently about evolution and to challenging dominant paradigms in 
microbiology. She fearlessly promoted a theory of evolution commonly 
referred to as endosymbiosis theory, symbiogenesis, or symbiosis, at a 
time when many of her scientific peers were simply not ready to listen. 
In a 1967 paper titled “On the Origin of Mitosing Cells,” Margulis argued 
that eukaryotic cells originated from three fundamental organelles that 
were once separate and free-living prokaryotic cells—namely, mitochon-
dria, photosynthetic plasmids, and the basal bodies of flagella.3 Later, 
drawing from and promoting the work of the Russian botanists Kon-
stantin Mereschkowski and Boris Kozo-Polyansky, Margulis provided 
microbiological evidence that similar symbiotic relationships between 
different organisms actually provided the driving force behind evolution 
and genetic variation.4 
In her book Symbiotic Planet, Margulis explained that the bacterial 
capacity to change or transform through metabolic means is at the heart 
of the origins of life on earth. “The smartest cells,” she wrote, “those of the 
tiniest bacteria, about one ten-millionth of a meter in diameter, continu-
ously metabolize. This simply means they continuously undergo hundreds 
of chemical transformations. They are fully alive. Recent work has revealed 
that the tiniest, most simple bacteria are very much like us. They continu-
ously metabolize, using the same components as we do: proteins, fats, 
vitamins, nucleic acids, sugars, and other carbohydrates. It is true that even 
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the simplest bacterium is extremely complex. Yet its inner workings are 
still like those of larger life.”5 Just as Margulis turned to bacteria to pro-
vide an alternative paradigm to thinking about the origins of life on earth, 
she also turned to bacteria to reframe our conceptions about the origins 
of sex. 
Collaborating with her son Dorion Sagan, Margulis’s scientific theories 
on the origins of sex are beautifully complex and yet have been made 
entirely accessible to nonspecialists.6 Although open to the possibility that 
sex may have evolved in “unstable molecules before the origins of life” 
before the ozone layer even formed around the earth, Margulis believed 
that sex began as a way for bacteria to repair their DNA that had been 
damaged by solar radiation.7 Bacteria did this by using DNA that was 
introduced from outside of their own bodies.8 A key argument throughout 
Margulis’s work on the origins of sex is that as humans we need to develop 
a broader understanding of sex. For instance, Margulis emphasized the 
distinction that needs to be made between sex and reproduction, claiming 
that if we think with bacteria, and consider a more historical evolutionary 
perspective that actually decentralizes the human, we can see that sex is 
simply a “genetic mixing process that has nothing necessarily to do with 
reproduction as we know it in mammals.”9 
Margulis stressed that reproduction occurs when a cell or organism 
copies itself, which, depending on the species, can take place with or with-
out the need for engaging in sex. “Everyone is interested in sex,” she wrote. 
“But, from a scientific perspective, the word is all too often associated with 
reproduction, with sexual intercourse leading to childbirth. As we look 
over the evolutionary history of life, however, we see that sex is the for-
mation of a genetically new individual. Sex is a genetic mixing process that 
has nothing necessarily to do with reproduction as we know it in mam-
mals. Throughout evolutionary history a great many organisms offered 
and exchanged genes sexually without the sex ever leading to the cell or 
organism copying known as reproduction.”10 Making this distinction 
between sex and reproduction, Margulis simultaneously underscored the 
notion that sex should not be thought of as a unified and singular type of 
act but rather as a “multifaceted and widespread phenomenon”—an idea 
that we return to later in this chapter.11 For now, I would like to highlight 
the rich intellectual curiosity that Margulis brought to the sciences of 
evolution, microbiology, and molecular biology. Framing sex as 
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multifaceted phenomenon, she perceived gene transfer mechanisms 
including conjugation, lysogeny, phage transduction, transformation, 
and plasmid transfer as different types of bacterial sex acts.12 Despite pro-
viding this elegant ontological shift in our understanding and grasp of 
sex, a tension emerges in her work.
Discussing bacterial sex, Margulis was at times surprisingly hesitant 
in her language describing some of the properties of sex that have come 
to be associated with gender. Her use of the terms “sex,” “gender,” “male,” 
and “female” with respect to bacteria foreshadows the message in the 
chapter epigraph and explains the tone of the cautionary notice posted 
on the Gendered Innovations website regarding the use of “unsound scien-
tific metaphors that present bacteria as sexed organisms.”13 Interestingly, 
while discussing the origins of sex and the mechanisms of bacterial sex, 
in many instances Margulis constructs the familiar scenario:
A sexual being, by biologists’ definition, has at least two parents; and 
“gender” refers to the differences between these two parents. If bacteria 
have “genders” they are very subtle. Conjugating bacteria, before conju-
gation, look and behave just like each other. During conjugation, though, 
the rounded form, the “male” bacterium with a “fertility factor” among 
“his” genes, injects DNA into a “female” recipient whose DNA lacks fer-
tility factor genes. In this travesty of transvestism, the “female” owing 
to its possession of the fertility factor, now becomes “male.” This genetic 
gift can be passed on, indefinitely, changing genders as it goes.14
With or without the scare quotes, and despite the use of the term “trans-
vestism,” Margulis and Sagan’s explanation of bacterial sex moves our 
understanding of sex from not only being richly complex but also being 
rather complicated. In the time I have spent over the years feeling around 
for bacteria, I have learned that something that is complicated can be 
quite generative. In fact, the scholarly and disciplinary complications of 
learning about the fertility factor in bacteria have provided me with the 
motivation for getting lost and for learning how to work among the runes/
ruins of molecular biology. 
For instance, in the entire four years of my undergraduate education 
and training in microbiology, I learned about male bacterial cells that 
 carried the fertility factor required for conjugation several times over. 
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However, the curriculum at my well-reputed institution never once men-
tioned Margulis’s work. Not even in my course and lab work in bacteriology 
and parasitology, where we learned about the possible interrelationships 
that can form between organisms—including symbiosis, mutualism, com-
mensalism, and parasitism—did I learn about Margulis’s ideas on the 
evolutionary concept of symbiogenesis. Despite this knowledge gap or 
“ruin,” I am forever grateful to my professors for sharing their passion 
for all things microbial. This passion and the accompanying sets of prob-
lematics led me to my encounter with viruses, and thereby to one of my 
first experiences as a budding feminist scientist. Microbiology taught me 
the value of thinking with scientific knowledges, languages, and practices 
that were not just complex but complicated. I didn’t have a name for it 
then, but I stumbled across my first object of “joint perplexity” between 
feminists and scientists when I asked my virology professor if there was 
a difference in the etiology of HIV/AIDS in women compared to men.15 
Although the answer given was profoundly insufficient, this was my first 
attempt to bridge disparate fields of scholarship, to mix disciplinary 
vocabularies, and to learn not to steer away from either the complexities 
or the complications of asking and knowing other wise. I’ll admit that after 
years of conducting interdisciplinary work, I am drawn to those produc-
tive tensions that emerge when we as feminist scientists, scientist femi-
nists, feminist theorists, feminist STS scholars, or those of us who wear 
a combination of these hats, turn toward and not away from such difficult 
questions. 
Thinking alongside bacteria, this chapter deals with a series of compli-
cated binaries. These binaries are often used to encounter and interpret 
the world around us, starting with the binary of sex/gender. I then move 
to the binaries of biology/culture and matter/language. These binaries 
have troubled, and have been troubled by, feminist scholars working in a 
number of different fields of expertise and, as it turns out, bacteria have 
played an important role in this work. Bacteria have served as key actors 
not only in molecular biology research and genetic engineering but also 
in the growth and development of feminist theory.
First the chapter looks at some specific outcomes of feminist projects 
that have utilized the sex/gender binary to advance molar projects such 
as the participation of women and marginalized groups in science. 
Although diversity in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) 
96 chapter 3
fields remains a key issue for feminism, the deployment of the sex/gender 
binary through molar projects that have been based on liberal/equal rights 
feminist frameworks in science have, for better or for worse, bolstered 
binarized sex differences research and produced new areas of scientific 
research including the field of “gender biology.” After demonstrating 
how the sex/gender binary has been incorporated into scientific analysis, 
I discuss why some feminist scholars have attempted to move beyond a 
molar and binary view of sex and gender. Importantly, they have also 
attempted to completely reframe how it is that we think about the terms 
“sex” and “gender” in the first place and, as a result, how we think about 
other related binary oppositions. 
Next, the chapter extends these reflections on sex and gender to the 
relationship between biology and culture as well as matter and language. 
It takes a generational feminist approach by reviewing key contributions 
made by feminist poststructuralist accounts of matter and the body, 
then turning to more recent feminist materialist critiques of these post-
structuralist contributions. Recent feminist and materialist scholarship 
attempts to recover from the purported split between sex and gender that 
was promoted by second-wave feminism. This has produced important 
insights for some feminists, particularly those trained and housed in cul-
tural theory, to make their way back to thinking about biology, matter, 
and language. After several decades of theorizing a firm distinction 
between sex (read as biology) and gender (read as culture), particularly in 
English-speaking feminisms, many feminists are now finding the ana-
lytical tools of scientific research and feminist STS particularly useful 
in navigating a path back to sex, biology, and matter. Many are making 
this return by paying close attention to the complexities of biological 
processes.
The chapter ends by charting this “material turn” as it has played out 
specifically in the context of bacteria. I attempt to think more closely with 
bacterial lives. How can biophilosophies of becoming and microphysiologies 
of desire help us to know bacteria and therefore the world within us and 
around us otherwise? How should new connections and kinships with 
bacteria be understood in an era where recent advances in molecular biol-
ogy have led us to the creations of synthetic biology and to genome editing 
technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9? If we return to a crucial feature of 
molecular feminisms, we are reminded that all ontological and ethical 
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gestures, including biophilosophies of becoming and microphysiologies 
of desire, must be held to some kind of contextual accountability, which 
is different from enacting a transcendent mode of responsibility. There-
fore, within this new era of molecular technologies, I suggest that we see 
bacteria and bacterial skills as events that can be reframed and understood 
through postcolonial and decolonial haecceities. It is clear, for instance, 
that these molecular technologies rely on bacteria as raw sources of labor 
in the production of new forms of biocapital. Similar to feminist STS, 
postcolonial and decolonial STS frameworks are rooted in social justice 
epistemologies. These approaches insist that our relationships with the 
matter and materiality of organisms such as bacteria are not just periph-
eral to science but are in fact constitutive of the histories, presents, and 
futures of scientific knowledge production. They remind us how important 
it is to think through both the molar and the molecular.
More Than “Add Women and Stir”
During the 1970s and 1980s in the United States, women’s rights activists 
mobilized to raise national awareness of gender discrimination in all 
aspects of life, public and private. Some of these activists documented and 
sought to redress the systematic underrepresentation of women in aca-
demic, business, political, religious, scientific, and technological careers. 
Motivated by calls for inclusion from the women’s movement and from 
members of Congress, government agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) began collecting data documenting the underrepre-
sentation of women and minorities in STEM fields.16 Within a decade the 
NSF moved from tracking the number of women and minorities working 
in STEM fields in 1991 to implementing a grants program in 2001. This 
program—named Increasing the Participation and Advancement of 
Women in Academic Science and Engineering Careers (or ADVANCE)—
was primarily aimed to “develop a more diverse science and engineering 
workforce.”17 According to the goals of ADVANCE, science itself did not 
need to change; it simply required a more diverse workforce.
Proponents of more inclusive science noted not only the absence of 
women as practicing scientists but also their exclusion from clinical trials. 
Again, in response to activist agitation and a congressional mandate, in 
1994 the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued a policy and created 
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specific guidelines for the inclusion of women and minorities as subjects 
in clinical research involving humans.18 Although the premise was that 
science itself did not have to change, the “add women and stir” approach 
in clinical settings pressed scientists to rethink their assumption that 
the adult male body was the norm on the basis of which all other bodies 
should be measured. Consider, for example, the announcement made in 
2013 by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that zolpidem, the 
active agent in many sleep aids including Ambien, is metabolized differ-
ently in women than in men and that in women there is an increased risk 
of “next-morning impairment for activities that require complete mental 
alertness, including driving.”19 
To offset that risk, the FDA recommended that the “dose of zolpidem 
for women should be lowered from 10 mg to 5 mg for immediate release 
products (Ambien, Edluar, and Zolpimist) and from 12.5 mg to 6.25 mg for 
extended-release products (Ambien CR).”20 Although the biological and 
molecular mechanisms for this difference in zolpidem drug processing are 
still not known, it turns out that the FDA did know back in 1992 that there 
was, as they say, an “effect of gender” when they conducted the clinical 
trials of zolpidem.21 However, since the NIH policy regarding the inclusion 
of women was not implemented until 1994, scientists working on zolpi-
dem apparently did not know what to do with this information regarding 
the effect of gender. Had scientists included women in clinical trials from 
the get-go and decided to learn about the causes behind the effects of 
gender that they observed in pharmaceutical research, years of overdosage 
in women could have been prevented. As this makes clear, the absence 
or disregard of women from most clinical trials has been problematic, 
not only for the health of women but also for the adequacy of scientific 
assumptions and the validity of scientific findings. Despite growing evi-
dence of the importance of including diverse populations in scientific 
research, the most basic lab science involving animal research continues 
to use only the cells, tissues, organs, and bodies derived from males.
To address this deficiency, in May 2014 the NIH unveiled a new policy 
to ensure that preclinical research was sex-balanced by including female 
animals and cell lines obtained from females.22 For some feminist scholars, 
however, simply including more women or female animals in biomedical 
research is equally problematic.23 For it is often not known whether dif-
ferent results, which appear to be related to sex or gender, might be caused 
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by an intervening variable. In the zolpidem case, the difference may have 
more to do with variations in height or body weight rather than with sex 
alone. Many feminists have even questioned how it is that scientists think 
they can go about isolating sex as such within a body, when it is not at all 
clear whether sex is even a factor that has a discrete biological location.24 
For example, is sex a genetic property that is easily identified through 
one’s chromosomes? Or is it a factor that is located in the cells, hormones, 
genitalia, tertiary physical characteristics, or some combination of these 
locations?25 Thus, for many of these scholars, a presumption of sex dif-
ference may be as troubling for scientific investigation as the absence of 
diverse populations from scientific research.
In light of such vexing questions, in 2009 a research team led by Londa 
Schiebinger created the web-based resource, Gendered Innovations in Sci-
ence, Health and Medicine, Engineering and Environment. Jointly sponsored 
by Stanford University, the NSF, and the European Commission, this 
resource seeks to transform the inclusion question from an additive model 
to a more sophisticated deployment of sex and gender as analytical catego-
ries in research design to produce new discoveries. According to Gendered 
Innovations, project goals are to develop “practical methods of sex and 
gender analysis for scientists and engineers” and to provide “case studies 
as concrete illustrations of how sex and gender analysis leads to inno-
vation.”26 The project explicitly seeks to move researchers beyond thinking 
about the category “women” as a “subgroup” of scientists who can diversify 
the workforce or as an additional variable to be inserted into an existing 
experimental protocol. The site pays particular attention to presenting 
feminist epistemologies and methodologies in science in an accessible 
manner for the scientific expert who is not trained as, or inclined to iden-
tify as, a feminist researcher.
In addition to providing examples of practical methods and case stud-
ies, the project defines key terms, including sex and gender, introducing 
feminist concepts to scientists who are unfamiliar with feminist scholar-
ship. In keeping with the sex/gender binary, sex is defined as “a biological 
quality” and gender as “a socio-cultural process.” Although these terms 
are treated as analytically distinct, a section titled “Interactions between 
Sex and Gender” emphasizes that the terms are not independent of one 
another: “Sex and gender also interact in important and complex ways. 
Rarely does an observed difference between men and women involve only 
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sex and not gender, and rarely does gender operate outside the context 
of sex. The precise nature of their interaction will vary depending on the 
research question and on other factors, such as socioeconomic status, or 
geographic location, interacting with sex and gender.”27
Perhaps it is this binary distinction, yet an emphasis on interaction 
that causes scientists, including Margulis, to easily conflate the terms 
“sex” and “gender.” To add to this confusion, there is also the complicated 
nature of their interaction. As the section “Analyzing How Sex and Gender 
Interact” on the Gendered Innovations website explains:
“Sex” and “gender” are distinguished for analytical purposes. “Sex” 
refers to biological qualities, and “gender” refers to socio-cultural pro-
cesses. In reality, sex and gender interact (mutually shape one another) 
to form individual bodies, cognitive abilities, and disease patterns, for 
example. Sex and gender also interact to shape the ways we engineer 
and design objects, buildings, cities, and infrastructures. Recognizing 
how gender shapes sex and how sex influences culture is critical to design-
ing quality research. Sex and gender also intersect in important ways 
with a variety of other social factors, including age, socioeconomic sta-
tus, ethnicity, geographical location, etc.28
The Gendered Innovations project represents a committed attempt to work 
with basic research and industry scientists and to have them seriously 
consider the epistemological moorings of their scientific research by 
rethinking research priorities, reformulating research questions, consid-
ering participatory research and design methods, rethinking language and 
visual representations, and more. The suggested revision of bacteriology 
textbooks to remove “scientifically unsound metaphors that present bac-
teria as sexed organisms” can be found in a subsection titled “Textbooks: 
Rethinking Language and Visual Representations.”29 The revision of text-
books is presented as a prime example of a gendered innovation. That this 
project exists and the website serves as a guide and reference for scientists 
is an important indication that feminism has indeed worked hard to 
change the sciences or, at the very least, has much to offer to change how 
we continue to do science into the future.30 
This project represents progress. It goes a long way to move scientists 
beyond the “add women and stir” mind-set and introduces scientists to 
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the idea of co-production through the categories of sex and gender. Yet 
we should draw attention to the possible consequences of a gendered 
innovation that draws such clear binary distinctions between sex and 
gender and that relies on an interactionist framework. The Gendered Inno-
vations chapter epigraph states that bacteria should not be thought of as 
being sexed organisms. In light of recent work in feminist theory, material 
feminisms, and feminist STS scholarship, I wish to explore what else it 
might mean to say that bacteria are sexed organisms and what else bacte-
ria might have to teach us so that we can think more robustly about sex.
Conjugating Sex and Gender
Not without good reason, the Gendered Innovations project relies on a 
clean ontological distinction between sex and gender. However, encourag-
ing scientists to consider sex and gender as distinct categories, even if an 
interactionist framework is added to their analysis, creates a new set of 
quandaries. For instance, feminist, queer, and postcolonial critiques of 
“inclusion-politics” have stressed that although no one would want women 
or other minority groups to be excluded from biomedical and technologi-
cal research, the use of binary and interactionist models of sex and gender 
in science and medicine could work to further essentialize these identities. 
Simultaneously, these models do little more than pay lip service to other 
crucial interacting factors such as race, ethnicity, class, ability, and sexu-
ality.31 Not to mention, it is also possible that the inclusion of a specific 
identity-based group such as an ethnic minority through “race-based med-
icine” may in fact make individuals who identify with this group into new 
potential targets for profit-motivated pharmaceutical companies.32
Turning to biology and physics for alternatives to such binary frame-
works, feminist STS scholars have advanced an important critique of 
“interactionist” approaches. The problem is that rather than troubling the 
boundaries between sex and gender, interaction presupposes the exis-
tence of two separate realms, which then come into contact. The limits of 
an interactionist frame can be illustrated by emerging research in gender-
based medicine or what has also been referred to as “gender biology.”33 In 
their attempts to investigate how gender interacts with biology, typically 
understood in terms of a gene or a group of genes that code for or regulate 
what have been deemed as masculine and feminine traits, scientists often 
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envision a Venn diagram. In this Venn diagram, biology occupies one 
sector, gender occupies another sector, and the space of overlap signifies 
the prospect of potential interactions. Although this limited interactionist 
framework could be used to help illuminate how gender inequalities (or 
race or class for that matter) produce biological effects such as health dis-
parities in disease distribution and mortality rates, scientists often tend 
to interpret the model in a far more essentialist mode. The study of gender 
biology has come to represent an examination of the interaction of biol-
ogy and culture in a manner that is reminiscent of sociobiology. Relying 
upon an ontological framework that produces a fixed biology (whether in 
the form of gene expression or hormones secretion), biological matters 
once again become the starting point of explaining the causes of perceived 
gender differences.
Philosophers of biology and feminist biologists have theorized alter-
native models in order to avoid the trap of biological determinism that 
is so frequently associated with the sex/gender binary system and its 
accompanying interactionist paradigm. They have turned to develop-
mental systems theory (DST), for example, which offers a framework for 
understanding biology and development in relation to several major fac-
tors, including (1) joint determination by multiple causes, (2) context sen-
sitivity and contingency, (3) extended inheritance, (4) development as 
construction, (5) distributed control, and (6) evolution as construction.34 
DST conceptualizes organisms beyond familiar binaries such as nature/
nurture, genes/environment, and biology/culture. Anne Fausto-Sterling 
has perhaps been the most vocal champion of this theoretical frame 
through her work on intersex issues, bones, and more recently gender 
development in infants.35 Yet DST also tells a cautionary tale for those 
who seek to move beyond dualisms by turning to interactionist conclu-
sions. As philosophers of biology Susan Oyama, Paul Griffiths, and Russell 
Gray have noted:
The standard response to nature/nurture oppositions is the homily  
that nowadays everyone is an interactionist: All phenotypes are the 
joint product of genes and environment. According to one version  
of this  conventional “interactionist” position, the real debate should 
not be about whether a particular trait is due to nature or nurture, but 
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rather how much each “influences” the trait. The nature/nurture debate 
is thus allegedly resolved in a quantitative fashion. . . . DST rejects the 
attempt to partition causal responsibility for the formation of organisms 
into additive components. Such maneuvers do not resolve the nature/
nurture debate; they continue it.36
In order to avoid this outcome, Karen Barad uses the concept of “intra-
action” as a means to move beyond the binary concepts of sex/gender, 
biology/culture, and matter/language. Advancing what she refers to as an 
agential realist ontology, Barad suggests that “the primary ontological 
unit is not independent objects with independently determinate bound-
aries and properties but rather what Niels Bohr terms ‘phenomena.’” As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Barad advocates this ontological view 
of phenomena in response to questions of social constructivism, material-
ity, and more specifically, to feminist and queer reworkings of sex and 
gender. Intra-action is key to this ontological framework. “The neologism 
‘intra-action’ signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies,” she 
explains. “That is, in contrast to the usual ‘interaction,’ which assumes 
that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, 
the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not pre-
cede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action.”37 Barad’s theoriza-
tion of intra-action reworks traditional ontological notions of causality 
and challenges binary relationships. This calls into question the preex-
istence and fixedness of any entity. Whether the phenomenon under 
investigation is an atom, a body, an experimental apparatus, a language, 
a scientific knower, or a collectivity, through their intra-action, each 
emerges in relation to other entities. Intra-action illuminates a relational 
ontology that is populated by mutually constituted phenomena.
Working with the categories of sex and gender in science, health, medi-
cine, and engineering, feminist STS scholars do not ignore questions con-
cerning the underrepresentation of women and other minorities in 
science. However, what has also become clear is that they have moved well 
beyond the “woman question in science.” In 1985, Donna Haraway pub-
lished “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Femi-
nism in the 1980s,” where she problematized essentialisms, including the 
idea of what it means to be a woman.38 In 1986, Sandra Harding started 
104 chapter 3
moving us beyond the women in science question by challenging us to 
consider the science question in feminism.39 As discussed in chapter 2, 
Sue Rosser followed up Harding’s challenge by calling for more feminists 
to enter into the sciences and to discover what else we could know about 
the relationship between science and feminism.40 As a feminist physicist, 
Barad responded to this call and used her knowledge and experience of 
thinking simultaneously with feminism and quantum physics to open up 
a fresh ontological terrain that troubles the ontological distinctions 
between sex and gender.
Conjugating Biology and Culture
Feminist STS scholars have identified a host of theoretical and empirical 
problems that emerge when sex and gender are placed in a binary. For 
some time now this scholarship has called attention to such unsavory 
consequences of the uncritical deployment of the sex/gender binary, while 
also questioning the viability of the biology/culture distinction.41 Drawing 
on ontological lessons brought forward by poststructuralist debates, as 
well as developments in biology and physics, these scholars have argued 
that biology and culture cannot be easily separated. Laying out a rich gene-
alogy of the role and contribution of intersexuality in our understand-
ings of gender as a concept, David Rubin has summarized trajectories of 
intersecting work on intersex, biomedicine, and feminism. “Biological 
processes are not exterior to culture,” he states. Rather than suggesting 
that the two simply interact, Rubin’s survey on decades of feminist, 
queer, and intersex scholarship indicates that the category of “sex cannot 
be definitively disentangled from gender” (i.e., a Venn diagram might not 
work).42 
This ambiguity between the categories of sex and gender, as well as 
biology and culture, has been quite troublesome but also productive for 
feminist scholarship. In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler posed a series of far- 
reaching questions: 
Can we refer to a “given” sex or a “given” gender without first inquiring 
into how sex and/or gender is given, through what means? And what is 
“sex” anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and 
how is a feminist critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport 
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to establish such “facts” for us? . . . Are the ostensibly natural facts of 
sex discursively produced by various scientific discourses in the service 
of other political social interests? If the immutable character of sex is 
contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed 
as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the conse-
quence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no 
distinction at all.43
Putting aside for a moment the crucial ontological disruptions of sex and 
gender that Butler proposes here, she also raises the important question 
of how a feminist critic is to “assess the scientific discourses which purport 
to establish such ‘facts’ for us.”44
Since Butler posed this question in 1990, the field of feminist STS has 
flourished. To be a feminist critic today does not automatically disqualify 
one from also being an informed scientist and/or feminist STS scholar 
who is able to knowledgably “assess the scientific discourses” and the facts 
that they “purport to establish.” Much of this increased participation with 
the sciences is of course directly due to the efforts made by those molar 
projects in early feminist science studies that were dedicated to increasing 
the number of women and feminists in the sciences. Those efforts may 
have directly fed into the work produced by several feminists who went 
on to train in the sciences such as Barad. Interestingly, their grasp of sci-
entific knowledge and intimate exposures to scientific practices have given 
rise to a subsequent generation of feminist scholars who can now attempt 
to answer Butler’s questions regarding our treatment of sex. The next sec-
tion highlights the work of two feminist scholars, Luciana Parisi and Myra 
Hird, who have done just this. Working closely with Lynn Margulis’s work, 
both of these feminist scholars have used their exposure to bacteriology 
and the details of scientific research and practices to produce new insights 
for feminism. It is clear that feminists now have the tools to consider the 
question of whether sex is natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hor-
monal, or whether the natural facts of sex are discursively produced. The 
answer of course is that it is all of these. 
After more than three decades of critical engagement, feminist scien-
tists and feminist STS scholars have learned a great deal about the scien-
tific and biological treatments of the categories of sex and gender.45 Many 
would agree that the use and understanding of the category “sex” in the 
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discourses of the sciences remains complicated and highly nuanced, but 
that more often than not, sex (1) is treated as a given or as an ontologi-
cally fixed category; (2) is still either conflated with gender; and/or (3) is 
placed into a binary and inter actionist relationship with gender (as seen 
in the Gendered Innovations project). This does not mean that feminist 
critics, who are qualified and able to rigorously assess the scientific dis-
courses, wish to entirely dismiss the work of the biological sciences or sex 
differences research for that matter. For instance, Angie Willey has intro-
duced the term “biopossibility” as “a species- and context-specific capacity 
to embody socially meaningful traits or desires,” as well as “a tool for 
naturecultural thinking.”46 What scholars such as Willey, Rubin, and other 
feminist and queer STS scholars are interested in doing is challenging the 
supposed “immutable character of sex.”47 They do so not only by showing 
how cultural ideals and language play a role in shaping our understanding 
of biology and matter, but also by recognizing the contributions that bio-
logical matters make in shaping our cultural expressions and grasp of what 
we come to know as sex. 
Thinking with biophilosophies of becoming, we can begin to see that 
biology and biological processes need not be essentializing for feminists. 
Importantly, however, such ontological and ethical gestures should not 
distract us from also examining the “political and social interests” that 
shape the sciences and our scientific discourses of sex.48 As Rubin has 
stated, we understand that sex and gender are both associated with a bio-
logical materiality and cannot be definitively disentangled from each other 
or from culture. The question now is, How do we begin to reframe sex?
A Thousand Tiny Bacterial Sexes
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the idea of segmen-
tarity, proposing that it exists principally in two modes—namely, a rigid 
mode and a supple mode. The rigid mode reflects an arborized state and 
molar view of segmentarity, whereas the supple mode is rhizomatic, rep-
resenting openness to the multiplicities of molecular processes. They 
argue that the “binarities” that form from within supple modes of seg-
mentarity are the result of “multiplicities of n dimensions.”49 While 
describing rigid and supple segmentarities, Deleuze and Guattari state 
that it is incorrect to simply oppose these modes of segmentarity and that 
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they too are entangled. I am most interested in how they develop their 
concept of segmentarity in relation to sex. They state:
Every society, and every individual, are thus plied by both segmentari-
ties simultaneously: one molar, the other molecular. If they are distinct, 
it is because they do not have the same terms or the same relations or 
the same nature or even the same type of multiplicity. If they are insep-
arable, it is because they coexist and cross over into each other. . . . In 
short, everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a mac-
ropolitics and a micropolitics. . . . If we consider the great binary aggre-
gates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that they also cross over 
into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a 
double reciprocal dependency between them. For the two sexes imply  
a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the 
man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each 
to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes.50
Elizabeth Grosz quotes these same lines from Deleuze and Guattari in 
her own theories on the body and in an effort to envision the deterritori-
alized body without organs (BwO). She is interested in using Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approaches to becoming in order to develop a feminist project 
of rhizomatics. This project views subjectivity through the lens of molecu-
lar becomings and treats the body, above all else, as a corporeal event that 
is capable of transformation.51 My intention is similar. By working with 
bacteria, I wish to better understand how the quality of changefulness is 
made possible by sex. More specifically, I am interested in what happens 
to our understandings of sex and gender when we allow them to cross over 
from molar treatments into the molecular. I am also interested in thinking 
with bacteria to better understand sex as an event that plays on and 
emerges from the “multiplicity of molecular combinations.”52
Extending feminist theories of sex and gender in her book Volatile Bod-
ies, Grosz notes that “feminists have exhibited a wide range of attitudes 
and reactions to conceptions of the body and attempts to position it at 
the center of political action and theoretical production.” Differentiating 
“sexual difference” approaches from “egalitarian feminism” and “social 
constructionism,” Grosz suggests that such thinkers as Luce Irigaray, 
Helene Cixous, Gayatri Spivak, and Judith Butler are particularly wary of 
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the sex/gender distinction. Grosz argues that for these feminists the body 
is not accepted as a blank biological slate upon which culture or gender is 
projected. Rather, Grosz explains that feminisms of difference understand 
the body to be active. In contrast to universal notions of essences or cat-
egories, she suggests that the body is seen as a “cultural interweaving and 
production of nature.” As such, there are irreducible differences not only 
between the sexes but also among members of the same sex. Turning to 
Deleuze to support her reconceptualization of the body, and to reframe 
the ontological distinctions that have been drawn between biology and 
culture, Grosz notes that a “Deleuzian framework de-massifies the enti-
ties that binary thought counterposes against each other: the subject, the 
social order, even the natural world are theorized in terms of the micro-
processes, a myriad of intensities and flows, with unaligned or unalignable 
components, which refuse to conform to the requirements of order and 
organization. . . . Identities and stabilities are not fixed.”53
The work of Luciana Parisi and Myra Hird offers examples of what we 
can come to know if we do learn to de-massify the binary that counter-
poses sex and gender. For some time now feminist STS scholars have 
questioned the stable ontological moorings associated with binary and 
categorical notions of sex and gender as well as biology and culture. They 
have started to elaborate on the idea of processual bodies and, as a result, 
are looking more closely at the materiality and material contributions 
made by biological matter. Using bacteria as their guide, both Parisi and 
Hird have emphasized the importance of understanding bodies and biol-
ogies as microprocesses, and sex in particular, as an event comprised of a 
multiplicity of differences. 
In Abstract Sex: Philosophy, Bio-Technology and the Mutations of Desire, 
Parisi argues that in this age of information, cybernetics, and human 
reproductive technologies such as genetic engineering and cloning, we 
must reformulate our understandings of sex. In this new era of cybernetic 
capitalism, she claims, human sex has been separated from so-called “nat-
ural” reproduction, further blurring the distinctions we make between 
natural sex and artificial sex. This blurring further impacts the distinction 
between the biological and technological as well as between embodiment 
and disembodiment. Parisi proposes her idea of “abstract sex” as a micro-
political framework that can address this blurring effect and that can work 
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to integrate three main nonlinear layers within which sex is stratified—
namely, the biodigital, the biocultural, and the biophysical. “Instead of 
re-articulating sex within a post-feminist critical framework where dif-
ference is no longer material,” Parisi states, “abstract sex extends the femi-
nist politics of desire by mapping the transversal mixing of information 
between bodies of all sorts (bacteria, vegetables, animals, humans and 
technical machines). Abstract sex proposes to tap into the kinetic ethology 
of tiny sexes that lay out a micropolitics of symbiotic relations between 
different levels of mutation of matter and desire.”54
Parisi also turns to the work of Margulis, and explicitly to bacteria, 
emphasizing that sex is ancient and that it emerged as a way for “bacterial 
cells to repair their DNA damaged by intense solar radiations.” As she 
points out, sex, as a mode of transmission and reproduction of informa-
tion, is almost as old as the Earth itself. In what can also be interpreted 
as an unapologetically posthumanist move, Parisi makes it clear that as 
humans we are embarrassingly new to this Earth compared to bacteria 
and have very little appreciation of the multiplicities of sex. We live in the 
“Age of Bacteria,” as Parisi emphasizes, and have much to learn from the 
sex lives and practices of bacteria.55 
Drawing our attention to the multiplicities of molecular combinations 
that are present in bacteria, Parisi reminds us that “transgenic sex, the 
recombination of genetic material from two or more cellular bodies, con-
stitutes the most ancient mode of genetic transfer on the biophysical stra-
tum: bacterial sex.”56 So that we do not mistake this propensity for 
transfer, change, and multiplicity with life and proliferation alone and 
forget to associate genetic transfer with death and destruction also, Parisi 
reminds us of the full range of consequences of the microprocesses of sex 
by turning our attention to the relationship between viruses and bacteria. 
She states:
Viruses attack bacteria and inject their genetic material into the cell. 
They hijack the bacterial genetic system and start viral replication. The 
bacterial cell eventually reaches a critical point, a threshold of change by 
breaking apart, and new viruses, produced by the combination of bacte-
rial and viral genes, will spread into a new bacterium host. Such a viru-
lent sex corresponds to bacterial abilities to trade genes by developing a 
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variety of metabolisms—including the use of metals—of which plants 
and animals have learned to use only few. Bacterial sex not only breeds 
new genes, but also manipulates the genetic composition of the bacte-
rial body itself. . . . Transgenic sex puts up no resistance to mutations 
and affords no protection from contagion.57
The virology professor from my undergraduate days would be very 
pleased to see this no-nonsense treatment of virus-bacterial encounters, 
even though he would probably not be interested or impressed in the 
slightest by the link made above between viruses, bacteria, transgenic 
sex, molecular politics, and feminism. I, on the other hand, am absolutely 
thrilled by Parisi’s success at bridging these fields of scholarship, by her 
smooth mixing of disciplinary vocabularies, and by her ability to steer us 
directly into the rich complexities and complications that come with 
thinking about sex otherwise. As should be clearly evident, in response 
to the query made by Butler in 1990, feminists can indeed trouble the 
ontological categories of sex and gender and also be informed feminist 
critics—not only of the humanities and social sciences but also of the 
biological, physical, and natural sciences.
In a similar show of interdisciplinary expertise, Hird has called for a 
“bacterial ontology” and “microontologies” to reinvent our understand-
ing of sex and sexual difference.58 In Sex, Gender and Science, Hird turns 
to bacteria to create a “nonhumanocentric position” and shows that by 
“paying attention to nonlinear biology it is possible to acknowledge that 
human bodies, like all living matter, physically actualize sex diversity.”59 
As Hird states:
Our remote ancestors continue to promiscuously exchange genes with-
out getting hung up on sexual reproduction. Bacteria are not picky, and 
will avidly exchange genes with just about any living organism anywhere 
in the world, including the human body. Thus bacteria are beyond the 
false male/female dichotomy of human discourse. Since bacteria recog-
nize and avidly embrace diversity, they do not discriminate on the bases 
of “sex” differences at all. The bacteria that move freely into and within 
our bodies are already infinitely “sex” diverse. . . . So in the tired game  
of identity, I would choose neither goddess nor cyborg. I would rather 
be a bacterium.60
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By suggesting that bacteria are infinitely sex diverse, Hird may be in favor 
of the statement made by Gendered Innovations that microbiology text-
books should not represent bacteria as being “sexed” organisms in a binary 
understanding of the term. After all, the naming of bacteria as male is 
based on the criteria that males are the “donor” cells that possess a fertil-
ity factor (F+) that allows for the extension of a sex pili, which in turn is 
required for conjugation. Alternatively, female bacterial cells are those 
recipient cells that lack the fertility factor (F-). 
For some, the language and model used to describe bacterial conjuga-
tion in this way may resemble the development of male and female sexual-
ity as articulated by psychoanalytic theory and Freud’s explanation of the 
development of normal female sexuality through her lack of a penis and 
subsequent penis envy. However, Hird’s work helps us to see that bacteria 
do in fact engage in sex, and that we could instead be using a bacterial 
ontology to reframe how it is that we think about sex. For instance, draw-
ing from the work of Margulis, Deleuze and Guattari, Grosz, Parisi, Hird, 
and many others, we could be thinking about sex as a process or as an 
event through the framework of symbiogenesis, rather than as a stable 
factor that exists within a closed binary. Given the distance that feminist 
theory and interdisciplinary feminist STS work has come in reframing the 
sex and gender binary, it would be a shame not to incorporate this think-
ing into our textbooks. If we can learn to treat sex as a haecceity, as a mul-
tiplicity, or as an event, we may even be able to reconcile this fact with the 
idea that bacteria actually are “sexed” organisms—multiple times, perhaps 
even a thousand tiny times over.
In addition to drawing our attention to sex diversity in bacteria, Hird 
highlights the capacity that bacteria have to communicate with each other. 
In The Origins of Sociable Life: Evolution after Science Studies, Hird points 
to the growth patterns of bacterial colonies and to their collective ability 
to sense, process information, and regulate gene expression in each indi-
vidual bacteria through various signaling mechanisms.61 Describing the 
processes that bacteria use to communicate changes required for antibi-
otic resistance, she states, “In other words, bacteria make use of a collec-
tive epigenetic memory that can, for instance, track previous encounters 
with antibiotics: they collectively glean information from the environ-
ment, ‘talk’ with each other, distribute tasks, and convert their colonies 
into a massive “brain” that processes information, learns from past 
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experiences, and, we suspect, creates new genes to better cope with novel 
challenges.”62 This ability to communicate indicates the complexity that is 
involved in bacterial signaling and it goes without saying that microbiolo-
gists and genetic engineers have developed a great interest and apprecia-
tion for this capability. 
However, Hird also touches upon the difficulty that biologists often 
experience while trying to avoid anthropomorphizing these bacterial com-
municative processes.63 She motions us toward Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
original theory of semiotics and suggests that microbiologists would do 
well by trying to understand bacterial communication through biosemi-
otics. “Constituting a theoretical approach or frame,” Hird explains, 
“biosemiotics ‘is concerned with the sign aspects of the processes of life 
itself ’ gleaned through the relationships between sign, object and inter-
pretant. According to biosemiotics, what organisms sense also has a mean-
ing (food, predator, escape, sexual mate and so on). All organisms are born 
into a system of signs—a semiosphere—consisting of the totality of 
movements, odors, colors, chemical signals, touch and so on.”64 Hird raises 
a very crucial point here. Similar to Parisi, by suggesting that bacteria like 
all organisms are born into a system of signs, Hird is enacting a critical 
posthumanist move that works to decentralize the human. By turning to 
semiotics to explain the communicative behavior of bacteria, Hird is fur-
ther engaging in a molecular politics that works to include bacteria and 
other nonhumans as users and participants in the practices of communi-
cation, language, and meaning-making.
What I find interesting here is that even while making this radical and 
immanent gesture, Hird herself is cautious about anthropomorphizing 
the communicative abilities of bacteria. What if while describing the col-
lective epigenetic memory of bacteria, she did not place quotations around 
the word “talk” and instead merely stated that bacteria talk to each 
other?65 If bacteria can indeed communicate, why do we feel the need to 
hesitate or somehow differentiate between what we do and what they 
do by saying that they “talk,” but that we humans simply talk? In the same 
vein, can we say that bacteria write or do they only “write”? Questions 
such as these bring me to the last binary distinction that I wish to analyze 
in this chapter. What can we come to know differently about the relation-
ship between the material and the semiotic, or between matter and lan-
guage? The question is not whether bacteria communicate, but rather 
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how we as humans learn to orient our encounters with bacteria when 
they communicate.
Conjugating Matter and Language
In Meeting the Universe Halfway, Barad lamented the following with 
regards to the relationship between matter and language:
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the 
semiotic turn, the interpretive turn, the cultural turn: it seems that  
at every turn lately every “thing”—even materiality—is turned into a 
matter of language or some other form of cultural representation. The 
ubiquitous puns on “matter” do not, alas, mark a rethinking of the key 
concepts (materiality and signification) and the relationship between 
them. Rather, they seem to be symptomatic of the extent to which 
 matters of “fact” (so to speak) have been replaced with matters of sig-
nification (no scare quotes here). Language matters. Discourse matters. 
Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing 
that doesn’t seem to matter anymore is matter.66
I have often wondered about the audience that Barad was targeting when 
she wrote that statement. Likely, she was appealing to feminist theorists 
influenced by poststructuralism and cultural studies, or radical social con-
structivists who, at least since the days of the science wars if not before 
then, have been attempting to confront and unravel several binaries 
including that between matter and language. 
I have also wondered if scientists working in a lab—a biology lab, for 
example—who may be ideal users for the Gendered Innovations website, 
would lament over the status of matter in the same way that Barad does. 
Would they say that matter doesn’t matter any longer when they are set-
ting up their experiments to work with animals, when they are killing 
animals, harvesting tissues, incubating cells, or isolating DNA and pro-
teins? I don’t think so. When the scale, space, and timeline of animals’ 
sleep and wake cycles, hormone pulsatility, or peaks in protein synthesis 
dictate your daily activities as a scientist in a biology wet lab, it is “matter” 
and not language that seems to have been granted more power. In fact, 
this is precisely why in the Gendered Innovations epigraph, a reverse 
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warning is put into place. Scientists who get their hands dirty with tis-
sues, cells, molecules, and other physical properties of matter on a daily 
basis have to actually be reminded that language and representations 
matter. Indeed, some days as an interdisciplinary scholar with one foot in 
the humanities and the other in the biological sciences, the constant back 
and forth I experience while trying to deal with the binaries that are drawn 
between matter and language (or between matter and text) is enough to 
give me whiplash.
In their book New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies, Rick Dol-
phijn and Iris van der Tuin describe new materialism as a new metaphys-
ics, which reinterprets previous work and creates a “new tradition” that 
alters understandings of the past, present, and future. Characterizing new 
materialism as a “transversal” cultural theory, they suggest that it “does 
not privilege matter over text or culture over biology. It explores a monist 
perspective, devoid of the dualisms that have dominated the humanities 
(and sciences) until today, by giving special attention to matter, which has 
been so neglected by dualist thought.” Although I would argue that matter 
has not been neglected in all forms of dualist thought, I am drawn to the 
ontological univocity that is implied with such a transversal theory. Claim-
ing to provide an “immanent answer to transcendental humanism,” new 
materialists are intent on disassembling powerful dualisms (including 
sex and gender) to “do justice to the ‘material-semiotic’ or ‘material-
discursive’ character of all events.”67
Multiple strands of feminist theory contribute to the new material-
isms. Feminist philosopher van der Tuin situates new materialism in rela-
tion to older forms of feminist materialisms that championed monism 
and vitalism. Positioning new materialisms as “the inheritor of feminist 
standpoint theory,” she traces continuities in feminist epistemological 
debates and philosophical engagements with materiality including his-
torical materialism.68 The term “new materialism” or “neo-materialism” has 
been credited to Rosi Braidotti, whose work on posthumanism and femi-
nist theories of subjectivity provides a basis for a new materialist think-
ing.69 New materialism also traces its origin to Haraway’s conceptualization 
of the material-semiotic.70 
Despite these long trajectories, it could be argued that recent scholar-
ship under the name of feminist new materialism also grows out of cul-
tural theory’s more recent engagement with decades of work in feminist 
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STS. In fact, the material turn, as conceived in relation to poststructural-
ism and cultural theory, stems from a very specific conversation within 
feminist theory. The particular conversation I am referring to here is the 
one that supposedly privileged postmodern constructivism and the sig-
nificance of language to such an extent that matter itself appeared to be 
discursively constituted. Judith Butler’s work is often taken as emblematic 
of feminist theory’s “flight from nature” or indeed its “failed materiality.71 
Criticizing the preoccupation with the discursive elements of bodies and 
power, material feminists as well as feminist new materialists have sought 
to mitigate the influence of poststructuralism’s linguistic idealism on 
feminist theory and have turned in many cases to the “hard” sciences in 
an effort to get closer to matter.72 In her efforts to illuminate the cultural 
and constructed aspects of “sex,” Butler suggests that the body cannot be 
known outside of inscription or discourse. “To posit by way of language 
a materiality outside of language is still to posit that materiality,” she 
famously wrote, “and the materiality so posited will retain that positing 
as its constitutive condition.”73 Critics have claimed that Butler’s refusal 
of any distinction between sex and gender precludes the possibility of 
material expressions of and by the body.74 
Correctly or incorrectly, many feminist new materialists have inter-
preted this emphasis on language, or on text, as an inherent inability to 
think about matter—whether that matter is coded as sex, biology, atoms, 
or nature. Although Butler’s work has served as fertile ground for this 
criticism, several European feminist scholars have suggested that her work 
is emblematic of a larger problematic characteristic of a dominant strand 
of US feminist theory. Articulating a Eurocentric approach to new mate-
rialism, Braidotti, for example, has advanced a “friendly but firm criticism 
of American hegemony in feminist theory, . . . attempt[ing] to develop 
other perspectives, drawn from historical and situated European tra-
ditions.”75 Braidotti and other European new materialists point specifically 
to misleading interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir’s work on sex, gen-
der, and sexual difference spurred by Butler’s article “Sex and Gender in 
Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex.”76 In contrast to Beauvoir’s complex 
account, critics have charged Butler with installing “a strict dualism” by 
overemphasizing the sex/gender split and attributing to Beauvoir “an over-
simplified idea of language.”77 European new materialists seek to rescue 
Beauvoir’s work by foregrounding the undecidability of sexual difference 
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in her works and by promoting her ideas of “sexual differing” and a “per-
formative understanding of ontology.”78
Vicky Kirby has also raised a number of critical challenges for feminist 
theory through her close readings of Butler’s analyses of nature/culture, 
discursive ontology, and conceptions of materiality. Turning Butler’s 
proposition that sex is “always already gender” on its head, Kirby asks the 
risky question, “What if culture was really nature all along?” She explores 
the possibility that signs are “substantively or ontologically material.”79 
In a piece that can be found in several places, Kirby shares an exchange 
that she had with Butler that pushes up against questions of language, 
matter, nature, and biology.80 In her interview with Butler, Kirby states 
that she is interested in thinking about what it is that prevents us from 
considering “signs as substantively or ontologically material.”81 She asks 
Butler: “In the face of contemporary medical research on the body in 
genetics, the cognitive sciences (I’m thinking of the similarity between 
neural-net behavior and Saussurean linguistics), immunology, and so on, 
there is a serious suggestion that ‘life itself ’ is creative encryption. Does 
your understanding of language and discourse extend to the workings of 
biological codes and their apparent intelligence?”82
Butler replies:
I take it that [you] want to know from this question and the earlier one 
what my engagement with science is. And here the question seems to 
be: does my view of discourse include “biological codes.” I confess to not 
knowing the literature to which [you] refer. [You] may need to take me 
through the theory that interests [you] here so that I might more intel-
ligently respond. From my recent exposure to the work of Evelyn Fox-
Keller, I would, however, say the following, reiterating what I take [your] 
view to be. There are models according to which we might try to under-
stand biology, and models by which we might try to understand how 
genes function. And in some cases the models are taken to be inherent 
to the phenomena that is being explained. Thus, Fox-Keller has argued 
that certain computer models used to explain gene sequencing in the 
fruit fly have recently come to be accepted as intrinsic to the gene itself. 
I worry that a notion like “biological code,” on the face of it, runs the 
risk of that sort of conflation. I am sure that encryption can be used  
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as a metaphor or model by which to understand biological processes, 
especially cell reproduction, but do we then make the move to render 
what is useful as an explanatory model into the ontology of biology itself? 
This worries me, especially when it is mechanistic models which lay dis-
cursive claims on biological life. What of life exceeds the model? When 
does the discourse claim to become the very life it purports to explain?  
I am not sure it is possible to say “life itself” is creative encryption unless 
we make the mistake of thinking that the model is the ontology of life. 
Indeed, we might need to think first about the relation of any definition 
of life to life itself, and whether it must, by virtue of its very task, fail.83
Kirby has followed up, in later reiterations of this exchange, by adding 
more background to the question she originally posed to Butler. Referring 
to the workings of “biological codes” and their intelligence, Kirby states: 
“On this last point, I was thinking of the code-cracking and encryption 
capacities of bacteria as they decipher the chemistry of antibiotic data and 
reinvent themselves accordingly. Aren’t these language skills?”84 In 
another reference to this interview, Kirby elaborates the point further by 
explaining:
In a bid to illuminate why Butler’s manoeuver will authorize the itera-
tion of the problem she so carefully unpacks for us, namely, that Nature 
(now under erasure) is incapable of cognizing or reinventing itself, I 
asked her to consider a rather simple phenomenon. My question directly 
relates to the theme of this issues’ problematic, namely, how to engage 
with science and its “objects.” I was thinking about the cryptographic 
skills of bacteria as they decipher the chemistry of antibiotic data and 
reinvent themselves accordingly. When ciphering skills are exhibited  
by boffins such as Alan Turing of Enigma Code fame, Steve Wozniak, 
cofounder of Apple Computer, or the infamous “black hat” hacker in  
the nineties, Kevin Mitnick, we interpret this capacity for abstract think-
ing as an exemplary instance of intelligent reasoning. Although we are 
unlikely to describe the growing number of superbugs in terms of these 
same special talents, it could nevertheless be suggested that these single- 
celled microorganisms with no nucleus (or “head”) have actually out-
smarted their human interlocutors.85
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No matter how many times I read it, I will be honest and admit that 
even with my undergraduate training in microbiology and graduate and 
postgraduate work in molecular biology, I struggle to grasp what Kirby 
means by the ability of bacteria to “decipher the chemistry of antibiotic 
data.” I consider myself somewhat fluent in the characteristics and func-
tions of bacteria that can be found in any standard microbiology or 
bacteriology textbook. I am also familiar with the processes by which anti-
biotics target peptidoglycan synthesis to break down bacterial cell walls.86 
I am aware that bacteria have several mechanisms for developing resis-
tance to antibiotics including the modification of protein structures that 
interfere with antibiotic carriage into the cell, that there are changes that 
occur in bacterial genomes that can cause antibiotic resistance by spon-
taneous mutation, and that these beneficial mutations can be passed 
through both horizontal and vertical genetic exchange.87 Yet, without a 
single reference to the vast scientific literature on bacterial resistance to 
antibiotics, what Kirby means by “the chemistry of antibiotic data” (which 
was meant to further clarify her original question to Butler) remains 
unclear to me.
Despite this lack of scientific clarity, I am convinced that Kirby is doing 
vital work by suggesting that life itself is creative encryption and by call-
ing our attention to the capabilities of bacteria and the intelligence behind 
their biological codes.88 By asking whether the skills that bacteria have are 
language skills, Kirby is attempting to use scientific knowledge to contrib-
ute to the evolution of key concepts in feminist theory that are grounded 
in the sex/gender binary. She is trying to force a particular audience of 
feminist theorists who have been trapped in a transcendent humanistic 
frame, and who have moved away from directly addressing questions of 
biological and physical matters, into rethinking their approach to matter. 
Following Jacques Derrida, Kirby forces the question of whether a distinc-
tion can be made at all between matter and language, matter and text, and 
matter and writing (writing understood here in a broad sense).
Interestingly, in order to support this posthumanist effort to acknowl-
edge the communicative capacities of nonhumans, and to consider life 
itself as a text, Kirby compares two contrasting interpretations of Derri-
da’s claim that “there is no outside of text.”89 The first interpretation 
reflects the view of many critics of poststructuralism who assert that 
“we are caught in an endless slide of referral that leads from one signifier 
Bacterial Lives 119
to another signifier, one meaning to yet another meaning, in a vertiginous 
spiral of implication that never quite arrives at its destination. As a con-
sequence, we can never retreat or advance to some natural, prediscursive, 
or extratextual space in order to test the truth or adequacy of our repre-
sentations because, as we have seen, intelligibility is reckoned through 
such systems.”90
As an alternative interpretation, Kirby appeals to Derrida’s claim 
“there is no outside of text” rather as an attempt to grasp “the worlding 
of the world” by thinking about writing in a more general sense. She 
argues that “‘writing in the general sense’ articulates a differential of 
space/time, an inseparability between representation and substance that 
rewrites causality. It is as if the very tissue of substance, the ground of 
Being, is this mutable intertext—a ‘writing’ that both circumscribes and 
exceeds the conventional divisions of nature and culture. If we translate 
this into what is normally regarded as the matter of the body, then, fol-
lowing Derrida, ‘the most elementary processes within the living cell’ are 
also a ‘writing’ and one whose ‘system’ is never closed.”91 Thus Kirby makes 
a compelling case that cells write and that “it is in ‘the nature of Nature’ 
to write, to read and to model.”92 The ontological openness of this stance, 
treating writing as a process that exceeds the divisions of nature and cul-
ture, accommodates feminist theories such as Haraway’s conception of 
naturecultures and Braidotti’s accounts of posthumanism that have also 
had formative impacts on the field of feminist STS.93 In my estimation, 
thinking about the communicative capacities of bacteria via their writing 
skills has several hallmarks of being a project for molecular feminisms. 
Thanks to my years in the lab and to experiences of “engaging with sci-
ence and its ‘objects’” such as neurons and microorganisms including bac-
teria, I am also absolutely on board with the idea that bacteria have special 
talents, including the ability to write, and not just “write.” I am persuaded 
not only by Kirby’s posthumanist gesture to extend capacities for language 
to nonhumans but also by her idea of seeing language, writing, and text 
itself as life. In fact, in chapter 5, I go one step further and extend these 
capacities to a concept of life that is not reduced to the organism or to the 
organic.94 I am more than willing to go here with Kirby. However, I suggest 
that if we want to consider her claim of bacterial writing through biophi-
losophies of becoming and microphysiologies of desire, we must begin to 
connect such an ontological gesture to an applied ethics of matter. 
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The Microprocesses of Bacterial Ethics
As Nancy Tuana has stated, “It is easier to posit an ontology than to prac-
tice it.”95 Saying that bacteria write is important, but our work does not 
end here. The challenge lies in learning how to identify and appreciate the 
material consequences that accompany such an ontological position. At 
its best, feminist STS is immersed in analyzing the practices of and data 
generated by specific sciences, along a wide array of different scales. In 
fact, the richness and credibility of STS itself depends on developing sys-
tematic knowledge of the minute details of specific fields in the sciences 
while also keeping an eye on the larger organizational, institutional, and 
political structures associated with the circulation of power. Many of the 
scholars who engage more closely with the sciences are keenly aware that 
there are material consequences of our particular ontological conceptions 
of the material world, which have profound implications for species other 
than our own. As Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman poignantly state in 
their introduction to Material Feminisms:
Redefining the human and nonhuman has ethical implications: discourses 
have material consequences that require ethical responses. Ethics must 
be centered not only on those discourses but on the material conse-
quences as well. . . . A material ethics entails . . . that we can compare  
the very real material consequences of ethical positions and draw con-
clusions from those comparisons. We can, for example, argue that the 
material consequences of one ethics is more conducive to human and 
nonhuman flourishing than that of another. Furthermore, material ethics 
allows us to shift the focus from ethical principles to ethical practices. 
Practices are, by nature, embodied, situated actions. Ethical practices, 
which unfold in time and take place in particular contexts, invite the 
recognition of and response to expected as well as unexpected material 
phenomenon. Particular ethical practices, situated both temporally and 
physically, may also allow for an openness to the needs, the significance, 
and the liveliness of the more-than-human world.96
With this emphasis on considering the needs and liveliness of the 
more-than-human world, let us return to the ontological status of bacteria 
that write and to possible microphysiologies of desire that can serve as an 
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applied ethics of matter as we go forward. What happens when a notion 
of language is extended to Nature? How do we begin to encounter this 
Nature? How do we encounter bacteria that we now acknowledge as hav-
ing the capability to write? There are good reasons for recognizing that 
bacteria have special talents, of which writing may be one. However, as 
Alaimo and Hekman suggest, the statement Kirby makes, that “it is in ‘the 
nature of Nature’ to write, to read and to model,” has ethical implications, 
precisely because it redefines the human as well as the nonhuman.97 If it 
is accepted that Nature writes, reads, and models and that signs are “sub-
stantively or ontologically material,” we should also be equally concerned 
with the outcomes or consequences of this ontology.98
It is one thing to say that bacteria write. It is another to learn how to 
pay attention to how bacteria write, why they write, and what they are 
writing. In fact, although Butler’s response to Kirby’s initial question 
regarding “life itself” as encryption and the “workings of biological codes” 
reveals Butler’s belief in a materiality but our ultimate inaccessibility to 
this materiality through language, we must also point out that Kirby does 
little to address the questions about context that Butler posed back to 
her during their exchange. It is this emphasis on looking for both specific-
ity as well as keeping an eye on broader contexts that I wish to extend 
to Kirby’s references to the “code-cracking,” “encryption capacities,” and 
“cryptographic skills” of bacteria. Perhaps in a way it is an attempt to 
address Butler’s poignant question that she posed to Kirby: namely, “What 
of life exceeds the model?”99 
If we turn toward bacteria that write by feeling around for the organism, 
we begin to explore what a bacterial ethics might look like. We might ask, 
for example, how are bacteria changed, how are labs changed, how are 
institutions changed, and how are we as human scientists changed when 
bacteria begin to write? We might ask, for example, if genetic engineers, 
who think that do-it-yourself (DIY) synthetic biology represents a demo-
cratic science, are willing to extend coauthorship and co-ownership not 
only to other human scientists but also to the bacteria that perform most 
of the writing and biolabor in synthetic biology. We can begin to see that 
the model that presents DNA as code has already become the ontology of 
life. A molecular line of questioning would have us ask whether we are 
willing to work within this ruin. Are we willing to work with bacterial DNA 
as code to better understand how bacteria alter their immune systems in 
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order to help humans fight their own diseases through genome editing? 
Biologists, geneticists, and bioengineers have long afforded bacteria with 
the capabilities of writing. They are beyond asking the question of what 
bacterial writing is and are more attuned to the question of what bacterial 
writing can do. In fact, they have built entire disciplines and biotechnolo-
gies based on the ontological premise that life, in the form of DNA, is text 
and that organisms such as bacteria not only write; they also transcribe, 
translate, and edit. Indeed, the model has long been accepted as the 
ontology, and although I am aware that this ontology needs to be con-
stantly interrogated, I am also aware that biotechnologies that are based 
on the writing and editing capabilities of bacteria already exist. 
By following our inquiries and engagements with bacteria through 
microphysiologies of desire, we may begin to ask different kinds of ques-
tions regarding these intimate encounters with bacteria. We could begin 
to ask whether in the specific case of bacteria, writing, reading, and mod-
eling “allow for an openness to the needs, the significance, and the liveli-
ness of the more-than-human world,” or whether our acknowledgment of 
bacterial writing works to support, promote, and benefit only the most 
humanist of causes?100 Are we at all concerned with the different genres 
of bacterial writing that might exist? If we can think about bacterial writ-
ing, can we also start to think about bacterial poetry? Or is bacterial writ-
ing only valued for its mechanistic appeal?101 Can we only learn to recognize 
or appreciate bacterial writing when it serves a mechanistic function such 
as building antibiotic resistance and interrupting genes that contribute to 
human diseases, or when it is aligned with militarized or highly gendered 
skills such as cryptography, hacking, and code-cracking? Does this new 
ontology ultimately serve as a “reshaping” for “productionist purposes?”102 
Trying to address the inseparability between representation and 
substance, Kirby suggests writing as a mutable “intertext.” Although I 
read this mutability as a feature resonating with the molecular capacities 
for changefulness and nonhuman becomings, I want to keep in mind that 
biophilosophies of becoming prompt us to examine the specific “contexts” 
in which such moments of “intertext” occur. To gain more insights into 
the importance of thinking with bacteria and to better contextualize the 
worlding of the world through bacterial writing, it is perhaps helpful to 
return one more time to Derrida. It could be argued that Derrida’s phrase 
written in French, “il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” is better translated in English 
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as “there is no outside-text,” rather than “there is nothing outside of the 
text,” or Kirby’s use of the phrase “there is no outside of text.”103 In his 
own later work Limited Inc, Derrida noted that “the phrase which for some 
has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of decon-
struction (‘there is nothing outside the text’ [il n’y a pas de hors-texte]), 
means nothing else: ‘there is nothing outside context’ or that ‘nothing 
exists outside context.’”104 It could be that Kirby’s use of a particular trans-
lation of Derrida’s phrase has influenced her interpretation of Derrida and 
where she chooses to turn her thoughts in relation to bacteria, bacterial 
writing, and the “worlding of the world.” 
Kirby’s ontological intervention in extending language, reading, and 
writing skills to the nonhuman is crucial. However, in the worlding of the 
world that biophilosophies of becoming would have us bring forward, con-
text matters. We must realize though that just as one cannot fix the mean-
ing of a text, of course what counts as context also cannot be fixed. It 
depends on how an event is oriented. The final section of this chapter 
treats bacterial writing as an event, one that can be reframed and under-
stood through postcolonial and decolonial haecceities. It interrogates the 
implications that follow when we say that bacteria have the capabilities 
to write. As Parisi reminds us, we must keep in view the full range of con-
sequences that accompany the microprocesses of becoming, whether we 
are talking about bacterial sex or bacterial writing. As crucial and produc-
tive new ontological approaches evolving out of the interrogations of sex/
gender, biology/culture, and matter/language binaries can be, we must 
remember that they don’t exist outside context.
Bacterial Writing as an Event
Postcolonial and decolonial STS work to decolonize relations and prac-
tices. While raising the question of whose interests are served by ventur-
ing toward new ontological terrains, they emphasize the importance of 
giving voice to a broader range of knowledge bases as we produce these 
accounts. Despite all the recent attention to the so-called “material turn,” 
many postcolonial and decolonial scholars recognize that certain bodies—
such as people of color, reproductive bodies, disabled bodies, animals, 
plants and others subjected to colonialism, racism, capitalism, patriarchy, 
and science—have been inextricably tied to “nature” and never had the 
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opportunity or the interest to join the so-called feminist “flight from 
nature.”105 Postcolonial and decolonial STS emphasize that all technologies 
should be contextualized. In fact, every technology, including bacterial 
writing, can be thought of as an event that is connected to specific tradi-
tions and practices of knowledge production. To decolonize these relations 
and practices, we can begin by reframing bacterial writing as an event. 
This event can be placed within postcolonial and decolonial haecceities, 
which encourage us to consider all technological events in relation to (1) 
transnational processes of colonialism and imperialism; (2) capitalist prac-
tices of production, consumption, and commodification; (3) gendered and 
raced labor of production and reproduction and the abstraction of this 
labor; (4) neoliberal forms of individualism and imperialism; and (5) 
effects of technology on global as well as local scales.
Recent work on the role of bacteria in the new life sciences demon-
strates why thinking about bacterial writing as an event is crucial. For 
instance, in Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life, Kaushik Sunder 
Rajan analyzes two important domains of current global consciousness. 
The first includes the life sciences, which he argues are “increasingly 
becoming information sciences.” The second is capitalism, which he sug-
gests has “defeated alternative economic formations such as socialism 
or communism and is therefore considered to be the ‘natural’ political 
economic formation, not just of our time but of all times.” As an STS 
scholar, Sunder Rajan insists that the life sciences and capitalism are 
coproduced, stressing that the “life sciences are overdetermined by the 
capitalist political economic structures within which they emerge.” He 
explains: “‘Overdetermination’ is a term used by Louis Althusser to sug-
gest a contextual relationship, but not a causal one (Althusser 1969 [1965]). 
In other words, even if a particular set of political economic formations 
do not in any direct and simplistic way lead to particular epistemic emer-
gences, they could still disproportionately set the stage within which the 
latter take shape in particular ways.”106 Sunder Rajan’s argument can be 
read to suggest that to discuss bacteria as writers, readers, and modelers, 
is to also discuss them in a contextual relationship—one that is structured 
by the domains of the life sciences and capitalism. Similar to their human, 
animal, and plant counterparts, in the purview of life sciences, bacteria not 
only carry information, they are information. This particular ontological 
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formation has influenced epistemic emergences for bacteria. For bacteria 
the sign does become ontologically material, but as humans it appears 
that we are only willing to recognize this through bacterial labor. 
However attractive it might be to imagine the bacterial capabilities of 
writing, in the life sciences that are driven by contemporary forms of capi-
talism, these capabilities are perceived through a highly mechanistic view 
of life. A view that not just figuratively but literally forces bacteria to write. 
In the realm of synthetic biology, for example, bacteria such as Escherichia 
coli are being purposely bred for their writing capabilities. This writing 
consists of transcribing DNA and translating RNA for human interests 
alone. In one case, students participating in the annual iGEM (the Inter-
national Genetically Engineered Machine) competition in synthetic biology 
have designed E. coli to produce a wintergreen scent during their exponen-
tial growth phase, and a banana scent during their stationary phase to 
address the olfactory challenge that scientists in molecular biology labs 
often have to face while working with bacteria. To be clear, it is precisely 
because of humans, who work in molecular biology labs with bacteria and 
do not want to be offended by their odor, that bacteria have been forced to 
rewrite their own genomes. As Sunder Rajan reminds us, even though the 
political economic formations that have led to genetic engineering tech-
nologies themselves may not have caused this event directly, we can begin 
to see the epistemic climate that these very formations produced, which 
have led to the design and emergence of banana-scented E. coli.
In another bacterial writing event, Melinda Cooper has suggested that 
the skills of lateral gene transfer through transformation, transduction, 
and conjugation have made bacteria of utmost interest to humans. This 
interest goes beyond studying bacteria for the human diseases they cause 
and for their antibiotic resistance. As Cooper notes, the observed ability 
of bacterial plasmid exchange and transformations led to the advent of 
recombinant DNA and genetic engineering technologies in the 1970s. 
Indeed, synthetic biology (discussed further in chapter 5) is but the latest 
face of genetic engineering. Instead of combining a single gene of interest 
into a bacterial plasmid, synthetic biologists have created entirely human-
designed genomes of human interest that they have then inserted into 
“surrogate” bacterial cells. These bacterial cells, created explicitly for their 
writing capabilities are mass (re)produced in the lab. In her book Life as 
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Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era, Cooper poses 
the pivotal question, “Where does (re)production end and technical inven-
tion begin, when life is put to work at the microbiological or cellular 
level?”107 She argues: 
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) differs from previous modes of biological 
production in a number of ways. First, while microbial biotechnologies 
such as fermentation are among the oldest recorded instances of bio-
logical production, recombinant DNA constitutes the first attempt to 
mobilize the specific reproductive processes of bacteria as a way of gen-
erating new life forms. Moreover, recombinant DNA differs from the 
industrial mode of plant and animal production in the sense that it 
mobilizes the transversal processes of bacterial recombination rather 
than the vertical transmission of genetic information. This is a technique 
that lends itself to the specific demands of post-Fordian production—
flexibility and speed of change—to a degree that was impossible in 
 traditional plant breeding.108
Discussing “biological growth” in the context of neoliberal biopolitics, 
Cooper argues that “neoliberalism reworks the value of life” by “effac(ing) 
the boundaries between the spheres of production and reproduction, 
labor and life, the market and living tissues.”109 
In the event that is bacterial writing, it is impossible to isolate and 
appreciate this skill outside of the political and economic formations of 
production, reproduction, and labor. It is important to keep in mind that 
in most cases, once bacteria have performed their tasks of transcription, 
recombination, or gene editing, they are promptly snuffed out for the 
valuable proteins they carry inside of them. This is not the high-profile 
secret life of cryptographers and code-breakers that we would like to imag-
ine. More akin to the value that was assigned to “natives in the jungle” 
during colonial science, bacterial writing becomes bacterial labor, which 
is “harnessed and controlled,” and “its products managed and turned into 
profitable use through the imposition of order and predictability.”110 
New ideas, politics, and practices can emerge at the intersections of 
molecular biology and feminism when we attempt to think with bacteria. 
By reflecting on what bacteria are capable of doing, we begin to change 
our understanding of some dominant binary relationships such as sex/
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gender, biology/culture, and matter/language. We begin to see that bacte-
rial desires, responses, experimentation, and communication skills such 
as writing can change how we frame our ontological, epistemological, and 
ethical questions in the lab. We begin to see the importance of thinking 
about our technological futures through bacterial lives. We may never 




Should Feminists Clone?  
And If So, How?
For these are strange times, and strange things are happening.
—Rosi Braidotti
The idea is to build our own transporting machine and use it to get a 
relay going and to keep it going, creating ever greater and more pow-
erful amalgamations and spreading them like a contagion until they 
infect every identity across the land and the point is reached where  
a now all-invasive positive simulation can turn back against the grid 
of resemblance and replication and overturn it for a new earth.
—Brian Massumi
Several years back, I seriously thought about cloning myself, but only 
twice. I needed two duplicates, plus an original template, making for a 
total of three. The plan was that one clone could teach in a women’s stud-
ies department and another clone could raise two young children. The 
third, the original me (the “template”), could take care of such pleasantries 
as writing this book. I, the template, would also be responsible for devel-
oping feminist STS practices so that the pleasures and dangers of new and 
emerging biotechnologies such as cloning would not go unexamined, as 
Rosi Braidotti put it, in these “strange times.”
As a feminist scientist, I have been interested in developing projects 
in feminist STS through molecular politics. In their theory of becoming, 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest that “all becomings are already 
molecular” and that on our way to becoming imperceptible, we must 
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“always look for the molecular, or even submolecular, particle with which 
we are allied.”1 However, this interest is not altogether detached from 
mainstream molar projects that may be more recognizable to women’s 
movements or other identity-based social justice work. In fact, I argue 
that in many cases, without molecular projects that emphasize biophi-
losophies of becoming and advance an immanent ethics of matter, our 
biological bodies, organs, cells, and molecules can be made to work against 
the very molar projects that rely on stable categories such as that of 
“Women.” As Deleuze and Guattari have stated, “it is thus necessary to 
conceive of a molecular women’s politics that slips into molar confronta-
tions, and passes under or through them.”2 This being said, molecular 
positions are often risky and can be potentially provocative, with the pro-
cesses of becoming, from woman to animal to molecules, appearing foreign 
(if apparent at all) to more conventional molar projects or what Isabelle 
Stengers has referred to as “moral” projects.3
I have posed the question, and quite boldly I might add, Should femi-
nists clone?4 The first time I asked this question, I was sitting on a panel 
surrounded by other feminist scholars.5 The looks of horror following my 
query told me that I had hit a nerve. Hadn’t I read Gena Corea’s The Mother 
Machine?6 Wasn’t I aware that women’s bodies have historically been used 
to support new reproductive and genetic technologies? Didn’t I realize 
that cloning was the latest iteration of a history of technologies and sci-
entific knowledge-making traditions that worked to oppress women 
through their biology? What became obvious to me was that although this 
history and context was absolutely important to remember, as the only 
trained biologist on the panel, I was interested in pursuing a different kind 
of politics. 
The question had come to me during a time in my PhD research when 
I was conducting experiments on an in vitro cell line of hypothalamic neu-
rons, investigating the possibility of feedback regulation of these neurons 
by gonadal steroids and by the pineal hormone melatonin. My experi-
ments involved using a molecular biology–based technology referred to 
as subcloning. I worried that using subcloning in my research, a technology 
that feminists on the panel were obviously opposed to, would disqualify 
me from being a feminist. Now, several years later, the question not only 
lingers in my mind but has in fact grown into a monster of sorts, feeding 
off technological, organic, and political fears and hopes.7 Even back then, 
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however, I knew that in some ways my desires to participate in reproduc-
tive biology research and to use molecular biology–based technologies 
were somewhat “inappropriate” to some feminist ethical orientations. The 
ethical orientations I refer to here generally follow feminisms of equality 
that would rather focus on molar issues of being and identity and work 
toward treating women as liberal human subjects. Feminisms of equality 
aim to correct the conditions whereby women are considered less than 
human. Understandably, this ethical position—which strives to safeguard 
women, protect their reproductive rights, and fight for their equal rights—
can be opposed to a great deal of molecular and reproductive biology 
research and technologies.
I believed then, and still do, that to deal with our posthuman living 
conditions, some feminists must express their energies and desires for 
change in different ways. Not everyone should or needs to work toward 
achieving subjectivity in that liberal humanistic sense. Instead, some of us 
must also turn our attention to developing molecular projects. Explaining 
what kinds of ethics are possible for postmodern subjectivities, Brai dotti 
states:
Ethics in poststructuralist philosophy is not confined to the realm of 
rights, distributive justice, or the law, but it rather bears close links  
with the notion of political agency and the management of power and  
of power-relations. Issues of responsibility are dealt with in terms of 
alterity or the relationship to others. This implies accountability, situated- 
ness and cartographic accuracy. A poststructuralist position, therefore, 
far from thinking that a liberal individual definition of the subject is the 
necessary precondition for ethics, argues that liberalism at present hin-
ders the development of new modes of ethical behaviour.8
I knew that by participating in the production of scientific knowledge on 
the body, I could use my micropolitics to new ends. I wanted to produce 
knowledge that addressed my concerns around contraceptives, hormone 
replacement therapies, and new reproductive and genetic technologies. 
This is why I decided to pursue a PhD in reproductive biology, why I 
worked with hypothalamic neurons of the brain in Petri dishes, and why 
I searched for the presence of estrogen receptor proteins using the tech-
nique of subcloning.
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By thinking with molecular feminisms, molecular biology, and the 
question of cloning, my intention has never been to leave aside women, 
women’s health, or reproductive justice issues. Rather, I have wanted to 
bring them into closer zones of proximity with the sciences and develop 
new forms of kinships with other actants—human, nonhuman animal, 
multicellular, and unicellular organisms—all of whom have a share in 
this biotechnological future. As a biotechnology, cloning is borne out of 
research in molecular, developmental, and reproductive biology, disci-
plines that have tried very hard to discipline biologies, bodies, and mol-
ecules. Dysfunctional as it may be, the culture of cloning has formed a 
new set of kinship arrangements, one that resembles a mess of growing 
crabgrass more than a neat and linear family tree and brings together 
disparate bodies starting from bacteria to plasmids, genes to eggs, uter-
uses to fetuses, humans to machines, and whole bodies to supposedly 
more identical whole bodies. Thinking through biophilosophies of becom-
ing, this chapter considers the qualities of kinship and hylozoism more 
closely. It attempts to use these qualities to develop a strategy for feminist 
scientists to navigate their way through this strange era of cloning. It 
attempts to use the biotechnology of cloning to overturn itself, if not for a 
new earth, as Brian Massumi suggests is possible, then at least for a fresh 
set of politics. 
What politics can emerge when we pay closer attention to the lab pro-
tocols involved in cloning? What happens when we learn to make kin with 
the nonhuman knowers and doers who actually carry out these biological 
processes for us in the lab? Building on the previous chapter, the skills of 
bacteria and bacterial plasmids are placed on an equal footing with human 
scientists, who have only recently learned how to recombine DNA in a lab. 
I apply a hylozoic view to the microorganisms and molecules that make 
molecular biology research and molecular biotechnologies possible in the 
first place. More important, I examine what happens when as scientists we 
become open to the push and pull exerted on us by our microscopic kin.
Tactical Recombinant Technologies
In his essay “Realer Than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and 
Guattari,” Massumi tells us that according to Jean Baudrillard, “we breathe 
an ether of floating images that no longer bear a relation to any reality 
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whatsoever” and that this is “simulation: the substitution of signs of the 
real for the real.”9 According to Massumi, Baudrillard can be interpreted 
to be lamenting the loss of the real and figures the simulacrum as a copy 
of a copy without any reference to an external model. Massumi suggests 
that such sentiments can make sense if the only “alternative to represen-
tative order is absolute indetermination.”10 Massumi states:
Baudrillard’s framework can only be the result of a nostalgia for the  
old reality so intense that it has difformed his vision of everything out-
side it. He cannot clearly see that all the things he says have crumbled 
were simulacra all along. . . . He cannot see becoming, of either variety. 
He cannot see that the simulacrum envelops a proliferating play of dif-
ferences and galactic distances. What Deleuze and Guattari offer, partic-
ularly in A Thousand Plateaus, is a logic capable of grasping Baudrillard’s 
failing world of representation as an effective illusion the demise of 
which opens a glimmer of possibility. Against cynicism, a thin but fabu-
lous hope—of ourselves becoming realer than real in a monstrous con-
tagion of our own making.11
If one accepts the philosophical system of positivism and the possibility 
of achieving aperspectival objectivity, it follows that what biologists do 
while working in a lab somehow gives us access to a “real nature.” This is 
perhaps why with the advent of molecular recombination and cloning 
techniques, many are lamenting the loss of this old reality and our grasp 
of “original nature” through biology. With recent developments in the 
field of synthetic biology, however, scientists have long moved away from 
efforts of preserving an “original model” to understand the molecular 
basis of “naturally occurring” life and have instead wholeheartedly 
embraced the idea of the simulacrum. 
These scientists are more interested in what biology can do, regardless 
of being an original or a copy. They are not held back by the virtues of the 
authentic or the significance of a “real” in biology. Since the discovery of 
the structure of DNA by James Watson and Francis Crick in 1953 (made 
possible by Rosalind Franklin’s work), scientists have witnessed the pro-
cess of DNA replication and the endless winding and unwinding of the 
double helix. Perhaps for this reason they are perfectly at ease in ground-
ing their scholarly and industry-driven biotechnological pursuits in a 
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world that deals entirely in the realm of the simulacrum, in a world inun-
dated by copies of copies. DNA replication—this is what biology can do. 
Therefore, what does the significance of a copy of a copy matter when, for 
instance, a replicated DNA transcript of a previously transcribed and 
sequenced PCR product can be inserted into a plasmid vector and used to 
make an organism fluoresce green? Molecular biology, knowingly or not, 
is already deeply embedded in the hyperreality of simulation. It has moved 
beyond the “question of substituting signs of the real for the real.”12
Given my interest in molecular feminisms and the question I posed 
regarding cloning practices, I am curious as to how, in this world of copies 
of copies, Massumi suggests we can we look for that “glimmer of possibil-
ity.” “The challenge is to assume this new world of simulation and take it 
one step farther,” he states, “to the point of no return, to raise it to a positive 
simulation of the highest degree by marshaling all our power of the false 
toward shattering the grid of representation once and for all.”13 In an effort 
to take on this challenge, this chapter makes the risky argument that 
recombinant DNA technologies such as subcloning may be used to dis-
mantle the grid of representation and move us toward a playful prolifera-
tion of differences. Admittedly, I am drawn to thinking more closely about 
the radical potential of recombinant DNA technologies as tactical tools 
for feminist scientists, due to my own fond associations with bacteria, 
plasmids, and subcloning in the lab. 
For me, the most pleasurable part of creating recombinant DNA was 
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) procedure. I began by pipetting 5 
microliters of mineral oil on top of the reaction mixture that contained 
the oligonucleotides, DNA and Taq polymerase, to avoid evaporation. The 
PCR machine would be warm to the touch, and the mineral oil flowed 
lightly and smoothly out of the micropipette tip into the tiny Eppendorf 
tubes (epis). Sometimes, I had a chance to add tiny drops of mineral oil 
into each crevice of the thermal cycler temperature block, watching the 
oil melt down into an even thinner form. From the warmth of my nonlatex 
gloved hands to the warmth of the thermal block, I imagined that each 
epi would be gently gripped by the mineral oil in the holes of the thermal 
block. I would bide my time through the steps of denaturation, annealing, 
and extension, knowing that the warmth would end abruptly once the 
PCR machine entered the cooling cycle and performed its final hold. Once 
the reactions had taken place and the temperature of the thermal block 
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had dropped to somewhere between 4°C and 15°C, I would remove the 
epis onto a plastic rack that was destined for the −20°C freezer. Although 
the contents within the Eppendorf tubes looked completely identical to 
how they looked before they were placed into the PCR machine, I knew 
that the DNA and enzymes, although thought of as “raw biological materi-
als,” had done their work. This idea that matter, as “raw” as it may be, is 
also capable of some form of expression or movement, defines the quality 
of hylozoism. In addition, similar to the production of simulacra, it was 
through these multiple processes of replication and repetition that the 
potential existed for something in the DNA to change, thereby introduc-
ing a “proliferating play of differences.”14 
I could tell that in the processes of cloning and repetition, there was 
not simply the lost air of simulation but also perhaps the opportunity for 
emerging breaths of difference. With this knowledge I went about ampli-
fying DNA on a regular basis for years, wondering how to move from 
repetition to positive repetition, or the inhabitation of a dominant dis-
course in order to open up a new site. Recombinant DNA therefore might 
be thought of as a simulacrum that has successfully broken out of the copy 
mold. Made through a series of repetitions and slight modifications, it has 
acquired a new purpose and function. Like the simulacrum, recombinant 
DNA “is less a copy twice removed than a phenomenon of a different 
nature altogether” undermining “the very distinction between copy and 
model.”15 In a Deleuzian ontology, whereby repetition is associated with 
difference, recombinant DNA technologies may allow for the emergence 
of “new experiences, affects and expressions to emerge.”16
Tropes and Turns
For some time now, in some areas of feminist theory, there has been a call 
for feminists to find their way back to the matters of the body and back 
to biology. Elizabeth Wilson, for instance, posed the following questions: 
“How many feminist accounts of ‘the anorexic body’ pay serious attention 
to the biological functions of the stomach, the mouth or the digestive 
system? How many feminist analyses of ‘the anxious body’ are informed 
and illuminated by neurological data? How many feminist discussions of 
‘the sexual body’ have been articulated through biochemistry?”17 Many 
feminists have answered this call by turning to the practice of re-reading 
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earlier scientific works, such as those belonging to Darwin and Freud, in 
order to diffract important biological theories for feminist purposes.
Although these re-readings and diffractions are important, a return to 
biology must involve more than the generous exploration of already estab-
lished biological theories and their relevance to feminism. The “project of 
refiguring the biological” must also support the movement of feminists 
back into the laboratory for the production of new biological theories.18 
In order to be “informed and illuminated” by current neurological data or 
biochemistry in more than a cursory manner, feminists also have to actu-
ally learn the science and the scientific techniques, then attempt to make 
new scientific knowledges.19 I have argued that to do this, feminists must 
learn how to face the nitty-gritty technical core of scientific knowledge 
production as well as all the contradictions, tensions, and dilemmas that 
come with carrying out scientific experiments. Part of the conversation 
that has been missing from this feminist call to return to the body and to 
biology, therefore, has to do with the lack of attention paid to developing 
feminist practices in the natural sciences. We need more ways to support 
feminists in the lab who can help us make this return to biology and give 
them the tools to deal with the dilemmas they will face upon this return. 
This is precisely why I posed my risky question regarding subcloning in the 
first place and why I return to it now. Despite its inappropriateness, I am 
interested in exploring the possibility that the scientific practices involved 
in the processes of cloning may be used to create new feminist politics. 
Indeed, the idea of cloning can produce several discomforts for femi-
nists. Some of this discomfort may be attributed to the fact that “cloning” 
serves as a particularly popular trope and is prone to metaphorical use. 
The use of metaphors, of course, holds an important place in scientific 
endeavors. As Donna Haraway has said: “A metaphor is the vital spirit 
of a paradigm (or perhaps its basic organizing relation). . . . It leads to a 
searching for the limits of the metaphoric system and thus generates the 
anomalies important in paradigm change.”20 I first posed my cloning 
question with the intention of finding out whether feminist scientists 
such as myself should conduct molecular biology experiments using the 
technique referred to as subcloning. As a biotechnology, subcloning has 
been used in the processes of directed evolution and has been integral to 
molecular biology research. The suggestion that metaphors lead to para-
digm change is absolutely crucial to my project. Regarding the use of 
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metaphors, Joseph Rouse has stated: “When tropes work, they ‘turn’ us, 
cause us to attend to or respond to things differently. . . . Tropes stand 
out from other unexpected uses of words in the responses they evoke: 
they amuse, provoke, associate, resound, and so forth . . . but they can also 
be occasions for reconfiguring the connections among things, utterances, 
and other practices.”21
My intention in this chapter is twofold. First, I want to use cloning not 
simply as an entertaining metaphor but as part of a molecular project that 
aims, for one thing, to provoke us into developing new feminist STS prac-
tices for the natural sciences. As a feminist scientist, I would like to pause 
on the idea of cloning in order to create new modes of kinship and zones 
of proximity between feminist politics and molecular biology. Using the 
qualities of kinship and hylozoism, I want to think differently about the 
role and contributions of molecular actants and thereby “reconfigure” 
some current connections between feminist theory and biology. By sug-
gesting that we use cloning as a feminist practice in the natural sciences, 
I aim to describe some of the complexity that surrounds a feminist when 
they find themselves as a knower in the biological sciences. This practice 
may allow the feminist scientist to address the dilemmas they face in the 
lab and turn these dilemmas into micropolitical actions.
Second, by developing subcloning into a feminist practice, my inten-
tion is to create movement through a form of strategic mimesis. Refer-
ring to Massumi’s work and the politics of identity, Braidotti states that 
“strategic mimesis [is] a positive simulation that does not essentialize 
an original. The point is to aim at the transformative impact of one’s 
political processes.”22 Following Stengers, I also believe that the trope of 
cloning “belongs to the present as a vector of becoming or an experience 
of thought—that is as a tool of diagnosis, creation and resistance.”23 The 
reason for posing this risky question, then, is to situate myself as a femi-
nist scientist and to “turn” our attention to new lines of flight that can 
come with cloning practices.
Cloning Subcloning
Subcloning is an integral part of molecular biology research. In this tech-
nology the scientist begins with a gene or gene fragment of interest that 
is most likely obtained by amplifying DNA through PCR. The scientist 
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then introduces or “clones” the gene of interest into a bacterial genome, 
typically bacteriophage lambda, which is also referred to as a plasmid or 
vector. Genetically engineered linear DNA is ligated into a plasmid and then 
placed back into a bacterial or yeast cell. As explained by New En gland 
Biolabs, a leading supplier of recombinant and enzyme reagents for life 
sciences research: 
Plasmid vectors allow the DNA of interest to be copied in large amounts 
and, often, provide the necessary control elements to be used to direct 
transcription and translation of the cloned DNA. As such, they have 
become the workhorse for many molecular methods, such as protein 
expression, gene expression studies, and functional analysis of biomole-
cules. During the cloning process, the ends of the DNA of interest and 
the vector have to be modified to make them compatible for joining 
through the action of a DNA ligase, recombinase, or in vivo DNA repair 
mechanism.24
Once the gene of interest has been isolated and then ligated (joined) to a 
vector, the next step in the molecular biology technique involves inserting 
the hybrid plasmid into “competent” Escherichia coli (E. coli) cells. Bacterial 
E. coli cells that are able to incorporate hybrid plasmids and successfully 
proliferate are referred to as being competent cells. Learning more about 
these competent E. coli bacterial cells is crucial to this chapter and to the 
process of becoming molecular.
To return to the subcloning procedure, the cloned vector is then 
inserted into the bacterial cells by heat shock and in this way transforms 
E. coli cells. Heat shocked and transformed E. coli cells are spread onto 
nutrient-rich LB plates and incubated overnight at 37°C to induce the 
growth of bacterial colonies. Of these colonies, about ten of possibly hun-
dreds are selected for culture—a process whereby the plasmid DNA 
inserted within the transformed E. coli cells is amplified. As a colony of 
competent bacterial cells begins to replicate, it also replicates the genomic 
material of the foreign gene as if it were its own. The amplified plasmid 
DNA is then analyzed by restriction enzyme analysis and gel electropho-
resis. In the final step of the molecular biology subcloning experiment, 
the amplified and cloned PCR product is analyzed by DNA sequencing. 
This is done to verify that the gene fragment of interest was obtained from 
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the appropriate gene. Several biotechnology companies have optimized 
the technology of subcloning. To simplify the experimental process, these 
companies sell “cloning kits” to scientists. These standardized kits include 
inorganic reagents such as salt solutions and buffers as well as organic 
materials such as nucleotides, segments of DNA known as primers, a heat 
stable DNA polymerase enzyme isolated from the bacterium Thermus 
acquaticus called Taq polymerase, and E. coli bacterial cells—all required 
for subcloning. 
While conducting my own research in molecular biology, I always used 
the Invitrogen® pCRTM8/GW/TOPO® TA Cloning Kit.25 The glossy and 
user-friendly manual provided with the Invitrogen® kits made the experi-
mental procedures easier. The “Never Clone Alone” slogan posted in our 
lab (a sense of humor that can only be cultivated by scientists) was 
intended to put me at ease, constantly reminding me that I should not be 
alone (even though much of the time I was alone, conducting experiments 
late into the night). Indeed, I did not feel alone, for I had developed a close 
and personal relationship with these Invitrogen® kits, carrying the pocket-
size manual close to my heart, in the breast pocket of my lab coat. The 
Invitrogen® cloning kit manual left a deep impression on my lab coat 
pocket and on me, making me yearn for a cloning technique of a different 
kind. The manual outlined the subcloning technique in these easy steps: 
(1) produce your PCR product; (2) perform the TOPO® Cloning Reaction; 
(3) transform into One Shot® Chemically Competent E. coli; (4) select and 
analyze colonies; and (5) choose a positive transformant and isolate plas-
mid DNA.26 
As I subcloned, I took to heart Haraway’s project of queering or mutat-
ing the modest witness and knew that I needed to subclone my way to 
something or somewhere completely different.27 Describing her dream, 
Haraway wrote: “My modest witness cannot ever be simply oppositional. 
Rather, s/he is suspicious, implicated, knowing, ignorant, worried, and 
hopeful. Inside the net of stories, agencies, and instruments that constitute 
technoscience, s/he is committed to learning how to avoid both the nar-
ratives and the realities of the Net that threaten her world at the end of 
the Second Christian Millennium. S/he is seeking to learn and practice the 
mixed literacies and differential consciousness that are more faithful to 
the way the world, including the world of technoscience, actually works.”28
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While I subcloned, I always felt an urge to reproduce (perhaps by par-
thenogenesis) a clone of subcloning.29 What follows is my attempt to clone 
subcloning into a practice that the feminist scientist can use to face dilem-
mas in their research and transform these dilemmas into desires for new 
scientific knowledges. The feminist practice that I yearn to produce resem-
bles the five easy steps to molecular subcloning outlined in the manual 
provided with the Invitrogen® pCRTM8/GW/TOPO® TA Cloning Kit. This 
feminist STS practice, which I refer to as Sub/FEM/cloning, consists of 
five steps: (1) isolate your dilemma; (2) ligate the dilemma to vectors of 
figuration; (3) transform the dilemma; (4) select and analyze new connec-
tions; and (5) collect your reconfigured dilemma. By pausing on each 
mode, the feminist scientist can move more freely through complex rela-
tions and enter into deeper zones of proximity between biology and femi-
nist politics. Sub/FEM/cloning draws from Haraway’s theory of situated 
knowledges, is intimately connected to Chela Sandoval’s methodology of 
the oppressed, and is inspired by Barbara McClintock’s work on transposi-
tions and the cytogenetics of corn.30
Step 1: Isolate Your Dilemma
In the first step of Sub/FEM/cloning, the feminist must articulate that 
question or issue which is at the basis of their dilemma in the lab. This 
dilemma may stem from tensions based on the epistemologies, paradigms, 
language, methods, or tools that a feminist scientist may use in their prac-
tice of science. Underneath it all, the dilemma may be borne out of stolonic 
desires to create connections between disparate groups of knowers. This 
dilemma is at first destabilizing and disorienting, but in this act of articula-
tion the feminist scientist isolates the stabilizing element of what Sandoval 
refers to in her methodology of the oppressed as differential movement. As 
an insider/outsider, marginalized-knower, hyphenated-cyborg creature, 
Sandoval argues that a “split-consciousness” allows one to “see from the 
dominant viewpoint as well as her own.”31 Differential movement can 
move the feminist scientist from the confines of her lab bench toward 
more complex micropolitical positions. 
In my case, by articulating the question “Should feminists clone?” I 
isolated a dilemma that stabilized me in my differential movement as a 
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feminist scientist working in a reproductive neuroendocrinology lab. 
During my PhD research I was interested in examining the regulation of 
hypothalamic neurons by gonadal steroids such as estrogen. I was also 
interested in examining the regulation of these neurons by the pineal 
hormone melatonin. I was most interested in searching for possible feed-
back control mechanisms in the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal (HPG) 
axis. In her book The Woman in the Body, Emily Martin provided ample 
evidence to suggest that in reproductive biology, the HPG axis had been 
depicted as a hierarchy, with the hypothalamus acting as the control 
center.32 
Indeed, this understanding of the HPG axis has had a great impact on 
how scientists and doctors “manage” women’s bodies, particularly in the 
treatment of menstruation and menopause. To counter this paradigm of 
a hierarchy and suggest the possibility of an alternative mechanism by 
which the HPG axis may function, such as feedback regulation, it first had 
to be established that estrogen and androgen receptors are expressed in 
specialized neurons of the hypothalamus. I was very excited to participate 
in one of my supervisor’s research projects that investigated the possible 
neurological impacts of estrogen by examining its effects on an in vitro 
model of hypothalamic gonadotropin releasing hormone (GnRH) neurons. 
This research remains extremely relevant to women’s reproductive health, 
particularly taking into consideration our lack of knowledge on the pro-
longed neurological effects of estrogen-based treatments such as contra-
ceptives and hormone replacement therapies. In fact, this concern for 
women’s reproductive health can easily be aligned with politics emerging 
from a molar position. 
To do this research, however, I needed to look for the presence of an 
estrogen receptor gene and protein expression in these hypothalamic 
 neurons—and to do this, I needed to use the molecular technology of sub-
cloning. This was my dilemma. Even while I isolated my dilemma as a femi-
nist scientist, the question of whether or not I should subclone, I also 
isolated total RNA from an in vitro cell line of GnRH neurons. I then syn-
thesized first strand cDNA from total RNA using reverse transcriptase 
(RT) reactions. Using oligonucleotide primers (short sequences of DNA 
nucleotides) that were designed specifically for estrogen receptors and poly-
merase chain reactions (PCR), I amplified and obtained cDNA fragments 
of the estrogen receptor-alpha (ERα) and estrogen receptor-beta (ERβ) 
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genes from these hypothalamic neurons.33 The following steps describe 
the process I used to bring together my molar and molecular politics.
Step 2: Ligate the Dilemma to Vectors of Figuration
Similar to the bacteriophage plasmids used in subcloning, in the feminist 
practice of Sub/FEM/cloning, the dilemma must also be ligated to vectors, 
but in this case, to vectors of figuration.34 The vectors of figuration produce 
a particular cartography or a map of relevant spaces, inhabited in my case 
by the material and discursive practices of cloning. As Rosalyn Diprose 
and Robyn Ferrell explain in their introduction to Cartographies:
A map does not simply describe what is. A map does not only set up  
a grid which determines what can be found by selection or omission. 
Nor is it merely a series of lines inscribed on a previously blank surface. 
There is an alterity which provokes the desire to map, to contain and to 
represent. . . . The political reality of the changing map of the world, its 
allegiances, exclusions and oppression, is testament to cartography as  
a relevant metaphor. Mapping, as representation, is inextricably caught 
up in the material production of what it represents. In the metaphor of 
cartography, to draw a line is to produce a space, and the production of the 
space effects the line.35
As an insider-outsider and implicated knower, the alterity experienced 
by the feminist scientist is bound to manifest itself in the form of a 
dilemma brought on by inhabiting a space constructed by dominant and 
traditional scientific practices. It is true that, in order for feminism to 
change science, feminists need to “inhabit” the sciences. Yet how is this 
space to be made somewhat hospitable? To play on Wilson’s use of the 
breach, I suggest that the feminist scientist must engage in the practice 
of “interior reconfiguration.”36 They must take hold of their dilemma 
and use it to produce an alternate cartography that better reflects their 
politics. 
While describing the principle characteristics of a rhizome, Deleuze 
and Guattari comment on the relevance of maps, suggesting that “the 
map does not reproduce an unconscious closed upon itself; it constructs 
the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields. . . . It can be drawn 
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on a wall, conceived as a work of art, constructed as a political action.”37 
Cartography or mapmaking is hard work and constitutes the most time-
intensive mode in the feminist practice of Sub/FEM/cloning. These acts 
of ligation can be thought of as being driven by what Sandoval has called 
democratics, the act of imagining social justice and positive change, and 
bringing into closer proximity particles that would otherwise wander 
without collision.38 So the vectors of figuration that a feminist scientist 
encounters in order to create a new map are not simply figurative ways of 
thinking. This work is not destined to be muddled by relativism or idio-
syncratic musings. Rather, these vectors of figuration provide a material 
mapping, allowing one to think with specificity. 
For instance, in her later writings, it is through her practice of figura-
tion that Haraway expanded on her model of situated knowledges. Using 
the idea of stem cells and sticky threads, Haraway states: “Objects like the 
fetus, chip/computer, gene, race, ecosystem, brain, database, and bomb 
are stem cells of the technoscientific body. Each of these curious objects 
is a recent construct or material-semiotic ‘object of knowledge,’ forged by 
heterogeneous practices in the furnaces of technoscience. . . . [O]ut of each 
of these nodes or stem cells, sticky threads lead to every nook and cranny 
of the world. Which threads to follow is an analytical, imaginative, physi-
cal, and political choice.”39 The marginalized-knower-feminist-scientist, 
also known as a cyborg in some circles, must recognize the value of their 
own specific analytical, imaginative, physical, and political choices in why 
and how they conduct their science. According to Haraway, the stem cells 
and sticky threads are the embodied consciousness of any given situated 
knowledge.
Embodied consciousness? Cyborgs? Allow me to flesh out this mess of 
stem cells, sticky threads, and ideas. As a six-year-old, I recall an incident 
that might very well have been my very first lived experience as a cyborg, 
or at least was a formative moment for my own personal “cyborg politics.” 
Describing this incident may help to explain my difficult but intimate 
relationship with science and technology. It was Toronto in the late 1970s 
and I was walking home from school sometime in the early part of spring 
when the sidewalks were clear, but there were still patches of snow here 
or there. I was almost home when an older student started throwing snow-
balls at me from across the road. As he threw each ball of snow mixed with 
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rocks, he yelled the racial slur “Paki!”40 At the time, as a six-year-old, I did 
not know what “Paki” meant and I did not know why he decided to throw 
snow balls at me. All I knew was that I was going to be able to run away 
very quickly from this bully. For what I knew, and he did not, was that I 
was bionic. Sure enough, having on my Bionic Woman running shoes 
helped, and so I was able to motor my way home. 
Visions of biotechnological futures saved me that day. Very early on in 
my makings as a feminist scientist-cum-cyborg, I realized that I was going 
to face difficulties in being both “bionic” and “brown”—two of the many 
stem cells, or material-semiotic “objects of knowledge” that have since 
come to form my conception of the technoscientific body. Which figura-
tions a feminist scientist brings into closer proximity depends on the stem 
cells and sticky threads that have come together to bring forward their 
dilemma. So being “bionic” and “brown” can be thought of as two stem cells 
that I acknowledge as playing a part in constructing my reality. As Hara-
way explains it, each stem cell is comprised of a “knot of  knowledge- making 
practices” formed by such sticky threads as “industry and commerce, pop-
ular culture, social struggles, psychoanalytic formations, bodily histories,” 
and more.41
In my scientific work, after the estrogen receptor gene fragments had 
been isolated from the cDNA obtained from in vitro GnRH hypothalamic 
neurons, these PCR products were electrophoresed in an agarose gel, 
stained with a dye called ethidium bromide and visualized under UV 
light.42 The DNA fragments were then isolated and ligated to the pCR2.1-
TOPO cloning vector (circular bacterial plasmid DNA) provided by the 
biotechnology company Invitrogen®.43 While I was conducting this most 
problematic recombination reaction, in my own Sub/FEM/cloning experi-
ment I was forced to ligate my dilemma to vectors of figuration. Through 
this process I became aware that my dilemma must be combined and con-
nected to broader contexts. The vectors of figuration that I encountered 
while trying to make some meaning out of my dilemma of subcloning were 
obtained from my own analytical, imaginative, political, and physical 
senses of being bionic and being brown at the same time. There are a num-
ber of possible figurations to explore, but I will restrict the discussion of 
my particular dilemma in the context of three figurations: (1) Shulamith 
Firestone, (2) Rajasthani prints, and (3) Superman.
144 chapter 4
Step 3: Transform the Dilemma
In the Sub/FEM/cloning transformation process, the dilemma that has 
been ligated to vectors of figuration must be used to create a transfor-
mation. In this mode of a Sub/FEM/cloning experiment, the feminist sci-
entist must take their isolated and ligated dilemma and move toward new 
scientific knowledges. Our hope lies with becoming like the competent 
E. coli bacteria, by gathering our strengths and harnessing our abilities to 
transform. This transformation in the feminist scientist reconfigures their 
outlook on the science that they practice. This new position can allow the 
feminist scientist to address their original dilemma and step in a direction 
that creates movement.
In her account of the life and work of Barbara McClintock, Evelyn Fox 
Keller brought to our attention the extraordinary story of a scientist who 
worked on the genetics of corn. By paying such close attention to the 
details of McClintock’s life and her approach to scientific research, Keller 
revealed much more than this, however. Throughout her life McClintock 
had many scientific accomplishments, one of which was the discovery of 
transpositions—the movement of genetic elements spontaneously from 
one site to another. As described in a previous chapter, McClintock’s work 
on transpositions came out of her scientific approach of developing a “feel-
ing for the organism.” McClintock describes how, while analyzing the chro-
mosomes of maize through the eye of the microscope, she would travel 
deep into the cell and find herself in and among the chromosomes, almost 
becoming imperceptible. Keller describes this level of association with an 
organism as a kind of “intimate knowledge.”44 This expression of proximity 
most vividly exemplifies a microphysiology of desire. 
As McClintock observed the phenomenon of transpositions, she came 
to realize that transpositions must happen, that organisms are not stable, 
and that DNA and chromosomal structures get mixed up. “In McClintock’s 
system,” Keller writes, “the controlling elements did not correspond to 
stable loci on the chromosome—they moved. In fact, this capacity to 
change position, transposition as she called it, was itself a property that 
could be controlled by regulator, or activator genes . . . no one was ready 
to believe that, under certain circumstances, the normal DNA of a cell 
could rearrange itself.”45 Referring to McClintock’s work in relation to 
DNA and the function of transpositions, Keller continues: “Perhaps the 
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future will show that its internal complexity is such as to enable it not 
only to program the life cycle of the organism, with fidelity to past and 
future generations, but also to reprogram itself when exposed to suffi-
cient environmental stress—thereby effecting a kind of ‘learning’ from 
the organism’s experience.”46
Through this transformation step in the feminist practice of Sub/FEM/
cloning, the feminist scientist can attempt a transposition or “reprogram-
ming” of their feminist politics. In the context of my dilemma, for instance, 
I was able to acknowledge that as feminists, we have been exposed to many 
new stresses in the past twenty to thirty years. We have been exposed to 
new biotechnologies, reproductive technologies, and molecular technolo-
gies, and these experiences have changed the way we live. The figurations 
that I describe below are meant only to serve as examples and are articu-
lated through my own experiences of alterity. I share these thoughts with 
the hope of providing some snapshots of “the political reality of the chang-
ing map of the world, its allegiances, exclusions and oppression.”47 
While working in a reproductive biology lab, I knew that strange things 
were happening constantly around me, but I was determined to go deeper 
into the science that I practiced until I was able to find the molecular prac-
tices that would show me how to transform my dilemma. I studied in more 
detail what was known about the HPG axis and spent a great deal of time 
working closely with an in vitro cell line of hypothalamic neurons. It was 
here that I found a new space emerging for my feminist politics. I confess 
that I isolated fragments of estrogen receptor genes from hypothalamic 
neurons. I moved these DNA gene fragments, not spontaneously but 
rather through ligation techniques, into bacterial plasmids. I transformed 
competent E. coli cells with these plasmids and used their cell machinery 
in order to amplify estrogen receptor DNA. Each transformation reaction 
required several agar plates, a vial of E. coli cells, and a specialized media 
containing tryptone, yeast extract, glucose, and several salts.48 The ligated 
vectors were added to the E. coli cells, placed on ice, heat shocked, and 
transferred onto ice again. The heat-shock process allowed the ligated vec-
tors to enter through the membranes of the competent E. coli cells. A small 
amount of the transformed bacteria was spread over selective plates of 
agar and incubated overnight at 37°C. Just as the bacterial cells needed to 
incubate to transform, as a feminist scientist I also had to allow vectors 
of figuration to incubate for a while to form a rich array of connections.
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Step 4: Select and Analyze New Connections
An efficient cloning reaction will produce nearly one thousand colonies of 
bacteria per transformation reaction. The ligation of the DNA fragment 
causes an interruption in a particular gene of the cloning vector. After a 
night of incubation, the agar plate containing the transformed E. coli cells 
will appear to have white colonies as well as blue colonies. Each white 
colony represents a single E. coli cell that was successfully transformed by 
a ligated vector and was able to multiply. If no ligation takes place and a 
particular marker gene on the plasmid is kept intact, this gene codes for 
a protein that can be made to react with another substance, turning the 
bacterial colony blue. Out of the nearly one thousand colonies that can 
grow on an agar plate, the scientist usually chooses a few of the white 
colonies or “positive clones” to examine. The colony of transformed bacte-
rial cells is selected and amplified further in a broth of nutrient media. In 
my own experiments I often selected up to ten colonies for analysis. Using 
a sterile wire tip, I scooped up cells from the white colonies and added them 
to test tubes that were full of nutrient media. The transformed E. coli cells 
were left in a 37°C shaker for several hours. This constant movement and 
the connections formed by the collision of cells allowed the transformed 
E. coli cells to multiply even further. Having already ligated my dilemma 
to vectors of figuration, it is now time to select and tease out some of the 
connections created by my own Sub/FEM/cloning reaction.
Figuration 1: Shulamith Firestone 
After the birth of my second child, I found myself in a curious predicament. 
I had to return to my teaching responsibilities after just six weeks of mater-
nity leave (which was actually categorized by the institution as a disability 
leave). It was necessary for me to pump breast milk before and after teach-
ing my three-hour upper-division women’s studies course, “Science and 
Technology in Women’s Lives.” While I pumped in my office, the pile of 
books on my desk that I had been meaning to read stared at me, so I decided 
to multitask and catch up on some reading. At the top of the pile was the 
newly released 2003 edition of Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex. 
First published in 1970 and considered an essential text of second-wave 
feminism, in this text Firestone put forward her feminist theory of politics. 
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“In the historical interpretation we have espoused,” she wrote, “feminism 
is the inevitable female response to the development of a technology capa-
ble of freeing women from the tyranny of their sexual-reproductive roles— 
both the fundamental biological condition itself, and the sexual class system 
built upon, and reinforcing, this biological condition.”49
Firestone was referring here to the advent of hormonal contraceptives 
and their potential role in the liberation of women. She was very clear in 
stating what she saw as the single most influential reason for women’s 
oppression: their capacity for reproduction. She went as far as saying that 
“pregnancy is barbaric” and was in favor of using the power of technology 
to rid women of the burden of reproduction.50 Sitting in my office, I used 
the technology of a breast pump, pumping with one hand and holding a 
book in the other. It seemed to me that it was not pregnancy that was 
barbaric, but rather the circumstances under which I was expected to func-
tion. In the state university system in which I was an employee at the time, 
my tenure clock was not stopped during my brief maternity leave; further-
more, I was expected to be able to lactate and teach only six weeks after 
giving birth. There was quite obviously an assumption made on Firestone’s 
part, and echoed by other feminists at the time, that all women find moth-
erhood to be a burden and experience oppression in the same way because 
of their capacity to reproduce. This assumption ignored the possibility 
that some women are not in a position to be able to afford to reproduce 
or are in fact forced into not reproducing. The erasure of issues pertaining 
to the intersections of race, class, disability, and sexuality and the bodily 
histories of marginalized others within this era of feminism became quite 
apparent to me while reading Firestone’s work.
Despite this, most fascinating was Firestone’s accuracy in predicting 
the direction that artificial reproduction would take from the period in 
which she was writing in the late 1960s. She even predicted the technology 
of cloning and was excited at its potential to liberate women. “[As] recently 
as five years ago,” she wrote, “Professor F. C. Steward of Cornell discovered 
a process called ‘cloning’: by placing a single carrot cell in a rotating nutri-
ent he was able to grow a whole sheet of identical carrot cells, from which 
he eventually recreated [sic] the same carrot. The understanding of a similar 
process for more developed animal cells, were it to slip out—as did experi-
ments with ‘mind-expanding’ drugs—could have some awesome implica-
tions. Or, again, imagine parthenogenesis, virgin birth, as practiced by the 
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greenfly, actually applied to human fertility.”51 Firestone was not suggest-
ing the use of a technology such as cloning without further examination. 
She was fully aware that in the wrong hands artificial reproduction would 
be dangerous. At the same time, she felt that artificial reproduction was 
inevitable. She believed that in order to deal with the inevitable, we would 
have to create a new culture based on a “radical redefinition of human 
relationships.”52 This radical redefinition, she believed, would force soci-
eties to destroy current class systems and ideas of family. Firestone did 
not think that artificial reproduction was inherently dehumanizing, and 
she believed in the potential of this technology in freeing women from 
their biology. At the end of The Dialectic of Sex, she lays down a “list of 
demands” for a feminist revolution. “The freeing of women from the tyr-
anny of reproduction by every means possible,” the first demand insisted, 
“and the diffusion of the child-rearing role to the society as a whole, men 
as well as women.”53
Beginning with the ligation of my dilemma to the figuration of 
Shulamith Firestone is a difficult maneuver. It reveals several hidden pat-
terns of molar politics that are present within a great deal of contempo-
rary feminist discourse. For example, Firestone pointed out that there is 
a series of feminist ethical positions that fit into one another beginning 
with the belief that technology is inherently evil, followed by the belief 
that technology is bad for women, and lastly, that artificial reproduction 
is dehumanizing. She argued that artificial reproduction is not inherently 
dehumanizing by forcing us to reconsider what we know and believe to be 
“natural” and question our ties to a certain mode of reproduction. Her 
work challenges us to reconsider our relationship with, or in more accurate 
terms, our distrust of technology. Extending Firestone’s assertion, many 
lesbian and feminist science fiction authors actually address the oppres-
sion of women in our societies by creating worlds where women and/or 
female bodies are no longer solely responsible for pregnancy, childbirth, 
breastfeeding, and childrearing. A common theme running throughout 
these science fiction and utopian novels has been that of supporting alter-
nate models of reproduction, and these models always involve some form 
of genetic manipulation. Parthenogenesis and cloning are very popular 
in these works.54 For many feminists the belief is that only men would 
want to design and control technologies related to reproduction. The figu-
ration of Firestone exposes the idea that some women may also support 
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technologies such as cloning. Similarly, while commenting on some of 
the popular biological techniques used for reproduction in science fiction 
novels, feminist science fiction writer Pamela Sargent stated, “What is 
the extent of possible biological change? It can involve new ways of 
reproducing ourselves, a use of techniques such as cloning, ectogenesis 
(the use of an artificial womb), in vitro or ‘test-tube’ fertilization, hybrid-
ization of animal species and humans, and others. . . . Biological change 
could in time affect our notions of what a human being is.”55
In the context of my dilemma of subcloning, the figuration of Firestone 
exposes several feminist projects such as those based on social struggles 
against traditional family structures. In order to gain entrance into a mar-
ket economy, women have been forced into living as commodities by way 
of their reproductive potential. The most challenging connection that 
emerges from the ligation of my dilemma with this figuration, however, 
con cerns the question of what it means to be “human.” An analysis of Fire-
stone’s work and the lesbian and feminist science fiction inspired by her 
work also forces us to ask, What is natural? By problematizing the validity 
of a “natural” mode of reproduction and imagining biological change to 
the extent that we can no longer easily define what a human is (something 
that has already occurred through the use of transgenic technologies and 
bionic woman in my case), this figuration forces us to reconsider what it 
means to be human. A revised notion of “the human,” or a posthumanist 
understanding of what it is to be human, may permit us to imagine the 
answer to this question to be a flexible amalgam of altered bodies, senses, 
and subjectivities.
Figuration 2: Rajasthani Prints
I include this figuration as part of my own analytical and imaginative map-
ping of a social reality because of its relevance to reproductive technolo-
gies and its deep impact on me as a brown child and later as a young brown 
adult visiting Rajasthan, India. Growing up in a home with parents who 
had immigrated to Canada from India, I was surrounded by explosions of 
color and texture from various Indian artworks and sculptures that deco-
rated our home. One such work was a Rajasthani print displayed as a 
central piece in our living room, above the sofa. As a child, I would climb 
onto the sofa and carefully examine each minute detail of this print. What 
150 chapter 4
fascinated me the most was the intricate design that served as a border. 
The hand-drawn border was comprised of a repetitive series of women 
dressed in identical clothing, with identical expressions on each face. As 
a child, I tried to find a woman drawn along that border that did not 
match, but I never could. The women depicted in the print were identical; 
they were clones.
Years later, as a once-removed NRI (nonresident Indian) on a trip to 
India, I had the opportunity to visit Rajasthan. It was 1994—the same 
year as the International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) of the United Nations Population Fund in Cairo. In one village I 
saw an “epidemic” of small, square patches pasted onto the arms of poorer 
women walking in the streets. These real women in Rajasthan were not 
clones, but each bore the mark of what I think was a clinical trial for a new 
contraceptive on the upper outer regions of their left arms.56 On this trip I 
was hosted by a generous woman and her daughter, who was fiercely inde-
pendent. When I asked about the women in the streets whom I had seen 
participating in what I thought might be a contraceptive trial, I was made 
acutely aware of my position as a “Western” feminist in this context. As a 
diasporic Indian, I recalled the incident that I had experienced as a six-year-
old—having been called a “Paki”—and realized that this was not the first 
time I was made to feel as though I did not belong to the space I inhabited. 
In any case, despite the anti-Malthusian arguments put forward by many 
local and national Indian feminist organizations, I was informed by my 
younger host that state-sanctioned family-planning incentive programs 
were beneficial to the poor and scheduled castes, and that the regulation 
and policing of reproductive bodies was necessary to better serve national 
economic interests.57 Incidentally, this was also the year that Rajasthan 
began to implement a “two-child norm” policy for government employees; 
to date, this policy is still in effect.58
The women who were participating in what might have been a contra-
ceptive trial in Rajasthan at the time are like many other women around 
the world, and not just those in so-called developing countries. All of these 
organic bodies function as commodities in the institutions of science, med-
icine, and the state. In many ways, women already exist as clones as their 
reproductive body parts are disassembled, traded, and reassembled in the 
technological production lines of scientific and pharmaceutical research. 
As a result of our expendability, women’s whole bodies as well as 
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individual reproductive body parts have been used as test subjects in the 
name of scientific progress. When women are the subjects of scientific 
study, they generally come to exist through a process of standardization. 
The notion that “women” can exist as a single category of organic beings 
who contain reproductive body parts that simultaneously have specific 
yet transferable technical capabilities, is in itself a molar position that 
forces individual identities into a cloned existence. Much like the repeti-
tive pattern of side-glancing women who served as a border in the Rajast-
hani print of my childhood memories, many women around the world 
already exist as clones.
Postcolonial and decolonial perspectives can help us to see that recent 
formulations of biocapital have created new forms of kinship between 
women, animals, and plants. They all share the experiences of forced 
modification and commodification. In India, where clinical trials for new 
drugs and contraceptives have been conducted, the Green Revolution also 
occurred, whereby several multinational corporations with the intent of 
colonization—albeit of plants and not of humans—entered into the coun-
try. Around the world, parallel patterns can be drawn between the produc-
tion of reproductively modified women and the production of genetically 
modified plants and animals. Both are organic material necessary for 
progress in a culture of cloning. The ligation of my dilemma to the fig-
uration of Rajasthani prints helps to make apparent the connections 
between women, reproductive biology research, pharmaceuticals, plants, 
genetic engineering, and multinational corporations. These newly 
formed sticky threads force me to trouble my practice of subcloning and 
consider more closely the impact that cloning technologies have had on 
the bodies of women of color, and how often they have served as material 
test subjects.
Figuration 3: Superman
This superhero first appeared in a comic strip in 1933, but since then, an 
endless number of incarnations have appeared on television, film, and even 
radio. The animated action hero easily materialized into a living and breath-
ing character, first as George Reeves in the 1950s television series and later 
as Christopher Reeve, who took on the iconic role of Superman in the 1978 
movie (just around the same time that I would have been at the peak of my 
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brown girl bionic fierceness). This latter materialization was quite convinc-
ing, to the extent that even today the identity of Superman is synonymous 
with the late actor. In the mid-1990s, when Christopher Reeve fell off a 
horse and severely injured his spine, part of me believed he would be the 
first human to walk again after a serious spinal cord trauma. After all, he 
was Super(hu)man. However, Reeve did not walk again. Following his acci-
dent, he became an activist and advocate for medical research to help 
people living with paralysis. Just days before his death in October 2004, 
one month before the US presidential elections, Reeve made his last public 
appeal on television for the support of stem cell research. From the likes 
of the actor Michael J. Fox, to the wife and son of the late Ronald Regan, 
Superman and his (super)friends from Hollywood, California, have taken 
their plight from the Hall of Justice to another legislative assembly, the 
US Congress. In as heroic a gesture as battling the Legion of Doom, super-
hero celebrity figures in the United States have made it their mission to 
garner support for human stem cell research, also referred to as human 
therapeutic cloning. 
Unlike reproductive cloning, human therapeutic cloning does not 
attempt to reproduce an identical human. Rather, the “purpose of thera-
peutic cloning is to generate and direct the differentiation of patient- 
specific cell lines” that can be used for personalized medicine and involves 
the “transfer of nuclear material isolated from a somatic cell into an enu-
cleated oocyte in the goal of deriving embryonic cell lines with the same 
genome as the nuclear donor.”59 Not surprisingly, a great deal of contro-
versy has accompanied this biotechnology. Although in theory therapeutic 
cloning research can be conducted using either adult or embryonic stem 
cells, much of the controversy has been over the creation and use of 
embryonic stem cell lines. In a script that almost plays out like a superhero 
versus villain drama, the controversy continues to rage, with emotions 
flaring high for both those opposed to the technology on the basis that it 
is immoral and unethical, and for those who support the technology for its 
potential to cure diseases, as scientists have promised.
To summarize some key scenes from this stem cell drama as it has 
played out in the United States, we can look at the battle between the 
federal government and the state of California.60 This story begins on 
August 9, 2001, when President George W. Bush announced that no fur-
ther federal funds would be used to support human embryonic stem cell 
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research in the United States.61 He made this decision on the grounds that 
stem cells obtained from human embryos at the early stages of develop-
ment constituted the unethical treatment of human beings. Scientists 
argued that in order to proceed with research in a meaningful way, they 
needed to create new human embryonic stem cell lines and receive support, 
financial and otherwise, from the federal government.62 No doubt with a 
keen eye to the lucrative potentials of this biotechnology, the state of 
California (a vortex in the universe where vectors of figuration perpetually 
hyperimplode) responded by passing a state proposition in 2004 support-
ing the issue of a $3 billion bond to fund human embryonic stem cell 
research for ten years at a staggering amount of $300 million a year.63 
Enter stage left another super(hu)man: Arnold Schwarzenegger, then 
Repub lican governor of California but also once a cyborg action hero. If 
nothing else, this appearance makes clear that Hollywood super heroes 
 support human therapeutic cloning research. Putting himself at odds with 
the Bush administration, Schwarzenegger endorsed the $3 billion bond 
measure in part to boost California’s biotechnology industry.64 In response, 
Bush exercised his first veto as president in 2006, rejecting legislation that 
would have increased the annual $25 million of federal funding for embry-
onic stem cell research. In 2007, California’s $3 billion state bond program 
(referred to as the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine) approved 
the distribution of $45 million for embryonic stem cell research, promising 
to fund an additional $80 million to established stem cell researchers.65 Two 
years later, in March 2009, President Barack Obama issued an executive 
order “removing barriers to responsible scientific research involving human 
stem cells,” effectively lifting the ban on human embryonic stem cell 
research that the Bush administration had put in place.66 
The back and forth of this script is almost comedic, yet it should come 
as no surprise that in 2017 conservative representatives once again urged 
for stronger restrictions on human embryonic research and are calling 
upon the current US president to fire Dr. Francis Collins, director of the 
National Institutes of Health, for his role in moving this research for-
ward.67 At the same time, ten years after starting up its initial stem cell 
program, California is ramping up yet again for an aggressive campaign 
on an upcoming state ballot (at the time of writing) that would put a fund-
ing measure in place to continue stem cell research. Although cures for 
Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, spinal cord injuries, and other diseases that the 
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program had envisioned have not yet been delivered, for many the recent 
success of treating a young girl from Corona, California, who suffers from 
Severe Combined Immunodeficiency or “bubble baby disease” is sufficient 
proof that the research is highly beneficial and desirable.68
Most governments around the world have placed a ban on human 
reproductive cloning, but their position on human therapeutic cloning 
varies. Those opposed to human therapeutic cloning research typically 
argue from the moral position that stem cell research violates the dignity 
of human beings. They are concerned with the rights of the unborn child, 
much like the line held by pro-life advocates in the abortion debate and 
argued in some cases with a similar evangelical fervor. Also of interest are 
arguments put forward by supporters of stem cell research, which includes 
several Hollywood stars. In the name of supporting our inevitable biotech-
nological destiny, stem cell research enthusiasts argue that this scientific 
research must be allowed to take place. In a typical humanistic vein, the 
argument put forth is that by denying stem cell research, not only are we 
depriving the quality of life for those humans who are currently suffering 
from diseases, we are also denying the “natural” process of human discov-
ery, thereby denying human progress, and ultimately human life. 
Those humans left off both the moralistic and humanistic radars of 
those engaged in the stem cell debate are the women whose bodies upon 
which this technology is to be developed. The discourses produced by both 
sides of the stem cell research debate fail to address any concern for the 
women whose reproductive parts—from ova to umbilical cords—are neces-
sary for the scientific research. The attitude on both sides of the debate is 
based on a popular consciousness that allows us to believe that women 
are merely resources for biological material and that this technology can 
and will be developed on women’s bodies. For instance, in light of legis-
lation that would allow Australian scientists to move ahead with ther-
apeutic cloning, Catherine Waldby pointed out concerns regarding the 
trafficking of ova and the exploitation of poor women around the world 
to support the rapidly developing market for human eggs.69 Waldby’s com-
ments were dismissed by an Australian stem cell researcher who, failing 
to see her point, stated: “Waldby’s concerns are of no direct relevance to 
Australia.”70
This figuration presents yet another tension. In a most uncomfortable 
move, many feminists in the United States have found themselves in a 
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strange alliance with the religious right and with social conservatives by 
voicing their opposition to therapeutic and reproductive cloning research. 
A molar politics based on the assertion that human life is more important 
than animal life acts as a corollary to the established hierarchical frame-
works in which our society operates. The political and religious right in 
the United States support patriarchy within this hierarchical structure, 
granting men a certain status and placing women below men. Following 
this logic, nonhuman animals fall below women, although perhaps not far 
behind. Many feminists, who are opposed to the patriarchal elements 
within this hierarchy, end up supporting this structure by also placing 
nonhuman animals below themselves, not recognizing the importance of 
kinship and hylozism. This allows one to oppose human stem cell research 
while ignoring or even supporting the cloning and/or genetic manipula-
tion of animals for medical research, such as in breast cancer research. 
Feminists as well as members of the political and religious right, who are 
opposed to reproductive technologies, both conveniently ignore or fail to 
realize the decreased value they have placed on lives that are not human. 
In March 2005 the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of 
a nonbinding ban on all human cloning, which in less clear language also 
includes therapeutic human cloning.71 In this UN ban on reproductive 
cloning, however, only human reproductive cloning is specified, therefore 
permitting reproductive and therapeutic cloning research on such animals 
as mice, cats, sheep, horses, monkeys, and cows. The United Kingdom and 
South Korean governments, for instance, have banned human reproduc-
tive cloning but do support animal reproductive cloning. As such, these 
governments have provided federal funds to scientists who have produced 
significant developments in animal cloning, the most famous of which 
includes Dolly the sheep.
Although much is known about the science behind the birth and death 
of Dolly the sheep, what is perhaps less well known is the namesake 
behind this first mammal that was produced through reproductive clon-
ing. Dolly was named after the American country singer Dolly Parton 
because of a strange kinship relation based on mammary glands. The asso-
ciation between the two may not be immediately clear to many of us but 
is apparently based on the fact that the cloned sheep was derived from 
the nuclear transfer of an adult somatic mammary gland cell, and that the 
superstar Dolly Parton has large breasts. In another strange kinship 
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alliance made possible through reproductive cloning, grieving pet owners 
can now replace a lost pet by purchasing a reproductively cloned animal. 
Once again, from the vortex of stem cells and sticky threads that is Cali-
fornia, the company Genetic Savings and Clone Inc., which was located in 
Sausalito, California, was the first to offer such services. The company 
closed its doors at the end of 2006, claiming that there was not enough 
demand for their product but directed anyone who was still interested 
in freezing their pet’s DNA for future cloning possibilities to the Texas-
based company ViaGen.72 As of 2017, ViaGen offered several services, 
including genetic preservation, reproductive cloning, and express tissue 
banking. According to their website, the “total cost of dog cloning is 
$50,000 [USD]” and the “total cost of cat cloning is $25,000 [USD].”73
The figurations of Shulamith Firestone, Rajasthani prints, and Super-
man create cartographic connections between a lab technique and new 
micropolitical positions. After placing a spotlight on the entanglements 
between biotechnology, popular culture, art, women, and animals, I con-
clude with the last mode of the Sub/FEM/cloning experiment.
Step 5: Collect Your Reconfigured Dilemma
The reason that Sub/FEM/cloning may actually work is that the feminist 
scientist can use this reflexive feminist practice for the natural sciences 
to arrive at Sandoval’s differential consciousness without ever having to 
leave their lab bench.74 As a hyphenated creature, living on the margins, 
the feminist scientist will have already created a space for their survival 
and feminist imaginings in the more confined spaces of the scientific insti-
tution in which they operate. This space, inhabited by the marginalized 
and existing within a space that is marginalizing, is what some might refer 
to as cyberspace.75 A differential consciousness allows the feminist scientist 
to enter into this cyberspace, where they can conduct their experiments 
and create new scientific knowledge. 
During my own escapes to the space I occupied while a graduate stu-
dent working in a lab, I was first confronted with the monstrous question, 
Should feminists clone? It has since occurred to me that as a feminist-
scientist type of hyphenated creature, the questions that I pose might not 
be monstrous at all but that I may in fact be the monster, and thus my 
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attraction to these types of questions.76 Drawing from Haraway, Sandoval 
describes a monster as “a creature who lives in both ‘social reality’ and 
‘fiction’ and who performs and speaks in a ‘middle voice’ that is forged in 
the amalgam of technology and biology—a cyborg poet.”77 If I am a mon-
ster, or aspiring to become one, speaking in a middle voice places me in a 
favorable position to meta-ideologize.78 
In an attempt to meta-ideologize, it becomes sensible and almost nec-
essary to suggest that subcloning should become a feminist practice in the 
sciences. Describing differential consciousness, Sandoval explains that the 
“manipulation of ideology” is a necessary skill for the survival of the mar-
ginalized.79 Which ideologies are manipulated, and in which direction to 
proceed, depends on one’s context. “Such a differential force, when under-
stood as a technical, political, aesthetic, and ethical practice,” Sandoval 
states, “allows one to chart out the positions available and the directions 
to move in a larger social totality. The effectivity of this cultural mapping 
depends on its practitioner’s continuing and transformative relationship 
to the social totality. Readings of this shifting totality will determine the 
interventions—the tactics, ideologies, and discourses that the practitio-
ner chooses in order to pursue a greater good, beginning with the citizen-
subject’s own survival.”80
The reason the feminist scientist is faced with a dilemma in the first 
place is in part due to their intimate relationship with science and tech-
nology. Is it possible for the feminist scientist to use their micropolitics 
to move toward a greater good and develop new knowledge without giv-
ing up their connection to science and technology? It is imperative that 
the feminist scientist continues to have this relationship, though strained, 
with the very science and technology that they wish to transform. My own 
intimacy with subcloning determined my intervention in the pursuit of 
creating new biological knowledges of the body. After ligating my question 
to vectors of figuration such as Shulamith Firestone, Rajasthani prints, 
and Superman, my dilemma was reconfigured. I became aware of recurring 
themes in the politics of cloning and this motivated a transformation in 
my research or a desire for movement in what already counted as estab-
lished knowledge in the field. The molecular biology technique of sub-
cloning allowed the isolation, the amplification, and finally the DNA 
sequencing of gene fragments that were of most interest to my research. 
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Subcloning allowed me to demonstrate the expression of estrogen recep-
tor genes in hypothalamic neurons. The possible expression of estrogen 
receptors and the direct action of estrogen on hypothalamic neurons in 
this location of the brain had been dismissed prior to my research.81 The 
significance of this finding, therefore, was that it contributed to new 
research on the HPG axis by providing evidence that the hypothalamus 
and gonads may interact through a series of feedback mechanisms rather 
than a hierarchical structure. Most important, I was able to bring molar 
and molecular politics to work together as my research contributions 
helped bring attention to the possible neurological effects of estrogen-
based drugs, contraceptives, and hormone replacement therapies. I  created 
a feminist account of the brain that was articulated through molecular 
biology
As a feminist scientist, I have always been extremely appreciative of 
feminist critiques of science, but I have yearned to go beyond these cri-
tiques. During my PhD research, I wanted to engage with the biological 
sciences to produce a new feminist account of genes, hormones, receptors, 
and neurons. I had an opportunity to address my concerns for reproduc-
tive justice issues at a molecular level, which is why I subcloned. In her 
discussion of practices that can be used to approach and engage the sci-
ences, Stengers reminds us that feminists may have to take the risk of 
“giving up the position of a judge.”82 To develop her ecology of practices, 
Stengers draws on Deleuze and his idea of “thinking par le milieu” and 
predicts some of the difficulties that may result from attempting to move 
from a majoritarian (molar) way of thinking to this minoritarian (molecu-
lar) thinking.83 She suggests:
I would thus claim that an important divergence between thinking in a 
major or in a minor key may well concern the relation between thinking 
and what we may call, in each case, ethics. The need and power to define 
a central stage is obviously determined by a political and also an ethical, 
project. . . . The problem, for me, is that such a characterization leads to 
identify the thinker’s task as one of enlightenment, a critical and decon-
structive enlightenment aiming to subvert the hegemonic languages and 
social structures, in order to free the constituent power which by right 
belongs to the multitude only. This is ethics in a major key since it implies 
and means to enact the great convergence between Truth and Freedom.84
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Stengers explains in her ecology of practices that the difference between 
technology and the power of Truth is an ethical one, whereby technology 
is accompanied by a “sense of responsibility that Truth permits us to 
escape.”85 By engaging with the micropolitics of cloning, I have endeavored 
to work on the side of technology and not Truth. 
Those who would answer my question regarding cloning with an imme-
diate and resounding “no” may be doing so from a molar position that is 
bound to Truth. Molecular politics, however, can encourage us to engage 
with “a world that is technologically and globally mediated.”86 The pur-
pose of having feminists enter into the sciences is not simply to keep 
the “women in science pipeline” piping. The goal instead is to create new 
biological knowledge that feminists desire. We want feminists to enter 
into the biological sciences. But once they are there, what should they do? 
Should they avoid the science and technologies that comprise the political 
economies of our time, or should they set up rebellion camps from within? 
Like it or not, encouraging feminists to enter into the biological sciences 
to the produce new knowledges involves supporting them as they use the 
technologies that are crucial to their discipline.87 As Braidotti warns: 
“What looks from one angle therefore as a potential threat of contamina-
tion of the minorities by the dominant norm or standard, from another 
appears instead as active resistance and innovation. This is not relativism, 
but the politics of location.”88
I certainly would not have articulated my position this way while I was 
doing my PhD, but looking back now, I was driven by a sense that molecu-
lar politics were just as crucial as molar politics. My molecular position 
was absolutely necessary if I was to relate to the world around me as a 
feminist scientist in what I saw as being more productive ways. Subcloning 
became my transporting machine for spreading feminist contagion within 
the science that I practiced. What if the question “Should feminists clone?” 
were posed one last time? I hope I have made the case that if as feminists 
we are willing to get our hands dirty, and if we are prepared to extend kin-
ship and hylozoic qualities to animals, plants, and even machines that 
have been created by the culture of cloning, it may be time to consider, 





Humans are part of the world-body space in its dynamic structura-
tion. Does this mean that humans have no responsibility for the 
outcomes of specific practices? . . . [D]oes that mean that human 
subjects are merely pawns in the game of life, victims of the same 
practices that produce the phenomena being investigated?
—Karen Barad
The heart of the project of philosophy as Deleuze conceives it . . . 
show[s] that going “beyond” the human condition does not entail 
leaving the “human” behind, but rather aims to broaden the horizon 
of its experience.
—Keith Ansell Pearson
Years ago, while preparing to split nearly confluent plates of immortalized 
mouse hypothalamic neurons, I had an experience in the lab that gave me 
pause. That pause has lingered with me ever since. It took place during a 
routine cell subculturing procedure, while I sat in front of a cold sterile 
fume hood with my latex-gloved hands placed on the door handle of a 
warm 37°C CO2 incubator. Something happened in my otherwise unre-
markable lab routine: I felt guilty for the shock in temperature I was about 
to inflict on unsuspecting neurons growing inside a warm bath of media 
and nutrients. I held off on opening the incubator door for a few labored 
seconds, then immediately considered the absurdity of the moment. I 
asked myself, What would these in vitro neurons think if they knew what 
I was about to do? 
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I had caught myself not questioning whether those neuronal cells 
growing in vitro were alive, or whether they could think, but rather, assum-
ing that these neurons were living and already knew how to know, I was 
concerned with what their response would be in the moment that was 
about to unfold. I didn’t quite see myself as a human pawn or a victim 
entangled in this phenomenon. Instead, I wondered about the lives of 
these neurons and the complex set of events that had come together at 
that moment to create an ontological crisis for me out of what was other-
wise the mundane molecular biology practice of passaging cells. Only by 
spending time in a lab, and by using the practices of molecular biology, 
have I learned to generate such questions about nonhuman life and biol-
ogy. This in turn has prompted me to consider an ethics of matter.
The in vitro lab protocol known as splitting, subculturing, or passaging 
allows the molecular biologist to keep cell lines alive for use in experimen-
tation. However, unless one is willing and able to deal with an entire pop-
ulation of multiplying cells in culture, it also requires getting rid of, or 
killing, a vast number of these cells. In my case, once the cell line I was 
using was established, approximately 75–80 percent of the growing cells 
were discarded during any given cell passage procedure if they were not 
being used for experimentation; the remaining cells were placed in new 
plates with fresh media, fetal bovine serum, and other goodies to stimu-
late cell growth and division. Hannah Landecker has provided a rich analy-
sis of how cells actually became technologies; she argues “that the history 
of cell cultivation is the history of an approach to living matter.”1 As part 
of her methodology of examining this history, Landecker places an empha-
sis on the importance of practice and the material basis of research, 
stating:
Attention to the things people work with in experiments and to the 
ways they attempt to stabilize living objects such as the cell for scientific 
study has allowed historians and anthropologists to address the condi-
tions under which scientific novelty is produced. Looking closely at the 
routine or infrastructural conditions that constantly allow the produc-
tion of new things is a method for getting around having to explain all 
scientific developments as a “paradigm-ordered or theory-driven activ-
ity.” In other words, the scientist does not have to think of it first, and 
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act on the biological thing accordingly; change can arise from the objects 
and practices of experimentation themselves—how cells are kept, 
watched, represented, manipulated, and how they react and adapt to 
their technical milieu.2
Landecker’s methodology deeply resonates with the emphasis I have 
placed on learning from experimental science and developing a practice-
oriented feminist STS. However, Landecker also notes that it is by observ-
ing the everyday experimental activities of scientists that historians and 
anthropologists (and presumably not scientists themselves) are able to 
address what it is that scientists do, further suggesting in reference to in 
vitro cell cultures that “it takes an anthropologist in the laboratory to note 
the strangeness of what has become quickly routinized or banal to its 
practitioners.”3 Landecker assumes that most scientists are not aware 
of or changed by the daily activities found in a lab. I agree that many sci-
entists may not be sufficiently reflexive. But this is not the case for all 
 scientists. In fact, this chapter is dedicated to exploring a pause that was 
generated precisely by such a strangeness. The pattern of growth, division, 
and purposely inflicted death that took place every three to four days 
in the in vitro cell line of neurons that I worked with created a distinct 
temporal cyclicity, which although was unlikely to occur anywhere in vivo, 
nevertheless became part of my own basal rhythms. Just as I was respon-
sible for designing experiments using these cells, the patterns of growth 
and multiplication of these neurons, and their cyclic hormone secretions, 
regulated my life for years.
On that particular day when I paused to open the incubator door, this 
rhythm was interrupted as the weight of several entanglements I could 
not continue to ignore came to bear on me, on the stainless-steel handle 
of that incubator door, and on the cell line of gonadotropin releasing 
hormone (GnRH) neurons known as GT1-7 cells. These entanglements 
included acknowledging accountability for the human practice of develop-
ing cancer in mice and killing animals and cells for research purposes. 
Obtained from the brains of transgenic mice that had been created 
through the technique of targeted tumorigenesis, these particular in vitro 
neurons were genetically designed to express an oncogene that led to the 
development of hypothalamic tumors.4 Before I even came to work with 
these neurons, there was already an entanglement with a molecular 
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biology technique that involved the noninnocent human-mediated infec-
tion of polyomavirus isolated from monkey kidney cells to produce SV40 
T-antigen, which caused malignant transformation of the infected cells. 
There were further entanglements of a reproductive justice movement and 
an antagonist and partial agonist of the progesterone receptor RU486 that 
was behind the pause I experienced that day.5 While leading many femi-
nists to march in the streets for reproductive justice, the compound RU486 
led me straight into a molecular biology and reproductive neuroendocri-
nology lab with the desire to learn more about the molecular mechanisms 
involved in the regulation of reproduction. Once there, I found myself 
intimately entwined in a molecular relationship with this in vitro cell line 
of neurons.
As significant as that pause was for me that day, and despite the fact 
that I knew I had to confront this challenging but generative ontological 
quandary, I did not have the language or skill set at the time to articulate 
my question about the lives and responses of in vitro neurons in a way that 
would be recognizable to my colleagues in the sciences. When I think 
about my interest in the response of those in vitro neurons in the lab, I 
realize now that even back then I was on my way to becoming an interdis-
ciplinary scholar. The examples of interdisciplinary work available to me 
at the time were not particularly amenable or easily translatable to the 
inquiry I had generated as a feminist scientist. A new era of interdisciplin-
ary exchange between the humanities and the sciences has helped to 
relieve some of this unintelligibility.
Interdisciplinary Incubations
These are indeed exciting times for interdisciplinary scholarship. For me, 
the pauses and causes for reflection encountered by trying to bring 
together the sciences and humanities can be incredibly complicated but 
also generative. Over the past decade, I have found a space within the field 
of women’s studies to carry that pause I experienced in a molecular biol-
ogy and reproductive neuroendocrinology lab along with me and to begin 
articulating that moment as a meaningful one, worth further reflection. 
As an invested onlooker and participant in feminist STS, I have witnessed 
significant paradigm shifts not only within this subfield in regard to its 
relationship with the sciences, but more generally also in the broader 
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discipline of women’s studies itself. These paradigm shifts may be con-
nected to the intellectual fallout from the science wars that took place in 
the mid-1990s as well as the ever-increasing uneven distribution of fund-
ing between the sciences and the humanities. Regardless, it is safe to say 
that the discipline of women’s studies (along with many other humanities-
based disciplines) is currently undergoing significant paradigm shifts to 
reorient itself in relation to the “hard” and natural sciences. The subfield 
of feminist STS serves as an example of the magnitude of these reorienta-
tions, as scholars wrestle not only with the fast-paced development of new 
biotechnologies but also with the impacts of recent ontological, posthu-
manist, and material turns in women’s studies and the humanities at large. 
The critique of poststructuralism’s influence on feminist theory and 
its apparent inability to deal with matter itself has brought forward calls 
for developing new types of engagements with biology—namely, through 
scholarship in material feminisms and feminist new materialisms.6 These 
calls have brought with them an era of enlivened regard for the sciences. 
Moving from in-depth critiques of gendered language and the use of 
gendered paradigms in science, to mining scientific research and data in 
efforts to move feminist theory forward, there has undoubtedly been a 
significant shift in the tone with which some women’s studies scholars 
(particularly those who are not trained in the sciences) now voice their 
interest in the sciences. Having placed questions that are central to the 
humanities in exchange with research in the natural sciences, this era of 
interdisciplinarity has made the question that I posed that day in the lab— 
What would these neurons think?—while holding on tight to that incu-
bator door, somewhat more legible. However, this increased exchange 
between the humanities and the sciences has also precipitated two major 
challenges for feminist STS scholars: first, being able to acknowledge life 
and the living at the level of the in vitro, the molecular, and even the inor-
ganic; and second, being able to respond to and deepen our human entan-
glements with these very lives by paying attention to questions of context 
and calls for social justice.
Just as an earlier wave of interdisciplinary work in the humanities 
forced us to examine the question of what it means to be human through 
multiple and inevitably intersecting frames of sex, gender, race, class, 
sexuality, ability, and more, as a result of new exchanges with the sciences, 
the first challenge that the next generation of feminist scholars must face 
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is to trouble the central premise of this very question. The current genera-
tion of feminist STS scholars is working hard to learn about the natural 
sciences, but not simply to find ways to understand the human condition 
alone. Rather, new alliances between the natural sciences and such fields 
as women’s studies are in fact working to decenter the question of the 
human within the humandanities. Sustained entanglements with animal 
behavior research, evolutionary biology, molecular genetics, and more have 
complicated our understandings of exactly what gets to count as a “life” 
and which lives are included in our concerns regarding “expressive life.”7 
The growth of posthumanist and animal studies is an indication of this 
paradigm shift when it comes to thinking about the ontological contours 
of “life.” In the field of women’s studies, for example, distinctions between 
the human and nonhuman and the living and nonliving have been trou-
bled by Donna Haraway’s idea of naturecultures, Karen Barad’s theory 
of agential realism, Jane Bennett’s notion of vibrant matter, and more 
recently, Mel Y. Chen’s concept of animacy, to name but a few.8 From 
these recent theoretical moorings, a question that seems important to 
address, when considering the future of feminist STS in this new era of 
interdisciplinary work, is not only whether we can continue to ask what it 
means to be human, but whether our theoretical frameworks and meth-
odolo gies are prepared to support the question of what it means to be a 
life—nonhuman, inorganic, and otherwise. This chapter tries to better 
appreciate what this notion of life and life in the lab can mean by turning 
to research in synthetic biology. A field borne through molecular biology 
practices, synthetic biology has produced both in vitro and synthetic lives, 
made of assemblages of both organic and inorganic matter. These lives, 
known as minimal genome organisms or minimal cells, move across taxo-
nomical thresholds. Interestingly, Michel Foucault wrote in The Order of 
Things, “Up to the end of the eighteenth century, in fact, life does not exist: 
only living beings. . . . As for life and the threshold it establishes, these can 
be made to slide from one end of the scale to the other, according to the 
criteria one adopts.”9
It is evident that the line we draw between the living and nonliving 
can be made to slide according to the criteria we adopt. Similarly, Deleuze 
and Guattari have described life as an intensive and powerful life that is 
not organized or necessarily found within an organ or an organism. In the 
final plateau of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari dedicate their 
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focus to the topic of space, discussing several modes of smooth (read as 
nomadic) and striated (read as sedentary) space, including technological, 
musical, maritime, mathematical, physical, and aesthetic space. Their dis-
cussion of aesthetic space emphasizes the mixture of smooth and striated 
space at all times, noting the lack of creativity that accompanies those 
lines that have been drawn to confine life within the organic alone. “If 
everything is alive,” they wrote, “it is not because everything is organic or 
organized but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. 
In short, the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a pow-
erful life without organs, a Body that is all the more alive for having no 
organs, everything that passes between organisms.”10
I turn to the idea of the body without organs below, but here I want to 
emphasize that the technologies and practices of synthetic biology have 
most certainly redrawn lines and disrupted what we have come to consider 
as the thresholds of life. This disruption may be jarring to some but,  similar 
to the pause that interrupted me while splitting in vitro neuronal cells in 
the lab that day, I believe it is important to reflect on this disruption and 
consider the possibility that these synthetic lives may not only be expres-
sive but may also be reaching back out toward the surrounding world. The 
question is, Will we know how to respond?
The second challenge for feminist STS scholars arising from this inter-
disciplinary exchange is a direct result of the earlier challenge. As all eyes 
turn to the nonhuman and to molecular and subatomic matter, we must 
remain aware of the costs of building theoretical interventions apart from 
their human social and political implications and entanglements. Our 
ideas of the social and political can expand so as to include or even focus 
upon the nonhuman, but as we shift our central questions in the humani-
ties, we must keep in mind the broader contexts and repercussions of this 
work. Thinking with the nonhuman or even the inorganic is an ethical 
project, but it does not mean, as the chapter epigraphs suggest, that we 
must leave humans behind or, for that matter, our notions of social justice 
behind. What is key here is not to stop theorizing once we have initiated 
our ontological, posthumanist, and material turns. We must keep theoriz-
ing our way through until we can connect these new insights to our role 
and contributions as humans within these turns. In addition, our ideas of 
social justice must apply to all forms of life—from humans to nonhumans, 
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from the organic to the inorganic. Haraway refers to this in her work as 
“multi species ecojustice.”11 
In her work on Darwin, feminism, and sexual difference, Elizabeth 
Grosz asks us to consider the following: “How does biology—the structure 
and organization of living systems—facilitate and make possible cultural 
existence and social change?”12 As a biologist, I am on board with the idea 
that biology can be used to initiate social change and even work toward 
social justice. In fact, an antagonist and partial agonist of the progester-
one receptor are precisely what made me march straight into a molecular 
biology lab in the first place. I am committed to what feminists can come 
to know not just by collaborating with the sciences but also by collaborat-
ing with molecules. I am invested in the futures we can begin to imagine 
by turning to the practices of the biological sciences and to the capacities 
of biological matters. However, I also think that much about what we come 
to know and the future that we want to see depends on the specificity of 
which “social change” we are talking about, and the approaches we actually 
use to get there. Envisioning new ontological and ethical frameworks is 
difficult work as it is, but biophilosophies of becoming require that we 
figure out how to apply these frameworks and live with these difficulties.
Vicky Kirby has made a compelling case that bacterial cells write and 
that “it is in ‘the nature of Nature’ to write, to read and to model.”13 Her 
intervention is crucial in terms of the first challenge posed to interdisci-
plinary scholars in the humanities and sciences—namely, what it means 
to be nonhuman. For feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial STS scholars, 
who are committed to thinking about social justice and want to make con-
nections between the humanities and sciences, such an ontological inter-
vention must be expanded to meet the challenge of thinking about 
contextual accountability. In her work on Niels Bohr, Albert Einstein, Wer-
ner Heisenberg, and quantum physics, Karen Barad draws from Jacques 
Derrida’s idea of “justice-to-come” to discuss entanglements and the 
behavior of atoms. She states:
The past is never closed, never finished once and for all, but there is no 
taking it back, setting time aright, putting the world back on its axis. . . . 
The trace of all reconfigurings are written into the enfolded materialisa-
tions of what was/ is/ to-come. Time can’t be fixed. To address the past 
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(and future), to speak with ghosts, is not to entertain or reconstruct some 
narrative of the way it was, but to respond, to be responsible, to take respon- 
 sibility for that which we inherit (from the past and the future), for the 
entangled relationalities of inheritance that “we” are. . . . Only in this 
ongoing responsibility to the entangled other, without dismissal (with-
out “enough already!”), is there the possibility of justice-to-come.14
Barad emphasizes the importance of recalling the past and thinking about 
the responsibilities we as humans hold while trying to think differently 
about materiality. 
Gill Jagger has recently argued that compared to Barad’s theory of 
agential realism, Grosz’s and Kirby’s turns to nature fall short of providing 
a useful way of rethinking materiality. “Thus, if the aim of the new mate-
rialism is to provide a way of rethinking the interimplication of culture 
and nature,” Jagger writes, “moving away from the negation of one in the 
determination of the other, difficulties remain in both Kirby’s and Grosz’ 
accounts. This is not the case, however, with Barad’s account of the intra-
action of nature and culture in the material-discursive relation: it involves 
a process of mutual articulation that is a matter of interimplication.”15 In 
my understanding of their work, Grosz and Kirby encourage us to think 
differently with the sciences to imagine biology and “nature” as providing 
the grounds for social change. In their own ways, Grosz, Kirby, and Barad 
each encourage us to find new ways to think about the relationships 
between human, nonhuman, organic, and inorganic lives through closer 
analyses of science, biology, physics, and matter. Perhaps because of 
Barad’s training as a scientist, however, I would agree that her work may 
resonate more with the feminist scientist who is concerned with questions 
of interimplication. For feminists who are working directly in scientific 
disciplines, recalling the past is a reflexive practice that requires learning 
how to think about the context of a biological event as deeply and broadly 
as possible.
Roots and Shoots: Approaches to Life and Context
As part of the basic structure of many species of grass, horizontal stems 
known as rhizomes (stems that grow below ground) and stolons (stems 
that grow above the ground) can form “nodes,” which in turn can give rise 
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to both “roots and shoots.” These new roots and shoots can develop new 
“daughter” plants.16 Similarly, molar and molecular politics can come 
together and form new projects in feminist STS. I have already started 
recounting my inquiries into the lives and responses of nonhumans by 
discussing my encounter with an in vitro cell line of neurons, developed 
through targeted tumorigenesis, and used for molecular biology research. 
This chapter brings into the mix other in vitro bio-actants such as minimal 
genomes, and bacterial and yeast cells that are referred to as surrogates 
in synthetic biology research. Yet before focusing on the intimacies of in 
vitro life, some may have more pressing concerns whether as humans we 
should be tampering with genes and organisms, or “playing god” at all. 
For some of us, the more acceptable and familiar place to begin this 
interdisciplinary analysis might be to interrogate the processes that have 
led to the recombination of genes, the creation of transgenic animals, and 
the synthesis of new organisms in the first place. Some of us may also ques-
tion the tenets of molecular biology itself and the validity of a science that 
places such authority and focus on DNA. Others might be more than wary 
of the pervading reductionist logic that lies behind mole cular biology as a 
whole, which has resulted in the field of synthetic biology and forwarded a 
completely mechanistic view of life. Alternatively, some of us may be rais-
ing traditional bioethical concerns related to agency, choice, and the safety 
of conducting recombinant DNA, transgenic, and synthetic biology exper-
iments. Of course, these concerns are valid and require much delibera tion. 
Although these concerns are crucial, they also follow already well- established 
lines of inquiry between feminism and the biological sciences. They are 
molar in their approach not only because they represent tried-and-true 
modes of inquiry but also because in many cases they eventually return 
us to questions of human subjectivity, identity, and representation.
Once again, I want to be clear that in feminist STS, it is necessary for 
scholars to continue their interdisciplinary work through such molar 
approaches and lines of inquiry. However, it is also necessary for some 
feminist STS scholars to take more molecular approaches to their inquiries 
at the intersections of feminism and molecular biology. These molecular 
approaches may not begin by assessing the “appropriateness” of a science 
such as synthetic biology, or whether it is ethically “correct” to create trans-
genic cell lines or animals, or use bacteria as surrogates to create minimal 
synthetic bacterial cells. In this case, a molecular approach might be about 
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spending more time learning about the intricate practices of synthetic 
biology in order to look for places where feminist and scientific ques-
tions of life, matter, context, justice, and ethics may be placed together.17 
A molecular approach may also involve suspending (even if just for a 
moment) our capital “E” ethical judgments regarding whether synthetic 
organisms should exist at all. It is perfectly sound to ask the question, 
How did we arrive at this point? However, if we follow a molecular 
approach, the question might become, Now that we are here, what is our 
relationship with the synthetic lives that already live among us?
My tendency to turn toward molecular feminisms obviously stems 
from the pause I experienced in the lab while working with an in vitro cell 
line. However, it also reflects that long-standing interest I have had in 
thinking about biological matters in the lab through biophilosophies of 
becoming and reaching toward these matters through microphysiologies 
of desire. So far, I have focused on the qualities of changefulness, nonhu-
man becomings, kinship, and hylozoism in our encounters with nonhu-
man others such as grass and bacteria. In this last chapter I think about 
ways to encounter synthetic lives that are already our kin by highlighting 
the qualities of univocity and immanence. Although I barely begin to 
scratch the surface, I pursue this encounter in two ways: first, by posing 
the question of what constitutes life and the living in this era of synthetic 
biology; and second, by finding a way to consider the human entangle-
ments that contribute to the contexts in which these lives are lived.
In After Life, Eugene Thacker has traced the ontology of life through a 
history of Western philosophy. He states:
“Life” is a troubling and contradictory concept. . . . Today, in an era  
of biopolitics, it seems that life is everywhere at stake, and yet it is 
nowhere the same. The question of how and whether to value life  
is at the core of contemporary debates over bare life and the state  
of exception. At another level, in our scientific worldview, it seems 
that life is claimed of everything, and yet life in itself is nothing.  
While biol ogists continue to debate whether or not a virus is living, 
the advances in genetic engineering and artificial life have, in differ- 
 ent ways, deconstructed the idea that life is exclusively natural or 
biological.18
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Thacker suggests that there are three major modes through which philo-
sophical engagements with the question of life are organized today. They 
are the affective-phenomenological, the biopolitical, and the political-
theological.19 It is within the affective-phenomenological mode that we 
find those approaches that relate to a biophilosophy of becoming and turn 
to the “immanently dynamic, self-organizing, and germinal qualities” of 
life.20 Life in this sense is treated as an event, a proliferative one at that, 
bringing with it the capability of generating difference.
Thacker argues that our habits of thinking about life in a hierarchical 
fashion, beginning with biological elements and building layers of behav-
ior, culture, and politics up onto this scaffold, is a direct result of Aristo-
tle’s philosophy of life. Starting with the philosophical works of Aristotle, 
Thacker turns to concepts of life that have attempted to work against this 
stratification. Although his project ultimately points to some inherent 
contradictions that are constitutive of the various concepts of life, Thacker 
provides a rich analysis of the importance of such concepts as univocity 
and immanence to understanding life in the biophilosophy of Deleuze. We 
know that for Deleuze, univocity is understood as a univocity of differ-
ence. The concept of univocity is what drives Deleuze’s ontology and is 
crucial to the idea that life can exist as a multiplicity within an ontologi-
cally single field. As Thacker explains:
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze takes up the concept of univocity  
in a way that places it at the center of his ontology of difference. For 
Deleuze, traditional ontology is predicated on the concept of identity 
(vs. difference), of the One (vs. the Many), of Being (vs. becoming), and 
so on. That-which-differs can be regarded only as in some way falling 
away from, or dependent upon, that which does not differ, or that which 
is whole, Ideal, One. As Deleuze states at the outset, his aim is to think 
the concept of difference not as secondary or derivative, but in some 
way as primary to our thinking about that-which-differs as well as to  
the processes of differentiating and creating differences.21
This framing of life through univocity, where univocity plays a central 
role in an ontology marked by difference, is the molecular approach to life 
and the living that is taken up in this chapter. Synthetic life therefore can 
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be understood as an event, with the capacity for generating difference. I 
am particularly interested in the lives that have been created via human, 
bacteria, DNA, protein, and technological interactions, ones that notori-
ously zigzag across taxonomical lines (between the organic and inorganic, 
living and nonliving), and ones that are expressive. Although they are 
synthetic, there is much to learn from minimal genome organisms, if we 
are able to work with them through this concept of univocity and if we 
can orient our curiosities toward them upon an immanent plane.
In this synthetic era of biology, we are being pressed to reconsider 
our onto-ethical orientations toward lives that are beyond being merely 
recombinant or transgenic. Indeed, “oncomouse” has now become an elder 
at the table.22 Minimal genome organisms, designed and produced syn-
thetically in a lab, are taking us out of our previous comfort zones, 
demanding that we revisit and further expand our notions of kinship. The 
concept of immanence may help to bring us to this newly reconfigured 
table. “For Deleuze,” as Thacker explains, “this conjunction of immanence 
and expression—or really, of immanence and life—has three fundamental 
principles.”23 These principles include the principle of equality, where 
“immanence is not only the immanence between Creator and creature (a 
vertical immanence), but the immanence between creature and creature 
(a horizontal immanence).” It also includes the principle of univocity as 
discussed earlier, which allows for an immanence that is “at the same time 
dispersive and inventive, distributive and creative, supernatural and natu-
ral.” Lastly, immanence can be characterized by the principle of affirma-
tion, incorporating “an ontological affirmation that supports a notion of 
being as purely superlative, affirmative, and creative” and not one defined 
negatively through lack.24
Several paradigms and practices come together to form the field of 
synthetic biology. The challenge we face as feminist STS scholars with this 
field is that while it has pushed us to question the boundaries drawn 
around life and the living, it has also created a novel synthetic life cycle. 
This synthetic life cycle first travels through a human-mediated and com-
puter-coded inorganic phase, which begins with digital representations 
of DNA that are used to place molecular materials into synthetic struc-
tures such as the minimal genome. It then moves on to an organic phase 
where minimal bacterial genomes that have been genetically engineered 
are introduced into “surrogate” cells (whose “naturally” occurring genome 
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has been removed) to become an organism that transcribes, translates, 
and produce proteins of interest in vitro. Lastly, the life cycle progresses 
to what might be considered a social phase, whereby a minimal genome 
organism, that has been synthesized to contain genes of human interest, 
requires a variety of human and nonhuman systems and resources in 
order to thrive. During this phase new forms of expression such as tech-
nologies can emerge as a result of the synthetic life cycle that both orga-
nize and are organized by humans and the environment. The challenge is 
to treat each phase of this life cycle through the qualities of univocity and 
immanence, beginning with the inorganic phase. 
Deleuze and Guattari speak of inorganic life that is expressive and 
germinal, that exists as a body without organs (BwO). For many scholars 
the ideas of inorganic life and a body without organs both represent highly 
contentious aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. The turn to inorganic 
life has been criticized as an attempt to recuperate some form of neo-
vitalism.25 In addition, there has been much confusion around their con-
cept of the body without organs, often being interpreted as a stance against 
organs themselves.26 I address both concerns here briefly. For many, vital-
ism is a highly fraught and untenable philosophical position. In my opin-
ion, the charge of vitalism in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, and perhaps 
in my own project here of thinking with the lives of bacteria, an in vitro 
neuronal cell line, and minimal genome organisms, represents a failure to 
recognize the important philosophical project of reframing and reimagin-
ing life, biology, and matter.27 In his work on Deleuzian approaches to 
thinking about life, John Protevi explains, “Deleuze is a machinic materi-
alist, not a mechanist, and it is only as a reaction to mechanism that clas-
sical vitalism makes sense. It is the impoverished sense of matter in 
mechanism, as chaotic or passive, that creates the temptation to classical 
vitalism of the ‘entelechy’ type. . . . What we need to look for in Deleuze’s 
notion of vitalism is the ‘life’ that encompasses both organisms and ‘non-
organic life.’”28 
Similarly, the idea of a body without organs can easily be misread. 
Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari, much like their position toward trees, on a 
first read appear to be “anti-organ” or anti-organism. Yet when they make 
such statements as “we’re tired of trees” or “the enemy is the organism,” 
they are in fact referring to their position against an arborescent model 
of linear and hierarchical thought.29 In the case of the BwO, they are 
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commenting on how life might be better understood by “situating it 
within the wider field of forces, intensities, and durations that give rise 
to it and which do not cease to involve a play between nonorganic and 
stratified life.”30 Leslie Dema has suggested that by using the idea of non-
organic or inorganic life, Deleuze and Guattari are attempting to disrupt 
our habit of creating taxonomical and terminological breaks and that 
“their theory of life directly challenges the idea of organic life that we find 
in contemporary biology.”31 
Although the idea of organic life in contemporary biology has been 
greatly troubled in recent years by the arrival of synthetic biology, Dema 
makes another crucial point regarding the philosophical challenge that is 
presented to us by confronting the idea of inorganic life. She explains that 
the best way to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of inorganic life 
is through their concept of assemblages. Assemblages are, according to 
Dema, “not like organs” but instead are “animated by coding and decod-
ing, deterritorializations, and lines of flight.” She states, “Assemblages are 
the symbiotic or sympathetic co-functioning of heterogeneous elements. 
They are formed through a rapport between partial objects that enter into 
monstrous couplings, experimental alliances, unnatural participations, 
and rhizomatic structures.”32 It is certainly fitting to characterize the inor-
ganic life that begins the synthetic life cycle as a monstrous coupling or 
experimental alliance. With the coming together of digital DNA, humans, 
DNA synthesizers, Petri dishes, bacteria, and yeast, the idea of the assem-
blage is useful to contextualize a life produced by synthetic biology. Fur-
thermore, the idea of an assemblage, similar to microphysiologies of 
desire, provides a way to encounter and extend ourselves toward syn-
thetic lives through the qualities of univocity and immanence, and with a 
methodology to consider questions of context.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, there are two types of assemblages— 
namely, machinic assemblages of desire and collective assemblages of enun-
ciation.33 While collective assemblages of enunciation work at the level of 
language and the symbolic, Levi Bryant explains that “when Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to machinic assemblages they are talking about the domain 
of physical objects, how they interrelate, and how they affect and are 
affected by one another.”34 Thinking about life in terms of machinic assem-
blages and material objects that come together to influence each other and 
connect with each other presents an alternative to thinking about synthetic 
In Vitro Incubations 175
life in only mechanistic terms such as DNA synthesis and protein produc-
tion. In Germinal Lives, Keith Ansell Pearson has suggested that the process 
of paying attention to machinic assemblages is a key part of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s strategy for approaching life itself. “A ‘machinic’ approach, then,” 
he states, “will not treat machines as projections of the human but rather 
in terms of ‘monstrous couplings’ involving heterogeneous components 
that ‘evolve’ in terms of recurrence and communications. . . . Humans are 
both component parts of a machine and combine with other forms of 
organic and nonorganic life to constitute a machine (or, better, machinic 
assemblage since there exists no isolated and monadic machine).”35
Reiterating the sentiment from his chapter epigraph, Ansell Pearson 
sees the machinic assemblage as a togetherness of organic and inorganic 
forms, and most important, a togetherness where the human is not left 
behind. By using the idea of the machinic assemblage, and by aligning our-
selves with the qualities of univocity and immanence, a biophilosophy of 
becoming that draws from Deleuze to “think beyond the human condition” 
does not need to leave humans behind.36 Deleuze and Guattari describe the 
assemblage as a multiplicity, and a machinic assemblage more specifically 
as having one side that “faces the strata, which doubtless makes it a kind 
of organism” and another side “facing a body without organs, which is 
continually dismantling the organism.”37 In other words, an assemblage 
can orient itself toward both molar and molecular tendencies. 
In addition to being easily characterized as its own monstrous cou-
pling, throughout its lifecycle a synthetic life demands a great deal of 
support from human, machine, and environmental resources. To bridge 
concerns over what constitutes life and living in the synthetic age of biol-
ogy, with concerns over context and the role that we as humans share in 
sustaining these life cycles, I suggest we see ourselves and these synthetic 
lives as part of a machinic assemblage. One side of this machinic assem-
blage faces toward molar tendencies of stratification, and the other toward 
molecular tendencies of dis-organ-ization. While discussing Deleuzian 
approaches to the question of life, Protevi explains: “For Deleuze and 
Guattari, ‘life’ has a double sense, reflecting both stratification and des-
tratification. It means both ‘organisms’ as a certain set of stratified 
beings and also the creativity of complex systems, their capacity to pro-
duce new emergent properties, new behavior patterns, by destratifying 
and deterritorializing.”38 
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Given that so much of the emphasis has been placed on the molecular 
within this text, the remainder of this chapter addresses the second chal-
lenge of finding ways to consider questions of context by reflecting on 
those elements of the machinic assemblage that face the molar or the side 
of stratification. As feminist STS scholars, we may not personally have a 
hand in creating new lives in this synthetic era of biology. However, we 
can begin to see ourselves as part of a machinic assemblage that includes 
these synthetic lives. If indeed we do begin to see ourselves as part of such 
an assemblage, there is a possibility to think differently about our role 
within that assemblage. We need to learn how to use both molecular and 
molar approaches in order to live and respond to those synthetic lives that 
are already here among us. This is perhaps one way to become accountable 
for our part within an entanglement or, as Barad says, aware of our respon-
sibilities for “that which we [have come to] inherit.”39
Inorganic Stratum: The Central Dogma  
and Its Implicit Forms
In the foreword to The Order of Things, Foucault states: “It is not always 
easy to determine what has caused a specific change in a science. What 
made such a discovery possible? Why did this new concept appear? Where 
did this or that theory come from? Questions like these are often highly 
embarrassing because there are no definite methodological principles on 
which to base such an analysis. The embarrassment is much greater in the 
case of those general changes that alter a science as a whole.”40
Here Foucault suggests the difficulty in tracing the factors involved in 
a specific change in a science, or in other terms perhaps, the birth of a new 
paradigm. This is true, particularly in the case of tracing how scientists 
have come to think about life and what constitutes the attributes of the 
living. In 1958, however, an important event occurred, a kind of big bang 
one might say, that altered the future of molecular biology and genet-
ics.41 This event was the formulation of the central dogma. As embarrass-
ingly simple the following tracing of the central dogma may be, I turn 
to it here because of its resemblance to expressions that can be found in 
inorganic strata. Protevi explains that “in the inorganic strata, expres-
sion is the molarization of molecular content that is, the carrying forth 
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to the macro scopic scale of the ‘implicit forms’ of molecular interactions.”42 
While the central dogma cannot be easily determined as the one and only 
implicit form that changed how biologists went from thinking about mol-
ecules to macroscopic organisms, it is a significant event worth remember-
ing for its role in shifting or “molarizing” how scientists have come to 
think about intensive or expressive aspects of life.
The central dogma refers to the process of the unidirectional and 
sequential flow of genetic information originating from DNA, moving to 
RNA, and then from RNA to protein.43 DNA and RNA are both biopoly-
mers that are made of nucleic acids and are comprised of the four nucleo-
tides adenosine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine in the case of DNA, and 
adenosine, guanine, cytosine, and uracil in the case of RNA. The central 
dogma tells us that both DNA and RNA provide the code for protein syn-
thesis, which occurs through a two-step process. The first step is referred 
to as transcription, whereby DNA serves as a template for the production 
of single strands of messenger RNA. The idea is that the information that 
is coded on the DNA template is transcribed or, similar to how the term is 
used in computer science, is transferred from one recording system to 
another. This transfer of DNA code is mediated by the enzyme RNA poly-
merase, which works to produce a new kind of information or code—one 
that is in the form of a complementary and anti parallel RNA sequence. For 
example, an antisense strand of DNA such as 3’ATGACGGA5’ is transcribed 
into the sense mRNA strand 5’UACUGCCU3’. This newly synthesized RNA 
molecule, however, is simply another messenger or a go-between, destined 
only to deliver the command required for gathering amino acids in the final 
event of protein synthesis. 
This next step of the mechanism of moving from code in messenger 
RNA to an ultimate protein destination is referred to in the field of molec-
ular biology and genetics as the process of translation. Translation is an 
important in-between process that proceeds in four phases, including acti-
vation, initiation, elongation, and termination. During these four phases 
of translation, a series of three nucleotide base pairs come together to 
create what is called a codon. Each codon is then decoded by a ribosome, 
and with the help of transfer RNA (tRNA) molecules, a chain of amino 
acids come together to form a protein. In synthetic biology, scientists 
make use of the metaphor of code to write or to program this code in a 
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specific way and thereby have a hand in directing protein biosynthesis. 
Interestingly, if we recall Judith Butler’s concern of “What of life exceeds 
the model?” noted in an earlier chapter and voiced during an interview 
with Vicky Kirby, we can see that the metaphors and models of coding, 
transcription, and translation, which have been used to explain and carry 
out the central dogma, have long become the ontology of molecular biol-
ogy and life itself—and quite productively, I might add.44
The central dogma in molecular biology was created and so named by 
the scientist Francis Crick, biophysicist and codiscoverer of DNA’s molec-
ular structure. Prior to his collaboration with James Watson, Crick had 
been trained as a physicist and was working on the X-ray crystallography 
of proteins. However, starting in the 1940s, there was immense interest 
and growing excitement in the field of protein biochemistry, in great part 
due to the work of Linus Pauling, who had also been trained as a physicist. 
In 1945, Pauling submitted a grant to the Rockefeller Foundation to launch 
a research program that was to become the field now known as molecular 
biology.45 Pauling was also responsible for popularizing the application of 
quantum physics into chemistry, in addition to developing the practice 
of 3-D molecular modeling. Since Pauling’s day, the practice of protein 
modeling has moved from plastic balls and wooden sticks to highly com-
plex computer modeling. I mention Pauling’s and Crick’s common back-
ground in physics and their shared interests in the physical and mechanistic 
aspects of protein chemistry and the structural modeling of proteins, 
because of what I see as an interconnected set of events that sheds light 
on a dominant paradigm that currently guides the field of synthetic biol-
ogy and its purchase on life and the living.
When asked why he named the process of information transfer, from 
DNA to RNA to protein, the “central dogma,” Crick apparently admitted 
to his mistake and laughed at his misunderstanding of the meaning of the 
word “dogma.” In his autobiography, What Mad Pursuit: A Personal View of 
Scientific Discovery, Crick stated:
I called this idea the central dogma, for two reasons, I suspect. I had 
already used the obvious word hypothesis in the sequence hypothesis, 
and in addition I wanted to suggest that this new assumption was more 
central and more powerful. . . . As it turned out, the use of the word 
dogma caused almost more trouble than it was worth. . . . Many years 
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later Jacques Monod pointed out to me that I did not appear to under-
stand the correct use of the word dogma, which is a belief that cannot be 
doubted. I did apprehend this in a vague sort of way but since I thought 
that all religious beliefs were without foundation, I used the word the 
way I myself thought about it, not as most of the world does, and simply 
applied it to a grand hypothesis that, however plausible, had little direct 
experimental support.46
Crick’s central dogma continues to serve as a particularly powerful struc-
tural and functional paradigm. Even with the now accepted phenomenon 
of epigenetics, the linearity and simplicity of the central dogma serves as 
a cornerstone for understanding the organization of organic life and the 
emergence of proteins through the processes of transcription and transla-
tion. Crick’s translation of the term dogma, or shall I say “mistranslation” 
of the term, has had profound ontological, epistemological, methodologi-
cal, and ethical impacts on how we orient ourselves while dealing with 
DNA, cells, and organisms in the lab. It has had a profound influence on 
how we think about life itself in biological terms and how molecular con-
tent is “carrying forth to the macroscopic scale.”47 Molecular biologists 
have relied on the central dogma to develop recombinant DNA technolo-
gies to design and bring forward new lives such as transgenic organisms. 
The central dogma has served, if not as a religious belief, then as a highly 
revered principle for many scientists. It can be argued that the paradigm 
of the central dogma has provided the intellectual anchor for a number of 
additional scientific enterprises on a global scale, including the justifica-
tion for spending billions of US taxpayer dollars to fund the Human 
Genome Project. It has also provided the scientific authority needed to 
continually drive social arguments based on genetic determinism, as is 
evident in the rise of a new eugenics.48 
That the term “dogma” is generally understood as that which is author-
itative and not to be disputed, but is simultaneously a belief that origi-
nates without reason or evidence, is not the meaning that Crick understood 
in his naming of a particularly important sequence of molecular events. I 
argue, however, that this is exactly how the central dogma has operated 
and continues to operate in molecular biology and, most effectively, in the 
field of synthetic biology. The idea that a unidirectional, linear, and hier-
archical deployment of molecules inside an organism is required for the 
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structure and formation of life lays the intellectual foundation for the 
field of synthetic biology. Synthetic biologists, who apply engineering 
principles to the design and creation of new life forms, were raised on 
molecular biology’s central dogma. Since the early 1970s and the advent 
of recombinant DNA technologies, scientists have been working on 
altering life forms. They have been guided by the central dogma but have 
also been taking advantage of the fact that DNA can be cut or digested 
with restriction enzymes, altered through the insertion of a foreign or 
synthet ically produced piece of DNA, and then ligated back together. 
For instance, for decades now, molecular biologists have designed and 
used transgenic or knockout animals to understand the biological basis 
of human diseases. These animals have been designed to contain muta-
tions in a specific gene, contain a completely “foreign” gene, or have a 
gene completely deleted in order to study a gene’s function and correla-
tion to human disease. 
However, many molecular biologists have grown weary of the arduous 
hit-and-miss techniques of recombinant DNA technologies. These scien-
tists are turning to the new tools of synthetic biology to study the material 
processes of biology. For synthetic biologists who see themselves as bio-
engineers, the beauty and simplicity of the central dogma lies in the fact 
that molecules such as DNA, and in turn molecular life, can exist in an 
inorganic form as a language or computer code. Instead of having a binary 
code of 1’s and 0’s used in computer processing, the main biological com-
ponents of life are thought to be comprised of the four letters A, G, C, and 
T. The BioBricks Foundation, for instance, literally stores DNA as a code, 
and thousands of inorganic gene cassettes can be transferred onto a com-
puter hard drive, in the form of magnets and megabytes. The foundation’s 
goals are to make DNA (as inorganic and digital code) accessible to every-
one and, as a result, create a better world through biology. The founda-
tion’s website explains:
Biology is everywhere. And matters to everyone. It affects our food, 
medicines, homes, and environment. Yet people are not working well 
together as partners with biology. BioBricks Foundation believes in  
a future where there is a free-to-use language for programming life  
that benefits everyone. A future where people around the world commu-
nicate and collaborate to create local biological solutions to meet global 
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needs. When people are inspired to work in partnership with biology 
this future is possible. When people have the tools and infrastructure to 
work with one another, we can meet global needs for food, medicines, 
shelter, clean water and air.49
In an effort to create such tools, there are three main ways of applying 
engineering principles to the material reconstruction of DNA—namely, 
the bottom-up, the top-down, and the pathways approaches.50 The 
research of a few prominent synthetic biologists, whose work represents 
diverse interests in the field, is discussed briefly here to reveal the logic 
behind each of these three approaches. 
The bottom-up or “parts-based” approach to creating synthetic life can 
be characterized by the work of Drew Endy, a civil and biochemical engi-
neer, previously at MIT and currently at Stanford University. Endy, who 
is pushing for the creation of an open-source platform for genetic bio-
technology, is the founder and president of the not-for-profit BioBricks 
Foundation. His bottom-up approach is based on forward engineering or 
the idea that DNA can be broken down into separate entities or cartridges 
that can then be used to deliberately assemble a specifically fashioned or 
desired biological product. Endy states:
Consider that most early discoveries of genetically encoded functions 
depended on analysis of the linkage between natural or randomly  
gen erated mutations and phenotypes, a powerful approach akin to 
blindly smashing many cars with a hammer and then determining 
which broken parts matter by attempting to drive each machine. Over 
the past 30 years, the invention and development of DNA sequencing 
technology have provided a complementary approach for discovering 
genetic functions. . . . However, two additional approaches are needed 
to confirm and exhaustively identify all functions encoded by a natural 
DNA sequence. Specific DNA sequences thought to affect phenotypes 
must be purposely changed and the expected effect confirmed. Also, seem-
ingly irrelevant DNA sequences must be removed, disrupted, or otherwise 
modified and shown to be unnecessary. . . . Going forward, the ability to 
implement many simultaneous and directed changes to natural DNA 
sequences and to build and test synthetic systems will give researchers 
a powerful new “hammer” for constructing how life works.51
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Alternatively, the top-down approach is led by entrepreneur and genet-
icist J. Craig Venter, whose work is discussed in greater detail below. In 
contrast to the bottom-up approach, Venter’s top-down approach can be 
summarized as starting with full genomes and then scaling them down to 
a minimal size, such as in the case of the minimal genome used to create 
the first minimal synthetic bacterial cell.52 This approach has been 
described as being modeled upon a “plug-and-play” set of functions.53 The 
last approach, roughly named the pathways approach, is illustrated by 
the work of Jay Keasling, professor of chemical engineering and bioengi-
neering at UC Berkeley and associate director of the Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory. Keasling’s work, utilizes a pathways or problem-
driven approach and opts for the use of any and all engineering approaches 
that make the modification of DNA more practical and cost-effective.54 
Regardless of their technical differences, what we are witnessing in this 
stage of the synthetic life cycle and from this particular orientation of the 
machinic assemblage is, as Protevi has called it, the “molarization of 
molecular content.”55 Each of these approaches falls in line with the work-
ings of the inorganic stratum. We can see here exactly how far an implicit 
form, by way of the central dogma, has shaped and produced our knowl-
edge regarding how molecules interact and how molecular structures can 
come together to form synthetic macromolecules. This implicit form has 
given birth to synthetic life.
Organic Stratum: Minimal Lives Respond to Problems
In The Politics of Life Itself, Nikolas Rose posits the politics of “life itself” 
as the vital politics of our time. He is concerned with the growing capaci-
ties to “control, manage, engineer, reshape, and modulate” the vital capac-
ities of human beings as living creatures.56 Defining the idea of vital 
politics he wishes to put forward, Rose describes what he calls a major 
shift in biopolitics today compared to the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. He suggests that recent developments in molecular biology have led 
to the phenomena of a “molecular vision of life.”57 
Rose is concerned with tracing an emergent form of life and biopoli-
tics that foreground the human, but I argue that synthetic biology requires 
us to trace a different concept of “life itself” as it relates to the emergent 
capacities of nonhuman minimal genome organisms. The concept of “life 
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itself” that must be applied here relates not only to the organic bacterial 
“surrogates” that are part of the machinic assemblage but also to inorganic 
life and minimal genomes that come together to form synthetic life. If any 
life can be said to have gone through the phenomena of a “molecular vision 
of life,” bacteria would have to be at the very top of this list.58 The step-
change in life that Rose argues we as humans have experienced is simply 
a change in scale, from whole organisms to the molecular parts of whole 
organisms. This change in scale is shadowed by the step-change that has 
occurred at the level of bacterial microorganisms. The step-change in life 
that I am referring to has occurred at the level of type, not scale. It is a 
step-change at the level of type because with the advent of synthetic biol-
ogy, the definition of “life itself” is being shifted from an organic life con-
tained within an organism, to an inorganic life that begins without organs, 
can be dis-organ-ized, and is comprised of code. Therefore, in addition to 
attending to what Rose sees as the extended reach of contemporary bio-
politics and a “molecular vision of life itself,” this step-change at the level 
of type forces us to appreciate the expressive life of a molecule itself, as syn-
thetic biologists have already done. 
If we approach the expressive life of a molecule as a machinic assem-
blage, we can begin to align our curiosities along the qualities of univoc-
ity and immanence. Returning to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, we 
can think about the second phase of the synthetic life cycle as facing the 
organic stratum, where “expression becomes autonomous in the linear 
genetic code, which results in greater deterritorialization (greater behav-
ioral flexibility) of organisms.”59 As Sara Dawn Eimer has described it, the 
organic stratum is where “the form of a line of DNA, itself molecular . . . 
operates upon other molecules to produce the ‘molar’ entity, the organism.”60 
In synthetic biology, entire genomes have been created through the top-
down method of molecular manipulation.61 These genomes are minimal in 
the sense that they have been designed to contain the minimum number of 
genes required for bacterial cell viability and growth.62 
Minimal genomes may contain the minimal number of genes required 
for a cell to grow and replicate, but they still require other nonchro-
mosomal elements for these genes to be transcribed and translated into 
proteins. The process of inserting a minimal genome into a “host” or “sur-
rogate” bacterial or yeast cell whose own genome has been removed is 
referred to as “genome transplantation.”63 For example, the newly arrived 
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“minimal synthetic bacterial cell” created by the J. Craig Venter Institute 
is comprised of a synthetic minimal genome that is based on the genome 
of the bacteria Mycoplasma mycoides but has been transplanted into the 
bacteria Mycoplasma capricolum whose genome, in turn, has been 
removed.64 Through the process of genome transplantation, we see the 
coming together of a genetically engineered minimal genome or line of 
DNA and a surrogate cell. This allows the machinic assemblage to shift its 
orientation from the inorganic stratum to the organic stratum, moving it 
from the form of a line of DNA to a molar entity that can be identified as 
an organism. The minimal genome becomes a minimal genome organism 
thanks to its surrogate.
It is precisely due to their capabilities of replicating DNA, transcribing 
DNA, and translating RNA into proteins that bacteria and yeast have long 
been perceived as potential surrogates or machines in molecular and syn-
thetic biology. For instance, in 2012 a team of synthetic biologists based 
out of the University of Nottingham announced their intention to create 
an operating system for new cellular life forms. Their project—named 
Towards a Universal Biological-Cell Operating System (or AUdACiOuS 
for short)—was supported through a $1.58 million grant awarded by the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council in the UK. This proj-
ect treated E. coli as an “information processing machine.”65 It was aimed 
at creating a line of bacterial cells that contained the minimal require-
ment of components to stay alive, but that could easily be programmed to 
execute specific functions through protein biosynthesis. Natalio Kras-
nogor, the primary scientist on this project, summarized the research as 
follows:
A living cell, e.g. a bacterium, is an information processing machine. It  
is composed of a series of sub-systems that work in concert by sensing 
external stimuli, assessing its own internal states and making decisions 
through a network of complex and interlinked biological regulatory 
 networks (BRN) motifs that act as the bacterium neural network. A 
 bacterium’s decision making processes often result in a variety of out-
puts, e.g. the creation of more cells, chemotaxis, bio-film formation, etc. 
It was recently shown that cells not only react to their environment  
but that they can even predict environmental changes. The emerging 
discipline of Synthetic Biology (SB) considers the cell to be a machine 
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that can be built—from parts—in a manner similar to, e.g., electronic 
circuits, airplanes, etc. SB has sought to co-opt cells for nano-computa-
tion and nano-manufacturing purposes. During this leadership fellow-
ship programme of research I will aim at making E. coli bacteria much 
more easily to program and hence harness for useful purposes. In order 
to achieve this, I plan to use the tools, methodologies and resources that 
computer science created for writing computer programs and find ways 
of making them useful in the microbiology laboratory.66
Sophia Roosth has also discussed the capabilities of microorganisms—
namely, the ability of yeast to scream.67 Although Roosth does not refer 
specifically to synthetic yeast, she argues that scientists who work with 
the technique of sonocytology on yeast species such as Saccharomyces cere-
visiae make a distinction between yeast cellular signaling and so-called 
baseline or background noise by approaching yeast cells as “subjects capa-
ble of speaking to their conditions.”68 Despite the fact that these scientists 
treat bacteria as machines, they also note the wide range of capabilities 
that bacteria have, including the capacity to react or respond to their envi-
ronment. In the organic stratum we start seeing self-organization and that 
“life responds to problems by experimenting with different kinds of solu-
tions.”69 As it turns out, synthetic organisms show indications of having 
behavioral flexibility and problem-solving skills.70 The problem is that they 
need to learn how to cooperate with one another. 
Maitreya Dunham has raised a crucial aspect of this phase of the syn-
thetic life cycle in her commentary “Synthetic Ecology: A Model system 
for Cooperation.” She writes: 
Synthetic biology offers the promise of a better understanding of bio-
logical systems through constructing them. Unlike naturally occurring 
biological systems, which are generally complicated by multiple vari-
ables and difficult to isolate components, synthetic systems can be sim-
plified to allow for experiments that would be too difficult to interpret 
if done in their full natural context. Up to now, synthetic biologists have 
primarily focused on gene circuits . . . [learning] more about the rules 
of gene expression and regulation, including fundamental issues regard-
ing noise, timing, and signal fidelity. In this issue of PNAS, Shou et al. 
demonstrate an example of a new direction for synthetic biology, what 
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might be called synthetic ecology. Rather than using gene modules as 
building blocks, they mix cell populations to construct a synthetic sim-
ple obligatory cooperative ecology.71
Our understanding of biology has come to this. Lives that exist as “natu-
rally” occurring systems are far too complicated. However, even though 
these systems can be simplified through synthetic biology, once they are 
created, they need to be able to respond to the problem of how to cooper-
ate with each other in order to live in a broader ecology.
Scientists, and particularly molecular biologists, have used the linear-
ity of the central dogma alongside the principles of reductionism to gather 
more details about the natural world. With synthetic biology, however, 
we are witnessing something new. What we have here is an ontological 
premise based on reductionism (DNA, RNA, and proteins) and linearity 
(transcription and translation) that has gone so far into itself that it has 
nowhere else to go but back out, sending out new lines of flight. It turns 
out that in order to survive and thrive, synthetic lives such as minimal 
genome organisms need to be able cooperate with one another and build 
themselves back up again, molecule by molecule, in an environment-
dependent and context-ridden “natural” world. Computational biologist 
Wenying Shou and colleagues argue that in the context of synthetic biol-
ogy, “cooperative interactions are key to diverse biological phenomena” 
and that “such diversity makes the ability to create and control coopera-
tion desirable for potential applications in areas as varied as agriculture, 
pollutant treatment, and medicine.”72 
Recognizing the importance of cooperation, Shou and colleagues show 
that “persistent cooperation can be engineered.”73 They state: “Specifically, 
we report the construction of a synthetic obligatory cooperative system, 
termed CoSMO (cooperation that is synthetic and mutually obligatory), 
which consists of a pair of nonmating yeast strains, each supplying an 
essential metabolite to the other strain. . . . Extending synthetic biology 
from the design of genetic circuits to the engineering of ecological inter-
actions, CoSMO provides a quantitative system for linking processes at 
the cellular level to the collective behavior at the system level, as well as a 
genetically tractable system for studying the evolution of cooperation.”74 
Linear thinking and reductionism have run their course, bringing us full 
circle. It turns out that synthetic organisms themselves are asking 
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scientists to consider Butler’s question, “What of life exceeds the model?”75 
Answering this call presents an opportunity for feminist scientists and 
feminist STS scholars. It invites us to consider what our responses will be, 
and what our encounters with these organisms will look like, when we 
realize that synthetic lives become expressive lives, capable of developing 
the quality of changefulness and desires for kinship.
Alloplastic Stratum: Deterritorializations  
through Postcolonial and Decolonial STS
In Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era, Melinda 
Cooper examines how the biotech revolution of the 1970s and early 1980s 
shifted economic production to the genetic, microbial, and cellular level.76 
She argues that the transformation of biological life, including bacterial 
life, into surplus value is at the core of the new postindustrial economy. I 
am interested in extending Cooper’s astute analysis of bacterial life and 
labor and other social, political, and economic factors to our own machinic 
assemblage. Postcolonial and decolonial STS can help to reframe synthetic 
biology along the social or alloplastic stratum. In particular, I am inter-
ested in using postcolonial and decolonial STS analyses to ask how, for 
example, are humans and nonhumans being organized to “manage the 
problems” posed by synthetic lives?77 How, and from where, are the vast 
amounts of biomass that are required to support synthetic lives being 
obtained? The last phase of the synthetic life cycle progresses to a social 
phase that requires a great deal of support from both human and nonhu-
man systems and resources. New forms of labor and production are 
emerging as a result of these synthetic lives. I am interested in tracing 
those stories that shed new light onto our machinic assemblage, which up 
until this point has been comprised of various components, including 
humans, machines, digital DNA, minimal genomes, bacteria, yeast, and 
surrogate cells. As I explore this stratum, I analyze our machinic assem-
blage for its monstrous couplings with an STD, sugarcane plantations, and 
the Sargasso Sea.
The postcolonial and decolonial STS projects of thinking about “knowl-
edge that is otherwise” and “reframing” biotechnological events reso-
nate with new lines of flight that can form within Deleuze and Guattari’s 
social or alloplastic stratum. In particular, the goal to actively “decolonize 
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relations and practices” works hand in hand with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
idea of deterritorialization.78 Using the alloplastic to describe social insti-
tutions and behavior that are human but not limited to the human, 
Deleuze and Guattari write: 
There is a third major grouping of strata, defined less by a human essence 
than, once again, by a new distribution of content and expression. Form of 
content becomes “alloplastic” rather than “homoplastic”; in other words, 
it brings about modifications in the external world. Form of expression 
becomes linguistic rather than genetic; in other words, it operates with 
symbols that are comprehensible, transmittable, and modifiable from out-
side. What some call the properties of human beings—technology and 
language, tool and symbol, free hand and supple larynx, “gesture and 
speech”—are in fact properties of this new distribution.79
The alloplastic therefore is seen as a social or cultural stratum that creates 
new forms of content and expression. Aligning our analysis of a technol-
ogy along the alloplastic stratum can be useful to understand how a 
machinic assemblage is working to modify the external world. In the case 
of content, we have those monstrous couplings that bring together several 
different kinds of physical bodies. In the case of forms of expression, we 
have new forms of technology, tools, and language used by humans (but 
not limited to humans) that also work to modify the external world that 
are a result of similar assemblages. 
For example, we can begin to map those sides of the machinic assem-
blage that face new economies of biocapital that have become possible 
through the labor and protein-production capacities not only belonging 
to minimal genomes organisms but also to those humans whose labor 
supports synthetic life. We can begin to take account of how this labor 
can be contextualized along colonial histories of plantation-based econo-
mies or recent forms of biopiracy. We can begin to approach new forms 
of expression created by this machinic assemblage through critiques of 
scientific imperialism and liberal humanist notions of individualism as 
they relate to synthetic biology. Since it is also in the alloplastic stratum 
that expression becomes most independent from content, allowing 
for the greatest amount of deterritorialization, we are further able to 
 contextualize, resituate, know otherwise, and reframe these events 
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through other symbolic means, such as through the expressivity found in 
our stories and literature.80
Vignette 1: STDs
To begin, we can examine how the minimal genome organism brings with 
it a new genesis story. In January 2008 a team of seventeen scientists at 
the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) in Rockland, Maryland, announced that 
they had successfully created the first synthetic bacterial genome.81 Using 
the top-down approach and a variety of genetic engineering techniques, 
including in vitro recombination, cloning, PCR, in vivo recombination in 
yeast, and “shotgun” sequencing, Venter and his colleagues synthesized, 
assembled, and cloned the complete bacterial genome referred to as Myco-
plasma genitalium JCVI 1.0. In 2016, Venter and his colleagues produced the 
even more streamlined version of the minimal bacterial genome referred 
to as JVCI-syn3.0, which contains only 531 kilobase pairs coding for 473 
genes.82 Interestingly, members of the Action Group on Erosion, Technol-
ogy, and Concentration (ETC), an organization that analyses the socioeco-
nomic ramifications of new technologies and is dedicated to the sustainable 
advancement of ecological diversity, referred to JVCI-syn1.0 as the “original 
syn.” They have since dubbed JVCI-syn3.0 as Synthia 3.0.83 Given Venter’s 
previous ventures, we should have known that this day was coming. 
In 1984, Venter held a position at the National Institutes of Health, 
where he began to work on a new technique for rapid gene discovery. He 
takes credit for developing a DNA sequencing technique referred to as 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs). In his biography on the JVCI website, it 
is suggested that in 1995 the ESTs technique led him to decode the genome 
of the first free-living organism using his new whole genome shotgun 
technique.84 This was not the end for Venter and his biotechnological 
ambitions.85 In fact, Venter actually traces his move toward synthetic biol-
ogy to 1995, when he sequenced Haemophilus influenza. This genome was 
found to have about 1,800 genes. The same year, Venter collaborated with 
other scientists to work on the bacterium Mycoplasma genitalia. This bac-
teria was chosen because it has the smallest “naturally occurring” genome 
of any self-replicating organism, with only about 482 protein coding genes 
and approximately 580 kilobases.86 However, some of us may find it 
extremely interesting to know that Mycoplasma genitalia, the “original” 
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organism from which Venter’s transformed minimal bacterial genome 
organisms are based, is a bacteria that causes a sexually transmitted 
disease (STD) in humans, known to lead to pelvic inflammatory disease 
(PID) in women. PID is a “major public health problem associated with 
substantial medical complications (e.g., infertility, ectopic pregnancy, 
and chronic pelvic pain) and healthcare costs.”87 In men, Mycoplasma 
genitalia is the “third most frequent pathogen causing non-chlamydial, 
non-gonococcal urethritis.”88 
Why would Venter choose a bacterial organism, known to cause a debil-
itating human disease that likely affects already vulnerable populations 
disproportionately, to serve as the biological backbone for the first syn-
thetic life? From postcolonial and decolonial perspectives, we can see neo-
liberal and capitalist strategies at work. In this business model the concern 
over whether a minimal genome organism derived from a STD-causing 
bacteria poses a health concern to already economically and politically 
vulnerable groups is overshadowed by the speculative futures promised 
by synthetic biology. Referring to the growth of the pharmaceutical indus-
try and the AIDS epidemic in Africa, Cooper explains that “one could go 
further along these lines and argue that the simultaneity of the North 
American–led biotech revolution and the troubling return of infectious 
disease of all kinds, in both the developing world and advanced capital-
ist centers, is symptomatic of the intrinsic contradictions of capitalism. 
The peculiarity of capitalism on this argument would lie in its tendency 
to create both an excess of promise and an excess of waste, or in Marx’s 
words, a promissory surplus of life and an actual devastation of life in the 
present.”89 As a modern technoscience of the global North, the possible 
futures that have been promised by synthetic biology include biotech-
nologies of personalized biomedicine, bioremediation, and bioenergy 
applications. These technologies are primarily geared toward already well-
resourced groups, and apparently their potential benefits outweigh the 
risk associated with the possible spread of a minimal genome organism 
that is STD-adjacent.
Vignette 2: Sugarcane Plantations
In 2004 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation donated $42.6 million to 
fund Jay Keasling’s research on developing a synthetic antimalarial drug. 
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A proponent of the pathways approach, Keasling and his partners at the 
biotech startup Amyris (a not-for-profit at the time) went to work using 
E. coli and brewer’s yeast to design a microbial cell whose metabolic path-
ways could be manipulated to incorporate the production of artemisinic 
acid, the precursor of the compound artemisinin.90 Originally extracted 
from the plant Artemesia annua found mostly in China and southeast Asia, 
artemisinin has been the favored antimalarial drug for several years now 
due to the fact that plasmodium parasites have become resistant to  quinine- 
and chloroquine-based treatments.91 The reported problem back in 2005, 
when Keasling was conducting this research, was that plant-derived arte-
misinin was in “short supply and unaffordable to most malaria sufferers.”92 
The tools of synthetic biology were supposed to fix this problem. 
In 2006, Keasling and his team reported that they were successful in 
engineering the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae to produce high titers of 
artemisinic acid through the process of fermentation.93 However, it was 
not until 2013 that they were able to report the production of “commer-
cially relevant concentrations” of artemisinic acid.94 The key limiting factor 
had been the ability to sustain the growth and fermentation of the syn-
thetically modified brewer’s yeast at an industrial level.95 Since then, Amy-
ris has become a private for-profit company, and using the technologies 
and expertise gained by having to produce semisynthetic artemisinin at 
industrial levels, they have expanded the applications of their synthetic 
microbial engineering model to include mass-scale production of cosmet-
ics and biofuels. They have designed a synthetic yeast cell to produce high 
levels of the molecule farnesene, which “has many potential applications 
as a renewable feedstock for diesel fuel, polymers, and cosmetics.” 96 Fer-
mentation in yeast species such as Saccharomyces cerevisiae is a metabolic 
process that converts sugars and starches into acids, gases, and alcohol. 
However, in order to carry out industrial levels of yeast fermentation, one 
also needs industrial amounts of sugar and starch-based biomass for the 
desired metabolic processes to occur. Therefore, while entering the market 
of cosmetics and biofuel production, Amyris also purchased sugarcane 
fields in Brazil to carry out their mass-scale operations.
As a global leader in biofuel production, Brazil has been producing 
ethanol-based biofuel from sugar and sugarcane-derived biomass for sev-
eral decades. Amyris decided to develop its own farnesene manufacturing 
facilities by using the country’s already well-established sugarcane 
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production infrastructure. As such, the company acquired portions of 
existing sugarcane fields as well as new feedstock facilities that are adja-
cent to existing sugarcane mills, such as in the municipality of Brotas, in 
São Paulo, Brazil. Adrian MacKenzie explains:
The Brazilian sugar-cane industry is the largest producer of sugar in the 
world. Rather than producing ethanol through the long-established 
industrial techniques of fermentation, some of the Brazilian sugar-cane 
will become something different in Amyris’ bolt-on bioreactors at Usina 
São Martinho in Brazil. The years of metabolic engineering that Keas-
ling’s team put into the isoprenoid pathway in yeast pays dividends now 
in the form of a usefully transformable chemical, farnesene. The mil-
lions of tons of sugar cane moving through Usina São Martinho no  
longer simply ferment as ethanol, the biofuel that Brazil has produced 
in quantity since the 1970s. Via Amyris’ re-engineered yeast strains, the 
chemical substrates present in sugar will be re-routed as feedstock for a 
much more complicated and efficient metabolic pathway, the melavonate 
or “HMG-CoA reductase pathway.”97
Drawing on the philosophical work of Gilbert Simondon, MacKenzie con-
ducts a rich analysis of biofuel, treating it as a technical object whose 
“genesis involves processes of concretisation that negotiate between het-
erogeneous geographical, biological, technical, scientific, and commercial 
realities.”98 I would add to this list of realities the colonial histories of 
sugarcane plantation–based capitalist economies, the indigenous peoples 
who were displaced or killed by European settlers, and the labor and bod-
ies that were organized by this economy. 
Brazil, like many other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, 
experienced its first wave of European colonial expansion soon after 
Christopher Columbus returned from his initial voyage to the “new 
world.” In fact, the earliest record of large-scale sugar production goes 
back to 1550, when the Portuguese built mills along the Atlantic coast 
of Brazil.99 Caribbean scholar Fernando Ortiz discussed the politics of 
tobacco and sugar production in Cuba in his influential work Cuban Coun-
terpoint, and his analysis of the European establishment of sugar planta-
tions as a strategy for economic claims to the colonies can be extended 
to Brazil. Ortiz explains:
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It is one thing to have cane and another to produce sugar on a commer-
cial scale. Between the raising of the cane, which experience had shown 
to be merely a question of man power, and the commercial production 
of sugar, which in Europe had a steady and growing market, stood the 
problem of industrial production, which demanded machinery and tech-
nicians that did not exist here, and of necessity had to be imported from 
Europe. In a word, capital was needed to buy slaves, to bring in experts 
and skilled workers and all the machinery for milling, boiling, evaporat-
ing, and refining. Even aside from the land required, the production of 
sugar was perforce a capitalist enterprise.100
Postcolonial and decolonial analyses encourage us to probe what the 
effects of sugarcane production were not only on the local indigenous 
populations in Brazil but also on the slaves who were brought from Africa 
over a period of roughly three hundred years to sustain the industrial 
production of sugar. What modifications to the external world were caused 
by the machinic assemblage that was, at the time, a monstrous coupling 
of sugarcane plantations, mills, slaves, and sugar? What were its effects 
on the lives of individuals who had been displaced by slavery? Ortiz 
describes the effects of displacement and the backbreaking labor in those 
sugar plantations: 
At the same time there was going on the transculturation of a steady 
human stream of African Negroes coming from all the coastal regions  
of Africa along the Atlantic, from Senegal, Guinea, the Congo, and 
Angola and as far away as Mozambique on the opposite shore of that 
continent. All of them snatched from their original social groups, their 
own cultures destroyed and crushed under the weight of the cultures in 
existence here, like sugar cane ground in the rollers of the mill . . . [they] 
brought with their bodies their souls, but not their institutions nor their 
implements. . . . They arrived deracinated, wounded, shattered, like the 
cane of the fields, and like it they were ground and crushed to extract 
the juice of their labor.101
Given the wealth that was generated by slave labor in the sugarcane plan-
tations, it is no surprise that Brazil was the last country to abolish slavery 
in the Americas. 
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Although I am no way suggesting that Amyris’s new sugarcane mills 
that produce semisynthetic cosmetics and biofuels employ slave labor in 
their fields, maintaining the sugarcane crops and operating the fermen-
tation plants must involve the extraction of local human labor. Even if 
much of the processes are now mechanized, a machinic assemblage that 
brings together a monstrous coupling of sugarcane fields, mills, laborers, 
sugar, and synthetic yeast organisms is still an assemblage that modifies 
the external world—namely by organizing the bodies and cultures of 
specific humans. It is important that the history of labor practices and 
worker conditions associated with sugar and sugarcane-derived biomass 
in Brazil and other countries not be forgotten.102 These histories can be 
used to better understand the effects incurred by the practices of trans-
national companies such as Amyris and the naturalization of similar 
capitalist practices. For instance, in her efforts to create anticapitalist 
transnational feminist practices, Chandra Talpade Mohanty asks us to 
bring forward the question of native or indigenous struggles in our analy-
ses. “Economically and politically,” she writes, “the declining power of 
self-governance among certain poorer nations is matched by the rising 
significance of transnational institutions such as the World Trade Orga-
nization and governing bodies such as the European Union, not to men-
tion for-profit corporations.  .  .  . [T]he hegemony of neoliberalism, 
alongside the naturalization of capitalist values, influences the ability 
to make choices on one’s own behalf in the daily lives of economically 
marginalized as well as economically privileged communities around the 
globe.”103
As we think about the sugar and sugarcane biomass needed for the 
production of malaria drugs, cosmetics, and biofuels by synthetically 
developed microorganisms, we should keep in mind that our decisions 
regarding the development and commercialization of new technologies 
and products for consumption will have local and global impacts. We must 
also keep in mind that many of these decisions are being made without 
input from the people whose lives will likely be disproportionately 
impacted. As ETC spokesperson Jim Thomas has pointed out, we live in an 
unjust world and if we want to develop technologies that are not going to 
add to this injustice, synthetic biologists need to realize that marginalized 
communities must have a say in what comes to constitute their reality.104
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Vignette 3: The Sargasso Sea
Interdisciplinary scholarship is a fantastic place for discovery, but some-
times ideas can easily get lost—a bit of a scholarly Bermuda Triangle one 
might even say. With this admission, I end this chapter by moving quickly 
into muddier waters, to the Sargasso Sea in particular, with the hope that 
our machinic assemblage doesn’t get marooned. Despite its reportedly 
weak currents and calm winds, the Sargasso Sea located in the North 
Atlantic Ocean is a busy place, playing host to the imaginations of colonial 
explorers, novelists, postcolonial theorists, marine microorganisms, 
pirates, biopirates, and synthetic biologists. Like the floating beds of sar-
gassum seaweed, after which the sea is named, entanglements come easily 
here. Here, our machinic assemblage is oriented to face the alloplastic 
stratum, where postcolonial and decolonial perspectives help us to reflect 
on synthetic life and the emergence of neoliberal forms of individualism 
and imperialism. 
In 2004, J. Craig Venter and colleagues published the article “Environ-
mental Genome Shotgun Sequencing of the Sargasso Sea” in the presti-
gious journal Science. Using his personal yacht, the Sorcerer II, Venter and 
his team had taken sail a few years earlier and applied the whole-genome 
shotgun sequencing technique to “microbial populations collected en 
masse . . . from seawater samples collected from the Sargasso Sea near 
Bermuda.”105 Funded largely by the US Department of Energy as well as the 
Discovery Channel, Venter and his team of scientists set sail again aboard 
the Sorcerer II in 2009, this time with the intention of traveling around the 
globe, collecting more marine microbial samples.106 Why this interest in 
marine microbes? Similar to the scientists at Amyris, Venter and many 
others saw the promise of using synthetic organisms to produce biofuels. 
However, instead of using brewer’s yeast and E. coli, in Venter’s case the 
synthetic powerhouse he had in mind for the job of biofuel production was 
a marine microbe, particularly a microalgae. This microalgae-based future 
was full of so much promise that in 2009 the oil and gas giant Exxon Mobil 
partnered with Venter’s startup Synthetic Genomics Incorporated and 
contributed $600 million to jumpstart synthetic biofuel research.
Since the 1970s, scientists have been experimenting with different 
strains of microalgae to take advantage of their ability to produce lipids, 
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which can be transformed into biofuels. The main stumbling block for 
these scientists has involved finding a microalgae that can photosynthe-
size “efficiently” enough to convert light energy and CO2 into industrial 
levels of biomass and lipid production.107 In 2017 it was announced that 
the collaboration between ExxonMobil and Synthetic Genomics had 
finally led to the creation of a synthetically engineered and phototropic 
strain of microalgae (Nannochloropsis gaditana) that would overcome these 
barriers. As the scientists of this joint venture explain in an article pub-
lished in Nature Biotechnology, they developed a CRISPR-Cas9 reverse-
genetics pipeline and used it to identify and modulate expression of a lipid 
regulator in N. gaditana, increasing its lipid production to commercially 
relevant levels. They state: “Using a microalga to produce lipids offers the 
potential advantages of being able to phototropically convert CO2 to lipids 
without relying on agriculturally derived sugars, thus mitigating the 
demand for arable land and freshwater. Our findings represent a step 
toward understanding and controlling lipid production in algae. This abil-
ity to control algal lipid production might eventually enable the commer-
cialization of microalgal-derived biofuels.”108 Cofounder, chairman, and 
co–chief scientific officer of Synthetic Genomics, Venter adds that “the SGI- 
ExxonMobil science teams have made significant advances over the last 
several years in efforts to optimize lipid production in algae. This impor-
tant publication today is evidence of this work, and we remain convinced 
that synthetic biology holds crucial answers to unlocking the potential of 
algae as a renewable energy source. We look forward to continued work 
with ExxonMobil so that eventually we will indeed have a viable alterna-
tive energy source.”109
While we learn about the promises of synthetic algae serving as a 
source of biofuel that meets our growing needs for alternative energy 
sources, we also witness the intimate partnering or placing together of 
synthetic biology research and a giant transnational oil and gas company.110 
Some of us may be reminded of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill in 1989 
and the environmental disaster that occurred in the waters off the coast of 
Prince William Sound, Alaska. Some of us may also remember the devas-
tating effects of this environmental disaster on local wildlife and the eco-
nomic effects that were felt by local indigenous communities in the 
area. Postcolonial and decolonial STS analyses urge us to recall this history 
as we attempt to reframe current microbe exploration and synthetic 
In Vitro Incubations 197
biofuel research that is being supported by ExxonMobil. We may begin to 
see a pattern of imperialist practices that include the impulses to explore 
“uncharted” spaces and to claim direct access to or ownership over natural 
resources in a faraway land—biopiracy by other means.
In this light, the vision of Venter sailing in his luxury yacht in the 
waters of the Sargasso Sea, collecting samples of microalgae to sequence 
their DNA, begins to look less like a journey of basic scientific inquiry into 
the evolution of marine life and more like the voyage of a venture capital-
ist who is shoring up promissory futures by gathering DNA samples and 
data from microbial life forms. Although patent applications were sub-
mitted for his two minimal genome organisms, Venter claims that he is 
not interested in patenting the microbial genome sequences obtained 
from the Sargasso Sea. Indeed, the strategy that he and others have dev-
eloped is not to place a patent on the “natural” genome sequence of an 
organism itself. This information is entered into public databases such as 
the National Institutes of Health’s GenBank. Rather, a patent is taken out 
on the tools and technologies developed to design and engineer synthetic 
genome organisms based on these “natural” organisms.111 
Venter has gone so far as to chastise the governments of poorer coun-
tries who share the waters of the Sargasso Sea such as Bermuda for voicing 
concern over Venter’s collection of water and soil samples from within 
their national coastal borders. In an interview with Discovery Magazine, 
Venter stated:
Most of the ocean is claimed by one or more countries. A lot of politics 
is building up around this thing. So now we’re evil because we’re putting 
data in the public domain. A group of people who are following every-
thing we do is putting out a lot of false information. You go on to some 
Web sites, and they say we’re trying to patent everything. [Interviewer: 
Are you?] No, and that’s the ultimate irony. We’re doing the stuff and 
giving it to the world, and now it’s evil because all these poor little coun-
tries like Bermuda want to profit somehow from this data. They don’t 
realize that they can profit from the knowledge. I think people just like 
to attack what we’re doing because we’re always on the leading edge.112
It is unclear what the distinction is that Venter is trying to make by chas-
tising so-called “poor countries” for wanting to profit from the data when 
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Venter’s own privately held company Synthetic Genomics is poised to profit 
enormously from the commercial applications made possible by the very 
same data. 
In an interview with Bio-IT World, Venter was reported to have said: 
“It was a big surprise to me that there’s very little international waters 
left. I thought I was out sailing free in the ocean and somebody’s claimed 
it all.”113 Venter’s desire to sail free into the Sargasso Sea, and to sequence 
the genome of all the organisms he could find, paints a familiar picture of 
neoliberal forms of imperialism and individualism. In 2007, Venter took 
pride in this individualism while appearing on the talk show The Colbert 
Report to promote his book A Life Decoded: My Genome, My Life. Having 
unveiled his own genome sequence and made it publicly available on the 
internet, Venter said, “I think we found that we’re far more different than 
each other than we thought even a few years ago. We’re 1 to 2% different 
instead of one letter out of a thousand base pairs. We don’t all have the 
same genes—we have major differences. As an individualist, I find that 
very encouraging.”114 Venter sees himself as an individualist and is 
delighted to have discovered that humans are more different from each 
other, by an entire order of magnitude. Basically, he is happy to announce 
that he is even more different from his human others than he previously 
thought. This understanding of difference is motivated by individualism 
and is not the proliferative difference found in Deleuze’s ontology of uni-
vocity. Postcolonial and decolonial STS analyses would have us consider 
what the consequences will be of this newer version of an old worldview, 
whereby the white male human subject gets to distance himself even fur-
ther from his human others, let alone the nonhuman synthetic others that 
he creates.
Years ago, in her essay “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Impe-
rialism,” Gayatri Spivak also took us on a voyage to the Sargasso Sea. 
Writing about the crucial role of imperialism in the “cultural representa-
tion of England to the English,” she directed us to the novel Wide Sar-
gasso Sea (1966) written by Jean Rhys, as well as Charlotte Bronte’s Jane 
Eyre (1847) and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), to argue that the 
“project of imperialism has always already historically refracted what 
might have been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other that 
consolidates the imperialist self.” Spivak wrote this article mainly as a 
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postcolonial critique of nineteenth-century English literature that pro-
moted feminist individualism; however, she also pointed out that the 
continued success of the imperialist project is due to it being “displaced 
and dispersed into more modern forms.”115 When Spivak published this 
piece in 1985, I don’t think she was thinking about synthetic biology, 
minimal genome organisms, or the production of biofuels by nonhuman, 
nonanimal, marine microbes in the Sargasso Sea as modern forms of the 
imperialist project. But who knows, perhaps she was, for the imperialist 
project that Spivak describes in the three novels above speaks surpris-
ingly well to the neo liberal practices being co-constituted with synthetic 
biology today. 
For instance, in Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhys tells us the story of a white 
Creole woman from Jamaica. The novel delivers the untold story of Bertha 
Mason, the “mad” West Indian woman in Bronte’s Jane Eyre who is locked 
up in her husband’s house in England but in the end manages to escape, 
burn down the house, and take her own life. Born in Dominica in 1890, 
and being of white Creole descent herself, Rhys saw the injustice being 
played out in Bronte’s literary treatment of Caribbean women through 
the character depiction of Bertha. Wide Sargasso Sea is written as a prequel 
to Jane Eyre and tells the heart-wrenching story of Antoinette (renamed 
Bertha) Mason’s life, with a backdrop in a time and place when the eman-
cipation of slaves was under way in the British colonies of both Jamaica 
and Dominica. Rhys’s novel, in its own way, addresses the cost of British 
imperialism on human lives by attempting to give a voice to the other 
within Bronte’s text. In her critique of Wide Sargasso Sea, however, Spivak 
suggests that the story of Antoinette, presented as the unwritten story of 
a white Creole woman, in fact “reinscribes” the weighty absence of the 
other in Bronte’s Jane Eyre. “As the female individualist, not-quite/not-
male, articulates herself in shifting relationship to what is at stake,” Spivak 
writes, “the ‘native female’ as such (within discourse, as a signifier) is 
excluded from any share in this emerging norm.”116 
Much in the same vein that Antoinette or Bertha’s story is absent in 
Jane Eyre, Spivak notes that “Christophine’s unfinished story is the tan-
gent” in Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea.117 In the novel, Christophine is a black 
woman from Martinique who practices obeah, was given to Antoinette’s 
mother as a wedding gift, and serves as Antoinette’s nurse. Although 
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Christophine’s character is given a crucial role in the novel, much like 
Bertha in Bronte’s text, Christophine disappears in Wide Sargasso Sea 
after confronting Antoinette’s husband, who embodies the mission of 
British imperialism. There is a distinction to be drawn, however, in the 
disappearance of Christophine and the limited depiction of Bertha. As 
Spivak suggests: 
She [Christophine] cannot be contained by a novel which rewrites a 
canonical English text within the European novelistic tradition in the 
interest of the white Creole rather than the native. . . . Attempts to 
 construct the “Third World Woman” as a signifier remind us that the 
hegemonic definition of literature is itself caught within the history  
of imperialism. A full literary reinscription cannot easily flourish in  
the imperialist fracture or discontinuity, covered over by an alien legal 
system masquerading as Law as such, an alien ideology established as 
only Truth, and a set of human sciences busy establishing the “native” 
as self-consolidating Other.118
Spivak points out that although such novels as Wide Sargasso Sea and Jane 
Eyre are often celebrated as proto-feminist works, they also promote 
forms of feminist individualism that feed into the imperialist project. 
Through these literatures we can see how such individualism was only able 
to occur through the subjugation of others. Spivak is critical of the glori-
fication of feminist individualism, for she argues that “what is at stake . . . 
in the age of imperialism, is precisely the making of human beings, the 
constitution and ‘interpellation’ of the subject not only as individual but 
as ‘individualist.’”119 In an era of biocapital, the self-interest of individual-
ism and the legacy of the imperialist project collide in fascinating ways. 
Of course, it goes without saying that the self-interest of the individualist 
gels very nicely with the subject formation necessary to propel oneself 
forward in a global economy based on such neoliberal values. It is this very 
skill set that is required for one to venture and set sail, as Venter and oth-
ers have done, into a life of biopiracy.
This chapter has covered a great deal of ground (and water). I have 
interrogated two main challenges we will face as we turn our attention 
toward the in vitro, the molecular, the synthetic, and the nonhuman. First, 
we must consider the question of what constitutes life and the living, and 
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second, we must figure out how to orient these questions so as not to leave 
the human behind. Interdisciplinary incubations produced through the 
encounters between molecular biology, feminism, postcolonial theory, 
and decolonial studies will be key in addressing these challenges. As we 
learn how to see the world and furthermore, how to encounter that world, 




Science in Our Backyards
| grass · root |
the root of a plant of grass
—Oxford English Dictionary
| grass · roots |
the most basic level of activity or organization
—Oxford Living Dictionaries
The term “grassroots” is a plural noun that has found its way into all sorts 
of political spaces. It seems that these days everyone is organizing in 
some way or another at the grassroots level. Grassroots movements range 
from those that work tirelessly to save the planet, those that travel door-
to-door campaigning for a political candidate, those that strive to end 
gendered violence, to those that work fearlessly against racial and social 
injustices, such as Black Lives Matter. It is interesting to think about the 
properties or qualities that actually make an organization or movement 
into one that is considered to be “grassroots.” If, as it is defined by the 
Oxford Living Dictionaries, for something to qualify as being “grassroots” 
it must meet the most basic level of activity or organization, then the ques-
tion becomes, Who or what counts as being “basic”? Who or what decides 
how we discern what constitutes a “level”? What boundaries and borders 
are we dealing with here? 
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For instance, starting as a call to action against state-sanctioned vio-
lence and anti–black racism, Black Lives Matter proudly stands as a lead-
erless social justice movement that is instead “member-led.” Does being 
“member-led” count as being a grassroots organization or an activity that 
takes place at the most “basic level”? The movement does affirm several 
key ideas and aspirations that serve as the organization’s guiding princi-
ples. As one of the most powerful movements of our time, Black Lives 
Matter encourages its members to work toward and affirm values of diver-
sity, restorative justice, globalism, collective value, empathy, and loving 
engagement. The movement is intergenerational, queer and transgender 
affirming, and unapologetically black, affirming black villages, black 
women, and black families.1 As inspiring as these principles are, how is it 
that a member-led organization—one that is comprised of a global net-
work—can aspire to build upon so many rich, but also disparate, princi-
ples? How does a grassroots movement such as this take action? 
Many grassroots movements, including Black Lives Matter, are built 
on the idea that everyday people can come together to organize and effect 
change. This indeed is the beauty and hallmark of doing things the grass-
roots way. Yet many such “member-led” movements commonly face criti-
cisms for being “horizontal” rather than “vertical” in their organizational 
structure—that is, without a clear hierarchy in their leadership. In their 
contribution to the anthology Urban Policy in the Time of Obama, Lorraine 
Minnite and Frances Fox Piven have commented on the capacity of hori-
zontal movements to exercise power. They explain that a “vertical” orga-
nization is mainly defined by unequal social relations of status and class, 
and that although they suggest that there is a chance for those at the 
bottom of this vertical organization to access power, this access mostly 
comes from “locating vulnerabilities” within a hierarchical structure.2 
Minnite and Piven go on to say that those at the bottom of a vertical orga-
nization can still effect change by “scale jumping” or, in other words, by 
overcoming institutional hierarchies that “lock in place the deep inequal-
ities of urban life.” 
Alternatively, they explain that horizontal urban social movements 
work as lateral networks of support.3 For these lateral networks to func-
tion, they must overcome several boundaries and borders by building 
coalitions through common interests. Interestingly, however, Minnite and 
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Piven suggest that in both the cases of vertical and horizontal organi-
zational structures, change is produced through “disruptive action.” They 
explain: “In this sense, movement activities and actions do not so much 
‘jump scale’ . . . ; rather, the effects of their actions pulse like electricity 
through the nodes of networked relations, both horizontal and vertical, 
the energy reconfiguring those relations to shrink the spaces in between, 
and bend authority in a favorable direction.” The definition of “disruption” 
that Minnite and Piven are working with here relates to urban social 
movements and refers specifically to “actions that withdraw contributions 
to social cooperation within institutional arrangements.”4 
Yet, as members of the Black Lives Matter movement would present 
the results of their collective efforts, it appears that the definition of what 
gets to count as a “disruptive action” in an urban movement is far more 
varied than simply withdrawing one’s contribution to institutional arrange-
ments. In fact, if one goes onto the Black Lives Matter website, they will 
find a link called “Take Action.” If one follows that link, further options to 
either “Find an Action” or “Take an Action” are presented. According to the 
movement, the disruptive actions that have been taken by their members 
have led to a number of accomplishments, having “ousted anti-Black politi-
cians, won critical legislation to benefit Black lives, and changed the terms 
of the debate on Blackness around the world.”5 It would appear that this 
grassroots, member-led movement, which is supposedly operating at the 
“most basic level,” can accomplish extremely complex tasks and effect 
change at many different ways.
This book is not about urban social movements. Yet it is predicated on 
the idea that by the mere act of pronouncing “molecular feminisms,” the 
reader will have engaged in several disruptive actions. The first disruptive 
action comes from the fact that the two fields, molecular biology and 
feminism, have been kept apart. For many reasons, including institutional 
structures and disciplinary gate keeping, the two fields rarely have a 
chance to “shrink the spaces in between” them. A second disruptive action 
of molecular feminisms follows from the fact that although this book 
brings together the topics of feminism and science, it does not do so by 
turning to predominant or majoritarian discourses of gender equality or 
banal pipeline metaphors that usually accompany most women and sci-
ence projects. It reaches instead toward those minor literatures or less 
explored lines of inquiry that are invested in questions of ontology, ethics, 
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epistemology, and everything else in between that goes into the political 
act of knowledge-making. Lastly, thinking with molecular feminisms 
serves as a disruptive action because at the heart of this project is precisely 
the idea that molecular biology itself can provide us with creative ways to 
enact critical disruptions and thereby reconfigure dominant relations.
Discussing urban social movements, Minnite and Piven describe the 
effect of movement activities and actions as a “pulse of electricity” that 
“moves through both nodes and networks” in order to reconfigure rela-
tions. It is here, in their description of how a disruptive action works, I real-
ize that in writing a book on molecular biology, feminist theory, Deleuzian 
philosophies, postcolonial theory, and decolonial studies, I might have been 
trying to describe strategies of horizontal social movements all along. The 
only difference is that what counts as “social” in my case has not been 
limited to the human experience. It has included not only humans but all 
nonhumans, including organic and inorganic others. My understanding 
of the social has even included “raw” matter. Molecular feminisms, biophi-
losophies of becoming, and microphysiologies of desire all attempt to 
reframe these social relations by turning to ontological and ethical maneu-
vers that create movement and disruptive actions along a horizontal plane. 
These social relations include those between the humanities and sci-
ences, culture and biology, feminist theorists and feminist scientists, and 
between the knower and what is to become the known. To reframe these 
relations, I have taken us back to the actual physical and material pulses 
of electricity that Jagadish Chandra Bose reported to have measured when 
he was conducting his experiments on the capacity for response in plants. 
Developed by an anticolonial figure, who conducted scientific research as 
a colonial subject under British rule, I have used Bose’s work to theorize 
a different understanding of “response” that may be useful to both femi-
nism and biology. Similarly, I have brought forward the work of such sci-
entists as Barbara McClintock and Lynn Margulis, who may not have 
referred to themselves as feminists but whose intimate scientific inquiries 
of chromosomes and bacteria can serve to address some of the most press-
ing questions in feminist theory and feminist STS today. 
Each of these scientists—Bose, McClintock, and Margulis—were mar-
ginalized within their scientific communities for different reasons in their 
day. Yet their theories and research findings have lived on and now con-
tribute to our efforts to bend scientific authority and to produce knowledge 
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that is otherwise. My reason for sharing their scientific work has been the 
hope that by learning about their disruptive actions, we as feminist scien-
tists, scientist feminists, and all other invested parties may also be called 
to action. Like the strategies of horizontal urban social movements, much 
of our efforts actually need to start locally, in our own backyards as it were. 
Practice-oriented feminist STS approaches can help in this regard by pro-
viding us with the everyday knowledge and tools to conduct our experi-
ments. Doing science in our backyards could include setting up local science 
shops where experts from a diverse range of knowledge bases come 
together, through a shared common interest, to solve local problems. It 
could involve creating feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial technoscience 
salons where academics learn to bring their research into interdisciplinary 
conversations. It could involve creating shared community maker spaces 
that prioritize the involvement of typically marginalized groups. It could 
even involve setting up interdisciplinary mentoring structures that sup-
port the radical act of having feminist scientists practice both their science 
and their feminism at the lab bench.
Lastly, I want to address the first definition of “grass root” placed at the 
start of this conclusion. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a “grass 
root” is a noun that can be defined simply as the “root of a plant of grass.” 
Yet, if I have succeeded in any way at all in writing this book, it should be 
evident by now that the coming together of stolons, rhizomes, roots, 
shoots, and molecular politics in the event that is becoming a blade of grass 
is anything but simple or inconsequential. I learned this lesson myself 
not from arboreal thought but from a tree that fell in my backyard.
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Glossary
agrostologist: A scientist who studies the branch of botany concerned with 
grasses.
alloplastic: A term used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to describe the 
social and cultural stratum.
anticolonial: A position held by a person or a country that opposes 
colonialism.
applied ethics of matter: A way of putting one’s ontological and ethical posi-
tions into action.
assemblage: An “assemblage” holds a heterogeneous collection of compo-
nents or elements together through complex sets of relations. It is also  
an ontological framework developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari  
to understand the multiple couplings and various combinations of bodies, 
expressions, institutions, and signs.
becoming: This philosophical concept emphasizes the capacities of flux and 
change, where the properties and components of nature are understood  
in terms of process and events.
bench science: Scientific research that is conducted in a laboratory at a bench.
biophilosophies of becoming: An ontological approach to thinking about the 
properties and components of nature as they relate to our research in biol-
ogy and our approach to biological matter.
bodies without organs (BwO): A phrase used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari that is not a stance against organs themselves. It is an attempt  
to think in a way that does not organize and produce boundaries around 
objects, but rather opens up our thought to the possibilities of broader 
connections and intensities (dis-organ-ization).
continental philosophy: Philosophical traditions that emerged in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries out of Europe.
cosmopolitics: A term used by Isabelle Stengers to describe an approach that 
does not avoid risks while working toward an experimental togetherness 
between two different communities of knowers.
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decolonial/decolonizing: Terms initially used by an emerging Latin American 
scholarly movement that applies critical theory to and from within ethnic 
studies to think about modernity and coloniality.
deterritorialization: The act of thinking otherwise and questioning those 
modes of analysis that claim to hold a position of organized or authorita-
tive knowledge.
epigenetics: Literally meaning “that which is above the gene,” epigenetics is 
the study of how heritable traits can be modified by nongenetic and/or 
environmental factors.
epistemology: The theory of how we know what we know.
essentialism: The belief that there is a real and invariable nature at the root of 
any given thing.
estrogens: A group of steroid hormones derived from cholesterol that plays  
a role in growth, development, and reproductive functions.
ethico-onto-epistemological: A term used by Karen Barad to describe the 
simultaneous events of learning how to see the world, learning how we 
come to know the world, and thinking about how we learn to approach 
that world.
feeling around for the organism: The book puts forward this approach as  
a way to think about our encounters with the world. It belongs to a group 
of microphysiologies of desire proposed throughout the book that serves 
as an applied ethics of matter. It is a way to think about the relationship 
between the knower and the known. 
haecceity: A Latin-derived term that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari use  
to describe an event that exists on a plane of immanence.
humanism: A system of thought whereby humans as well as their actions, 
 values, and interests are placed at the center of inquiry.
hylomorphism: A tradition of philosophical thought that views matter as 
being passive or inert until it assumes a pre-given form.
hylozoism: A tradition of philosophical thought that recognizes the expression 
of certain capacities in all forms of matter.
immanence: Central to Gilles Deleuze’s ontology, this concept puts forth the 
idea that all becomings exist beside or with other becomings upon a hori-
zontal plane of immanence. This concept is contrasted with the concept of 
transcendence, which Deleuze associates with a Platonic and hierarchical 
distinction between matter and form and with fixed or essentialized traits.
immunostaining: An antibody-based method used to detect a specific protein 
in a sample.
intra-action: This term, used by Karen Barad, describes the mutual constitu-
tion of agents that are always entangled with each other.
in vitro: A process that takes place outside of a living organism or body. 
Throughout this book in vitro refers to scientific research that takes place 
within cell cultures rather than in whole animal models.
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kinship: A relation made possible by developing connections and ties with oth-
ers. Rather than seeing genetic or blood relations as the only way to form 
kin, feminist scholars have expanded the scope of who and what we are 
able to connect with and respond to and thus consider to be kin.
machinic assemblage: Similar to an assemblage, the machine assemblage is 
more about an approach to thinking rather than actual machines. It con-
siders the monstrous couplings of heterogeneous components that go into 
the making of all actants.
major/majoritarian: Belonging to a well-established or dominant mode of 
thought.
materialism: Theories that deal with matter and/or material goods and place 
significance on their roles in constituting all phenomena.
metaphysics: This branch of philosophy deals with such ideas as cosmology, 
being (ontology), and knowledge (epistemology).
microphysiologies of desire: This term describes the approaches we use to 
move forward in our encounters with others. Microphysiologies of desire 
provide frameworks for putting our ethical positions into action. They  
are related to biophilosophies of becoming in the sense that ontology and 
ethics are also always related, if not the same thing. All microphysiologies 
of desire work by helping us to (1) cultivate an openness to nonhuman 
becomings and the capacity for changefulness; (2) make connections through 
kinship and sensing hylozoism; and (3) create movement by way of univoc-
ity and immanence. 
micropolitics: Refers to those politics that do not follow our dominant habits 
or usual modes of engagement.
minimal genome organism: An organism whose genome has been reduced  
to a bare minimum number of genes required for growth and division of 
that organism.
minor/minoritarian: Belonging to a less explored or marginalized mode of 
thought.
molar: In chemistry this pertains to a solution containing one mole of a solute 
per liter of solution. A term also used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
to describe an ontology of being that is tied to fixed identities.
molecular: Relating to molecules, this term used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari describes an ontology of becoming that examines actants in terms 
of processes. Also used to describe minoritarian projects or politics. 
monism: A concept that attributes a oneness to nature. 
naturecultures: Coined by Donna Haraway, this term describes the commin-
gling and co-constitutive properties of all things previously considered to 
be separate through such categories as nature and culture.
neuroendocrinology: A branch of the life sciences that studies the physiologi-
cal interactions between the nervous system and hormones of the endo-
crine system.
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onto-ethical: A term used to describe the idea that our theories on how to 
come to see the world are in and of themselves also always about questions 
of  ethics, or questions about how to approach and treat that world.
ontology: A theory of being, or in the case of Gilles Deleuze and other philoso-
phers, a theory of becoming. In other words, a theory of how we come to 
be and how we see the world.
Petri dish: A transparent, circular, and flat dish that is used to support cell 
 cultures and/or study microorganisms in the lab. 
plasmid: A small and circular double-stranded piece of DNA that is distinct  
from an organism’s chromosomal DNA. Plasmids are generally found in 
bacteria.
postcolonial: Refers to the period following colonialism but also the study  
of the political, institutional, and cultural effects of colonialism and 
imperialism.
posthumanism: Although this term can be understood as meaning after or 
beyond the human, it is also a field of scholarly inquiry that is critical of 
humanism and attempts to decenter the human and human values and 
interest from our inquiries.
process ontology: A theory of being that is based on the idea that all beings 
are becomings and that there is a dynamic nature to all entities.
receptor: A protein structure that binds with substances such as hormones, 
drugs, or neurotransmitters.
rhizome: A continuously growing horizontal stem that grows underground 
and that can produce shoots and roots leading to the generation of new 
plants.
stolon: Also referred to as a runner in agricultural terms, the stolon is a stem 
system that grows above ground by developing new shoots and extending 
itself horizontally. The stems of a stoloniferous plant grow by sensing light 
and sending out aerial shoots. Other than cespitose grasses, all other 
grasses grow as rhizomes or stolons. Whereas rhizomes grow beneath the 
surface of the soil, stolons grow and move above ground.
strata/stratification: Terms used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to 
describe a kind of grouping or a process of taking on particular forms and 
expressions.
subcloning: A recombinant DNA technology used to amplify a short segment 
of DNA by inserting it into a vector or plasmid that can be further 
replicated.
symbiosis: An evolutionary theory developed by Lynn Margulis that describes 
how the relationships between different organisms are the driving force  
of evolution.
synthetic biology: A field of research that brings together advances in biology, 
chemistry, genetics, computer science, and engineering to provide toolkits 
for the design of biological systems.
taxonomy: The science and practices of classification.
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teleology: A direct or linear arc of events or reason used to explain a purpose 
or end goal.
transcendence: Although this term has several meanings, it is used here in the 
Deleuzian sense of being superior to or surpassing a level of existence and/
or expression. Rather than immanence, which is understood as remaining 
with or beside something, “transcendence” is understood as being that is 
beyond or outside.
transcription: The process whereby DNA serves as a template for the produc-
tion of messenger RNA.
transgenic: A term used to describe an organism that contains genetic material 
from another organism. Also describes the technologies used to introduce 
foreign genes.
translation: The process whereby messenger RNA is used to form a chain of 
nucleotides that in turn become a protein.
transpositions: The process of horizontal transfer of genetic materials between 
organisms. The process of “jumping genes” and the existence of transpos-
able elements or transposons was discovered by Barbara McClintock.
univocity: A concept that everything shares a kind of oneness. This oneness 
does not mean that everything is identical or that there is no chance for 
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